Western Front 1941 commanders. Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos

The encirclement of the main forces of the Western Front in the summer of 1941 is one of the greatest tragedies in the history of Russian weapons, standing on a par with the battle on the Kalka River in 1223 or the death of Samsonov's army in East Prussia in the summer of 1914. Yes, during the Great Patriotic War we also had large losses, but this tragedy happened first, and it was this tragedy that largely determined the further unfavorable development of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front ...

Recognized that the main fault in the fact that the German attack turned out to be unexpected for the covering troops of the western border districts and for the entire Red Army lies with the top leadership of the country. But questions remain. The main one, in my opinion, is the following: where does the responsibility of Stalin and his inner circle end and the responsibility of a lower level, the front command, begins? The relevance of the issue is determined by the highest price paid for the mistakes made.

The country's leadership reacted to the growing flow of reports about the concentration of German troops to the western borders of the USSR with a partial call-up of reserve troops. About 800 thousand people - out of the 5 million planned in the event of full mobilization - replenished the divisions of the western districts in May-June. June 12 People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko signed directives on the advancement of infantry divisions located in the rear areas of the border districts to the border. However, due to the lack of vehicles, they moved extremely slowly. By a resolution of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, the armies of the second strategic echelon, advanced from the depths of the country to the Dnieper-Western Dvina line, were united in the High Command reserve group - the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies.

However, the advancing troops were not equipped with sufficient numbers of people and equipment, and arrived to the west in parts. Worst of all was the readiness of the covering troops to repulse sudden aggression. At the direction of I.V. Stalin, the commanders of the troops of the districts were warned by G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Tymoshenko both about the need to increase vigilance and to prevent reasons for provocation. Any measures that could be interpreted by the command of the Wehrmacht as bringing the Soviet troops to full combat readiness were suppressed by the Kremlin in the strictest way.

The result is known. The troops of the Wehrmacht and its allies brought to full combat readiness - about 4.4 million people, 4 thousand tanks, 4.4 thousand aircraft opposed in the west, although large in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft - 11 thousand and 9.1 thousand, but not combat-ready, a three-million-strong Soviet grouping that was at the stage of formation and did not have a plan for a deep defensive operation. The defense was presented to the Soviet command as a short-term phase of the initial period of hostilities ...

Could the commanders of the troops of the border districts in any way influence the situation and thereby mitigate the tragic consequences of reinsurance and indecision of the top leadership?

By the beginning of the war, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was subordinate to the administrations of the 3rd, 10th, 4th armies, located in the immediate vicinity of the border, and the 13th - in the rear area of ​​​​the district. 678 thousand people, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2,200 tanks and more than 1.5 thousand aircraft. With approximate equality in aircraft, the district was inferior to the Army Group Center in terms of people and artillery, but it was one and a half times superior in tanks. The 6th mechanized corps of General M. Khatskilevich was considered the most complete armored unit in the Red Army - 1.022 tanks, of which 352 KV and T-34. However, most of the tanks were outdated T-26s and BTs.

Information about the deployment of the offensive grouping of the Wehrmacht on the other side of the border began to arrive at the headquarters of the ZapVO from the beginning of 1941. On June 4, the head of the intelligence department of the district headquarters, Colonel Blokhin, presented General Pavlov with a special report "On Germany's preparations for war against the USSR." As noted, in the second half of May, the Germans reinforced their grouping by 2-3 infantry, two armored divisions and an SS division. At the border, the deployment of air defense and anti-tank weapons was noticed. The unloading by the Germans of a large number of trains with aerial bombs, gunpowder, landing at airfields of large aviation formations was established. The movement of the local population in the border zone was reduced to a minimum, and from many areas they were evicted to the "deep regions". All civilian medical institutions in large cities and towns were engaged in hospitals. Intelligence reported that "the covert mobilization of officials for future positions in western regions of the USSR... In Czech Prague, there are paratrooper courses, for which members of the Belarusian committee from Warsaw are mobilized. At the beginning of hostilities, they will be thrown into the rear of Soviet Belarus to carry out sabotage tasks ... "

The following paragraph of the special message attracted attention: "On May 24, 1941, the branch of German intelligence in

Ciechanow sent five agents to the territory of the USSR with instructions to return no later than June 5, 1941. One of the agents said that he would not have time to return from Bialystok and Grodno by this date. The head of the intelligence point answered this: after June 5, hostilities with the USSR are possible, therefore he cannot guarantee the life of an agent ... "All agents received, among other things, the following tasks: to establish the percentage of former tsarist officers who are in the Red Army, and the mood of the population living in the border areas.

Undercover data confirmed that "the Polish population, based on the experience of preparing the war between Germany and Poland in 1939, and the German soldiers, based on the existing experience of waging war, also consider the start of hostilities with the USSR in the near future inevitable."

The head of the intelligence department came to the conclusion: "Information about the forced preparation of the theater and about the strengthening of the grouping of troops in the zone against the ZapOVO is trustworthy."

It is clear that the Kremlin and the General Staff were informed. But how did Pavlov himself react to detailed information about German preparations for war? We are helped to answer this question by materials prepared after the war, when the cases against Generals Pavlov, Klimovsky, Korobkov and others began to be reviewed for the purpose of rehabilitation.

Here is what, for example, the former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the ZapVO, Major General B. Fomin, wrote:

"Pavlov carefully monitored the preparation of the theater of operations ... Field defensive zones with bunkers were created along the entire length of the border. As for the levels, they were not built and armed by the beginning of the war. Carefully monitoring the deployment of enemy troops, Pavlov repeatedly raised a question with the People's Commissar of Defense about the redeployment of the district's troops from the depths to the border area ... However, the 113th, 121st, 143rd and 50th rifle divisions did not have time to go to the areas they planned and the war caught them on the march .. .

By the beginning of the war, the troops of the district were in the stage of organizational measures. Five tank corps, an airborne corps were being formed... The material supply was slow... The district aviation was in the stage of pilot training on the incoming new materiel, but there were few retrained crews.

Pavlov knew about the preparation by the Germans of a surprise attack (italics ours. - M.M.) and asked to occupy field fortifications along the state border. On June 20, 1941, in a ciphertext signed by the deputy. Vasilevsky, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Pavlov was informed that his request was reported to the People's Commissar and the latter did not allow him to occupy the field fortifications, as this could cause a provocation on the part of the Germans ... "

In the actions and deeds of Pavlov, General Fomin did not see wrecking, much less betrayal. In his opinion, the front failed for the following reasons: the numerical superiority of the enemy; surprise attack; inadequate provision of air defense systems; the lack of reserves and a defensive line along the Shchara River at the front and the withdrawal of troops from it on the night of the first to the second day of the war, "as a result of which the enemy, having occupied it without hindrance, created conditions for encircling the troops of the 3rd and 10th armies"; belated occupation of the ur lines along the old state border by troops

13th Army, the illiterate intervention of Marshal G.I. sent by Stalin from Moscow. Kulik at the disposal of the Deputy Front Commander I.V. Boldin and commander of the 10th Army K.D. Golubev, "which led to the inglorious end of the mobile front group."

In the note, Fomin also mentioned the former chief of staff of the front, Major General Klimovskikh, who, in his opinion, was distinguished by "great efficiency and honesty." However, he noted the chief of staff's lack of "a sober assessment of the enemy and his capabilities. Klimovskikh did not believe that the enemy was able to plan his initial operation so far and deliver massive air strikes far into the depth."

In conclusion, Fomin wrote that all the generals he listed, who were arrested and shot in the summer of 1941, “were cut off from command and control at the moment when, through their efforts, the pace of the enemy’s operation began to fade, and command and control of the troops was getting better.”

Fomin's opinion is worthy of attention, but, unfortunately, it leaves out the question: if Pavlov knew that the Germans were preparing a "sudden" attack, what did he actually do - not in words, but in deeds - in order not to lose all their strength in the first days of the war?

preserved a note and the former commander of the 3rd Army, Colonel-General V.I. Kuznetsova. It said:

“All the commanders of the armies, including myself, reported to Pavlov about the completely open preparation of the Germans for the war. For example, we accurately established the concentration of large German forces in the Augustow forests southeast of Suwalki.

We also had anonymous letters in our hands, which indicated the approximate time for the Germans to go on the offensive - June 21, 22, 23. Nevertheless, Pavlov, a few days before the start of the war, ordered all artillery to be sent for artillery firing several hundred kilometers from the front line ... "

Further, Kuznetsov said that he considered Marshal Kulik's instruction to organize a counterattack on June 24 by army units in the general direction of Grodno-Suwalki in order to secure the flank of the front strike group consisting of the 10th Army and Khatskilevich's mechanized corps from the north as incorrect. The fact is that the corps then had only one and a half refuelings of fuel, the front's aviation was defeated, the flanks of the front were open. According to Kuznetsov, the most reasonable would be a transition to "mobile defense" and a counterattack on the rear of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, which was rapidly advancing towards Baranovichi from the southwest.

Kuznetsov did not see anything treacherous in the actions of Pavlov or Klimovsky, but noted that they "simply failed to master and cope with the situation of the initial period of the war."

Indeed, the opinion that Pavlov and his staff "did not master and cope with the situation" in the initial period of the war seems to be correct. But hardly anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the troops of the Western Front even under a different, more strong-willed or more experienced commander. However, it is obvious that the origins of the tragedy of the Western Front were laid in the pre-war period, and General Pavlov did not do everything possible to prevent the worst-case scenario of hostilities. One example of this is the case with the artillery of the front, brought out just before the war to the rear for firing. It can be assumed that Pavlov's intuition failed here, but one can also think about a certain negligence shown by the employees of the headquarters of the ZapVO.

The lack of proper exactingness in the command of the ZapVO - as well as in the command of the KVO - is evident from the example of the construction of operational airfields in these districts. After all, it was precisely because of the lack of a sufficient number of landing sites that the aviation of the Western Front on the first day of the war lost about 750 combat vehicles, which amounted to about 60 percent of all our aircraft destroyed on June 22 ...

June 18 In 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense issued Order No. 0039 "On the state of construction of operational airfields according to the main construction plan of 1941." It said: “The situation with the construction of operational airfields is amazingly bad. As of June 1 this year, only 50 percent of the plan approved by me has been covered by the construction ... Construction is especially bad in the KVO and ZapVO. The main reason is the lack of exactingness on the part of the military councils of the districts , the failure to take decisive and exhaustive measures to use all the possibilities on the ground".

It is possible to dispute the accusations made in this document, signed, by the way, by S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov. Interestingly, his last paragraph read: "Additional limits on fuel will not be given," so it is necessary "to involve more horse transport and grabars in the construction." It is known that the commanders sorely lacked either the strength or the means to build airfields, but it must be admitted that they were not responsible for peaceful construction and were not simple administrators. They were responsible for the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. It was about the combat readiness of aviation, which in the event of war was supposed to cover their subordinate personnel and equipment ... It is no coincidence, apparently, that General Pavlov’s losses in aviation turned out to be much higher than on neighboring fronts. Most of his aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

Nevertheless, it is hardly productive to compare the degree of competence of one or another commander in the pre-war period or at the beginning of the war. It is very difficult to determine whose mistakes were harder and who behaved more competently. KVO - the Southwestern Front - met the enemy invasion in a somewhat more organized manner than other districts, but it was also the most powerful district in the Red Army. The PribVO - the North-Western Front - also managed to retreat without such severe losses as on the Western Front, but a smaller grouping of Wehrmacht troops operated in the Baltic states. The German command aimed two tank groups at once to defeat our troops in Belarus, which objectively created the prerequisites for the encirclement of our large forces near Bialystok and Minsk.

First of all, you need to look for common mistakes made by the command of the districts. The military councils could take more intensive measures aimed at reducing losses in the event of sudden aggression. These include the creation of minefields in the directions of the alleged enemy strikes, preparations for the explosion of bridges across border rivers, more active construction of airfields and the dispersal of aviation on them, the organization of reliable protection of communication lines - all these measures are purely defensive and could not give rise to a German provocation . Everything turned out differently: German tanks captured the bridges across the Bug intact, and the communication lines cut in the first hours of the war brought chaos to the organization of command and control. The high pace of the German advance to the east was predetermined from the very beginning.

Troops were not mentally prepared for the attack of the enemy. The war was expected, and at the same time they did not want to say goodbye to a peaceful life. Yes, there was a TASS report of June 14, but there was also a lack of strict discipline in the troops themselves. Demandingness was replaced by complacency, which was not long in affecting on the first day of the war. The soldiers and commanders then experienced the greatest shock, which can be judged from the text of the cipher message of the military council of the Western Front to subordinate troops, sent on the evening of June 22, 1941.

“The experience of the first day of the war,” it said, “shows the disorganization and carelessness of many commanders, including big bosses. They begin to think about providing fuel, shells, and cartridges only at a time when cartridges are already running out, while a huge mass of vehicles busy with the evacuation of the families of the commanding staff, who are also accompanied by the Red Army, that is, people of the combat crew. The wounded are not evacuated from the battlefield, the soldiers and commanders are not organized to rest, when they leave, cattle, food are left to the enemy ... "

The ciphergram was signed by D. Pavlov, A. Fominykh (a member of the military council of the front), V. Klimovskikh.

Unfortunately, the blame for the panic that began on the first day of the war, confusion, deviations from the rules of the charter lies largely with the generals themselves, who signed this document. But can the punishment that befell them be considered just? Was their condemnation to death an attempt at self-justification of the country's top leadership?

Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In the pictures: General of the Army D.G. Pavlov; they fought to the end.

75 years ago, exactly one month after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army Dmitry Pavlov, was shot.

Pavlov was executed in Moscow and buried at the NKVD training ground in Butovo.

Until recently, he, along with Georgy Zhukov, was considered the most powerful and promising commander of the Red Army.

“For cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without the permission of the high command, the collapse of command and control, inaction of the authorities,” the verdict read.

In the draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0250 with the announcement of the verdict, brought to the troops on July 28, these words were inscribed by Stalin's hand.

Six more generals shared the fate of Pavlov at the same time or a little later: Chief of Staff of the Front Vladimir Klimovskikh, Chief of Artillery Nikolai Klich, Deputy Chief of the Air Force Andrei Tayursky, Chief of Communications Andrei Grigoriev, Commander of the 4th Army Alexander Korobkov and Commander of the 14th Mechanized Corps Stepan Oborin.

The head of the air force of the front, Major General Ivan Kopets, on June 22, according to some sources, committed suicide, according to others, he was killed while resisting the Chekists who came after him.

Pavlov's wife, son, parents and mother-in-law were exiled to the Krasnoyarsk Territory as the family of a traitor to the motherland, although treason was not mentioned in the verdict. Except for the son, no one returned from Siberia.

On July 31, 1957, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR overturned the sentences against the command of the Western Front due to the absence of corpus delicti in the actions of the convicts. They were posthumously restored in titles and awards.

An important role was played by a note by Colonel General Leonid Sandalov, in June 1941, the chief of staff of the 4th Army.

Legally, the "i" dotted. Historians continue to argue about the extent of Pavlov's personal guilt for the defeat of the Western Front, and about why it was he who paid the price, although the situation with neighbors in Ukraine and the Baltic states was no better.

rout

During the first 18 days of the war, the Western Front lost almost 418 thousand out of 625 thousand personnel, including 338.5 thousand prisoners, 3188 tanks, 1830 guns, 521 thousand small arms.

Thirty-two of the forty-four divisions were encircled, from which, according to the entry in the Journal of Combat Actions of the Western Front, "small groups and individuals" emerged.

34 generals and colonels in general positions were killed, captured or seriously injured.

On June 28, on the seventh day of the war, Minsk fell. The territories attached at the cost of colossal reputational costs under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were completely lost in five days.

The Wehrmacht paid for this with the loss of 15,723 men killed and wounded.

On June 22, Stalin and the leadership of the USSR considered the German attack as a major nuisance, but by no means a catastrophe. Directive No. 2 (07:15 on June 22) demanded "to fall upon the enemy forces and destroy them", and directive No. 3 (21:15) - to seize Suwalki and Lublin by June 24, that is, to transfer hostilities to enemy territory.

Of the 10,743 Soviet aircraft in the border echelon, the first strike on "peacefully sleeping airfields" destroyed about 800. There was more than to fight.

In the first days of the war, Stalin was calm and active. The stupor, when he left for the Middle Dacha, did not contact anyone, and, according to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, he threw to the arriving members of the Politburo: “Lenin left us the proletarian Soviet state, and we blew it”, happened to him after the fall of Minsk, June 29-30.

Proponent of the Soviet government

Dmitry Pavlov was born on October 23, 1897 in the village of Vonyukh, Kostroma Region, later renamed Pavlovo. He graduated from two classes, in the First World War he rose to the rank of non-commissioned officer, in 1916 he was taken prisoner.

Returning to Russia in January 1919, he was mobilized into the Red Army and almost immediately joined the RCP(b). He served in the "food battalion" in Kostroma, that is, he was engaged in food requisitioning. He fought with Makhno, then with the Basmachi in the vicinity of Khujand and Bukhara.

In 1931, he switched from horseback to tank, after graduating from the Frunze Academy and courses at the Military Technical Academy.

Historian Vladimir Beshanov, based on an analysis of the curricula and memoirs of teachers and students, expresses doubt about the quality of education in the Soviet military academies of that time, but most of Pavlov's colleagues did not have this either. Georgy Zhukov studied only at short-term courses and used to say: "Whatever the fool, then the graduate of the academy."

In 1936-1937, Pavlov was an adviser to the Republican government of Spain under the pseudonym "General Pablo". Upon his return, he received the star of the Hero and was appointed head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army. Participated in the operation on Khalkhin Gol and the war with Finland. In June 1940 he headed the Western Special Military District.

The first tanker of the Union

Nikita Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that in 1940 he was present at the tests of the T-34 tank and was amazed at how he, under the control of Pavlov, "flyed through swamps and sands", but in a conversation after the end of the races, the general "made a depressing impression, seemed to me underdeveloped man."

Some authors sarcastically ask what kind of Pavlov was, who depressed Khrushchev, who was also not too burdened with cultural baggage. Others point out that Pavlov probably did not read Kant or even Marx, but there is one circumstance that makes it difficult to consider him primitive.

From the experience of fighting in Spain, Pavlov learned that it was necessary to create diesel tanks with anti-ballistic armor and long-barreled guns, and managed to convince Voroshilov and Stalin himself, who wrote a resolution on his memorandum: "I am for."

Thanks to Pavlov, on the eve of the war, the Red Army received the KV and T-34 tanks, which had no analogues in the world, which were developed and built respectively in Leningrad and Kharkov and were put into service on the same day: December 19, 1939.

Only forward!

At all the exercises of the ZAPOVO under the leadership of Pavlov, only the offensive was practiced with "overcoming fortified areas" and "forcing water barriers." The next maneuvers were scheduled for June 22, 1941.

At a meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army in the presence of Stalin on December 23-31, 1940, Zhukov and Pavlov made the main reports.

Zhukov's speech was entitled: "The nature of the modern offensive operation," Pavlov specified the tasks in relation to the mechanized corps, the main strike force of the Red Army.

“Tank corps, supported massively by aviation, break into the enemy’s defensive zone, break his anti-tank defense system, hit artillery along the way. A pair of tank corps will have to cover a tactical depth of about 30-35 kilometers within a couple of hours, and rifle units will follow them. Of course, the surprise factor is the most important,” Pavlov described his vision of the upcoming war.

He also thought about the details: “do not take food trucks into the breakthrough, meat can be obtained on the spot, bread must be found on the spot”; "to take cans and kegs on top of the tank, diesel fuel does not burn."

According to the memoirs of the meeting participants, 43-year-old Pavlov, squat and broad-shouldered, "breathed volcanic energy."

The only report on the defense was made by the commander of the Moscow Military District, Ivan Tyulenev, and even then about the containment of the enemy in certain areas, which would have to be exposed in order to concentrate forces for a general offensive.

Historian Igor Bunich points out that of the 276 marshals, generals and admirals present, only one in three was destined for a long life. The rest were soon expected to die in battle, in a Nazi camp or from a KGB bullet.

Mystery game

From Zhukovsky’s “Memories and Reflections”, the story is widely known about how, during the command-staff game on the cards that followed the meeting, Pavlov repelled German aggression, commanding the conditional “reds”, Zhukov advanced at the head of the “blue” and defeated Pavlov, acting almost like this the same as the real enemy will act in six months.

Why were the results of the game not taken into account when preparing the defense of Belarus? And why didn't Stalin dismiss the "incompetent" Pavlov, but a month and a half later he equalized him with Zhukov, conferring the rank of army general?

Declassified documents cited by historian Pyotr Bobylev testify that during the game, again, not defense, but an offensive was practiced, and it took place in two stages: January 2-6 and January 8-11, 1941.

It was possible to attack Germany in two ways: from Belarus and the Baltic states to East Prussia and Northern Poland, or from Ukraine and Moldova to Romania with access to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Southern Poland.

The first option opened the shortest route to Berlin, but this theater had significantly more German troops and fortifications, as well as complex water barriers.

The second delayed the final victory, but made it relatively easy to take control of Romanian oil and knock Germany's allies out of the war. The first phase of the game, where Pavlov led the Soviet offensive and Zhukov repelled it, demonstrated the difficulties of the "northern" option.

At the second stage, the military leaders switched roles. Stalin, who had already decided everything for himself, was not present, and People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and his deputy Semyon Budyonny, who supported the "southern" option, made the conditions so as to play along with the "Reds" as much as possible.

The traditional version is correct in one thing: Pavlov really acted against Zhukov without success.

As is clear from the latest plan for the war with Germany, known as Vasilevsky's note and reported to Stalin on May 19, 1941, the final choice was made in favor of the "southern" option.

But the leader, obviously, had no complaints against Pavlov in connection with this: it was intended that way.

How did Pavlov command?

All day on June 21, 1941, Pavlov and Klimovskikh reported to Moscow about suspicious movement and noise on the other side of the border.

Although by a secret order of June 19 the district was transformed into a front with an order for the headquarters to move from Minsk to a command post near the Obuz-Lesna station, Pavlov spent Saturday evening in the capital of the republic at a performance in the House of Officers, diligently demonstrating, as Army General Sergei Ivanov later wrote , "calm, if not carelessness."

The neighbor on the left, the commander of the Kyiv district, Mikhail Kirponos, was watching a football match at the same time, and then went to the theater.

Pavlov, of course, did not go to sleep. At one in the morning on June 22, the People's Commissar of Defense called Minsk: "Well, how are you, calmly?"

Pavlov reported that German columns had been continuously marching towards the border for the last 24 hours, and that wire barriers had been removed from the German side in many places.

“Be calm and don't panic,” Tymoshenko replied. - Gather the headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but, look, do not go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations, call.”

The next time Pavlov called with the message that the Germans were bombing and shelling Soviet territory and crossing the border.

On the one hand, permission to do what one wants, in professional language, is called a loss of control.

According to many researchers, the order, which demonstrated the confusion of the command, marked the beginning of the demoralization of the troops and the collapse of the front.

On the other hand, before receiving Directive No. 2, which Zhukov began to write by hand in Moscow only at 07:15, the only valid instruction was Directive No. 1 of 00:25, the main content of which was the requirement “not to succumb to any provocative actions” .

Pavlov, at worst, allowed to open fire on the enemy, but he could not set more specific tasks, since he himself did not have them.

Failure near Grodno

Having received Directive No. 3, Pavlov at 23:40 on June 22 ordered his deputy, Lieutenant General Ivan Boldin, to form a group consisting of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps and the 6th cavalry corps (seven divisions and 1597 tanks, including 114 KV and 238 T-34) and hit the flank of the advancing Germans in the Grodno region.

“Due to the scattered formations, instability of control, and the influence of enemy aircraft, it was not possible to concentrate the grouping at the appointed time. The goals of the counterattack were not achieved,” the authors of the monograph “1941 – Lessons and Conclusions” state.

The Volkovysk-Slonim highway was littered with abandoned tanks, burned-out vehicles, broken cannons so that traffic was impossible. The columns of prisoners reached 10 km in length,” wrote activists of the Belarusian search club “Batkovshchina” from the words of local old people.

Judging by the memoirs of the commander of the 3rd tank group of the Wehrmacht Herman Goth, who opposed Boldin, he simply did not notice a counterattack in the Grodno region.

The Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder, in his “Military Diary” mentioned Russian attacks in the direction of Grodno, but already at 18:00 on June 25 he wrote: “The situation south of Grodno has stabilized. Enemy attacks repulsed.

On June 24, Pavlov powerlessly called out from the front headquarters: “Why is the 6th MK not advancing, who is to blame? It is necessary to beat the enemy in an organized manner, and not run without control.

On the 25th, he stated: "During the day, no data on the situation at the front was received by the front headquarters."

Actually, this was the end of Pavlov's independent leadership of the troops. Marshals Timoshenko and Kulik, who had flown in from Moscow, took over control, but they also failed to control the situation.

Rapid reprisal

On June 30, Pavlov was summoned to Moscow, where Molotov and Zhukov spoke to him, and appointed deputy commander of the Western Front.

On July 4, special officers stopped the car of Pavlov, who was going to the headquarters of the front in Gomel, near the city of Dovsk.

The investigators developed the case in a standard way, being interested not so much in the reasons for the failures of the Western Front, but in the relationship of the suspect with the "enemies of the people Uborevich and Meretskov."

Pavlov, severely beaten, signed a confession that he was in a conspiracy and deliberately opened the front to the enemy, but at the trial he retracted this part of the testimony.

Stalin decided to confine himself to accusations of incompetence and cowardice, probably considering it inappropriate in a difficult situation to increase panic by declaring that traitors were in charge of our fronts.

As everybody

Pavlov, of course, did not crown himself with commander's laurels, but he was no worse than others.

The tank battle that unfolded on June 23-30 in Ukraine under the leadership of the commander of the Southwestern Front, Mikhail Kirponos, and the chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov, who flew in from Moscow, in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area (3128 Soviet and 728 German tanks, more than near Prokhorovka), ended in defeat five mechanized corps of the Red Army. Losses amounted to 2648 and 260 tanks, respectively.

In the Baltic states, the Wehrmacht advanced at a rate of up to 50 km per day. Vilnius fell on June 24, Riga on June 30, Pskov on July 9, by mid-July the fighting was going on a hundred kilometers from Leningrad.

Ivan Boldin, the second man on the Western Front, who was also directly responsible for the defeat near Grodno, and the commanders of the 3rd and 10th armies Vasily Kuznetsov and Konstantin Golubev were not held accountable and commanded the armies until the end of the war.

The reason is simple: at the beginning of July they were encircled and inaccessible, and when they got out, the political necessity disappeared. In addition, in 1941, only 63 Soviet generals found themselves in captivity, so the rest had to be protected.

And in any case, it was not Pavlov who forbade even talking about defense in the pre-war years.

It was not Pavlov who pushed airfields and warehouses to the very border instead of arranging trenches and minefields.

It was not he who came up with the idea that if the Germans attacked, then the main blow would be delivered to Ukraine, as a result of which the 4th Army, located in the main Brest direction that turned out to be in reality, became the only army of the first echelon that did not have an anti-tank artillery brigade in its composition.

Russian roulette

The announced demotion was not so big, considering that Timoshenko himself took command of the front.

Obviously, something changed in four days - and this was due not to Pavlov's actions, but to Stalin's mood.

One of the versions says that on June 30, the leader, who was in prostration in the country, was not up to Pavlov, but when he came to his senses, he began to restore order in his usual manner.

Perhaps a political decision was made to shoot one front commander in a revealing manner, as in the early 2000s they imprisoned one oligarch.

The choice fell on Pavlov, because Stalin was especially shocked and outraged by the loss of Minsk. According to historian Aleksey Kuznetsov, "Kiev was still far away, and Vilnius did not sound so tragic."

A certain role could be played by the appointment of Lev Mekhlis, a particularly trusted Stalinist emissary, as a member of the Military Council of the Western Front, known for his habit, arriving at any new place, after a few days sending a proposal on who should be shot here.

Finally, Mark Solonin and some other researchers suggest a connection between the Pavlov case and the Meretskov case.

The former chief of the general staff, then commander of the Leningrad Military District, General of the Army Kirill Meretskov, was arrested a few hours before the start of the war on the Red Arrow train on the way from Moscow to his duty station.

In September he will be released, he will command the Volkhov and Karelian fronts and become a marshal. But by the time Pavlov was arrested, Meretskov had been in Lefortovo for almost two weeks, where he was beaten so that the caring Stalin subsequently offered him to report while sitting.

What and to whom Meretskov testified is unknown, because his investigative file was destroyed in 1955 by order of the KGB chairman Ivan Serov.

Among the confessions knocked out from Pavlov, there is this: allegedly in January 1940, on the Finnish front, drinking with Meretskov, he said: “Even if Hitler comes, we will not be worse off from this.”

Front commanders. It was on their ability to manage large military groups that success or failure in operations, battles and battles depended. The list includes all generals who permanently or temporarily served as front commander. 9 military leaders from among those on the list died during the war.
1. Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny
Reserve (September-October 1941) North Caucasian (May-August 1942)

2. Ivan Khristoforovich (Hovhannes Khachaturovich) Baghramyan
1st Baltic (November 1943-February 1945)
3rd Belorussian (April 19, 1945 - until the end of the war)
On June 24, 1945, I. Kh. Bagramyan led the combined regiment of the 1st Baltic Front at the Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow.

3. Joseph Rodionovich Apanasenko
Since January 1941, the Commander of the Far Eastern Front, on February 22, 1941, I. R. Apanasenko was awarded the military rank of General of the Army. During his command of the Far Eastern Front, he did a lot to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Far East.
In June 1943, I. R. Apanasenko, after numerous requests to be sent to the active army, was appointed deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. During the battles near Belgorod on August 5, 1943, he was mortally wounded during an enemy air raid and died on the same day.

4. Pavel Artemevich Artemiev
Front of the Mozhaisk line of defense (July 18-July 30, 1941)
Moscow Reserve Front (October 9-October 12, 1941)
He commanded the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. From October 1941 to October 1943, he was the commander of the Moscow defense zone.


5. Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov
Front of reserve armies (July 14-July 25, 1941)
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed commander of the front of the reserve armies. Since November 1941, the commander of the 39th Reserve Army in Torzhok, since December, the deputy commander of the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front. In July 1942, after the evacuation of the commander of the 39th Army, Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Ivan Alexandrovich Bogdanov, who refused to evacuate, took over the leadership of the army and led a breakthrough from the encirclement. July 16, 1942, when leaving the encirclement near the village of Krapivna, Kalinin region, he was wounded. Having withdrawn 10,000 fighters from the encirclement, on July 22 he died from his wounds in the hospital.

6. Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky
3rd Belorussian (February-April 1945)


7. Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin
Voronezh (July 14-October 24, 1942)
Southwestern (October 25, 1942-March 1943)
Voronezh (March-October 20, 1943)
1st Ukrainian (October 20, 1943 - February 29, 1944)
On February 29, 1944, N.F. Vatutin, together with his escort, drove out in two cars to the location of the 60th Army to check on the progress of preparations for the next operation. As G.K. Zhukov recalled, at the entrance to one of the villages, “the cars came under fire from the UPA sabotage group. N.F. Vatutin, jumping out of the car, joined the officers in a shootout, during which he was wounded in the thigh. The seriously wounded commander was taken by train to a Kiev hospital. The best doctors were called to Kyiv, among them - the chief surgeon of the Red Army N. N. Burdenko. Vatutin received a through wound of the thigh with crushing of the bone. Despite surgery and the use of the latest penicillin during treatment, Vatutin developed gas gangrene. A council of doctors headed by Professor Shamov proposed amputation as the only way to save the wounded, but Vatutin refused. It was not possible to save Vatutin, and on April 15, 1944, he died in the hospital from blood poisoning.


8. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov
Leningrad (5-mid September 1941)

9. Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov
Leningradsky (June 1942-May 1945)
2nd Baltic (February-March 1945)


10. Philip Ivanovich Golikov
Bryansk (April-July 1942)
Voronezh (October 1942-March 1943)

11. Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov
Stalingradsky (July 23-August 12, 1942)

12. Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko
Western (June 30-July 2, 1941 and July 19-29, 1941)
Bryansk (August-October 1941)
Southeast (August-September 1942)
Stalingradsky (September-December 1942)
Southern (January-February 1943)
Kalininsky (April-October 1943)
1st Baltic (October-November 1943)
2nd Baltic (April 1944-February 1945)
4th Ukrainian (from March 1945 until the end of the war)


13. Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov
Central (August 7-end of August 1941)
Since the evening of April 13, all communication with the headquarters of the 33rd Army has been lost. The army ceases to exist as a single organism, and its separate units make their way to the east in scattered groups. On April 19, 1942, in battle, commander M. G. Efremov, who fought like a real hero, was seriously wounded (having received three wounds) and, not wanting to be captured, when the situation became critical, he called his wife, who served as his medical instructor, and shot her and himself. Together with him, the commander of the artillery of the army, Major General P.N. Ofrosimov, and almost the entire headquarters of the army were killed. Modern researchers note the high spirit of steadfastness in the army. The Germans were the first to find the body of M. G. Efremov, who, having deep respect for the courageous general, buried him with military honors in the village of Slobodka on April 19, 1942. The 268th Infantry Division of the 12th Army Corps recorded on the map the place of the death of the general, the report came to the Americans after the war and is still in the NARA archive. According to Lieutenant General Yu. A. Ryabov (a veteran of the 33rd Army), the body of the commander was brought on poles, but the German general demanded that he be transferred to a stretcher. At the funeral, he ordered the prisoners from Efremov's army to be put in front of German soldiers and said: "Fight for Germany the way Efremov fought for Russia."


14. Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
Reserve (August-September 1941)
Leningradsky (mid-September-October 1941)
Western (October 1941-August 1942)
1st Ukrainian (March-May 1944)
1st Belorussian (from November 1944 until the end of the war)
On May 8, 1945, at 22:43 (May 9, 0:43 Moscow time) in Karlshorst (Berlin), Zhukov received from Hitler's General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel the unconditional surrender of the troops of Nazi Germany.

On June 24, 1945, Marshal Zhukov took over the Victory Parade of the Soviet Union over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, which took place in Moscow on Red Square. Marshal Rokossovsky commanded the parade.

C O N F E R E N T I E

WESTERN FRONT DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. NEW DOCUMENTS
Strategic defensive operation in Belarus June 22 - July 9, 1941

In recent years, certain changes have taken place in the country, in the scientific world. New scientific works were published, dissertations were developed and defended, documents and materials of the eve and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War were published in newspapers and magazines.

All of them carry different information: from the publication of genuine documents, sometimes even classified as secret, written on the basis of documentary sources of the works of historians, to complete unfounded and far-fetched judgments of books and articles, and even falsifications and fakes. The latter causes bewilderment, disappointment and fear: publications, books, brochures, articles, "documentaries" that are historically incorrect, distortedly cover the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, are published and get to the reader and viewer much more than works based on a scientific basis .

In this regard, the topic we have mentioned in the title also attracts special attention. We will try to consider it, based on the latest research by Russian historians and new data from domestic archives.

The author would like to dwell on the following issues: "Strategic defensive operation in Belarus", definition of its content, chronological framework, combat and numerical strength of the opposing armies, conduct of hostilities, results of the operation, losses of the parties, results and conclusions. This material will be published in the 5th volume of the Military Encyclopedia, developed by the Encyclopedic Department of the Institute of Military History, as well as in the work being prepared there "Strategic Operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Book I. Summer-Autumn Campaign of 1941.", 7 th issue of the Military Historical Journal. It is presented to your attention for the first time.

Strategic defensive operation in Belarus was carried out by the troops of the Western Front with the participation of the Pinsk military flotilla in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, is an integral part of the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 and covers military events the first eighteen days of the war from June 22 to July 9.

The purpose of the operation was to repel the invasion of the Nazi troops in the western strategic direction and create conditions for mobilization, deployment of the main forces of the Red Army and their transition to a decisive counteroffensive.

The western direction, which was one of the main ones even during the preparations for the war against the USSR, and also after the attack on our country, was given exceptionally great importance by the fascist German command. The "Plan Barbarossa" provided for the main efforts to concentrate north of the Pripyat marshes. Therefore, the enemy attached paramount importance to the offensive in this shortest direction leading through Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow.

The German command took into account that the outcome of the first battles would largely determine the subsequent development of military events. Therefore, it sought at all costs to achieve the defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus, primarily in the Bialystok ledge.

The enemy was aware that the holding by the troops of the Western Special Military District of the Bialystok ledge, which was deeply jutting out to the west, could slow down the actions of his troops, intended both for an offensive in the Baltic states and in Ukraine. The grouping of Soviet troops located in the Bialystok ledge could strike both on the flanks and in the rear of the advancing German troops in the Baltic and Ukrainian directions and disrupt the timing of the implementation of the enemy's plans at the very beginning of the war. It was important for the German command not to give such an opportunity to our troops. In addition, and this was the main reason, it believed that by delivering two blows in converging directions from the Suwalki ledge and from the Brest region, it would be possible to encircle and then destroy the main forces of the Western Special Military District. Planning a quick defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus, the Nazis hoped that, having solved this problem, they would open the way for the unhindered advance of their armies to Smolensk and, thereby, achieve the most important strategic success in the Moscow direction.

The encirclement and liquidation of Soviet troops in the Bialystok ledge and in the Minsk direction, as well as the development of the offensive on Smolensk and its subsequent advance on Moscow, were entrusted to Army Group Center(Commander Field Marshal F. von Bock). In addition to the two field armies (4th and 9th), it included two tank groups (2nd and 3rd) (five motorized corps), i.e. as many mobile formations as there were in Army Groups North and South combined.

Army Group Center on June 21 was deployed in a section of 550 km from Goldap to Vlodava and included 50 divisions and two brigades. A total of 51 settlement divisions, incl. 31 infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized, 1 cavalry, 3 security and two motorized brigades (1 motorized and motorized SS regiment "Grossdeutschland"). Army Group Center had 6 infantry divisions in reserve. The armies of this group were reinforced with significant reserves of the main command of the ground forces. They were given a large number of artillery battalions, engineer and construction battalions, pontoon-bridge parks and various special-purpose units. For aviation support of the actions of the Army Group "Center" was allocated 2nd Air Fleet(Field Marshal A. Kesselring), who had 1677 aircraft in his air connections.

The concept of the operation of the army group "Center" was to, advancing in two large strike groups on the flanks, split the Soviet troops in Belarus, surround and destroy them between Bialystok and Minsk, and further advance to the Smolensk region, create prerequisites for the interaction of mobile troops with Army Group North in order to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic and in the Leningrad region.

Strike force as part of the 3rd Panzer Group and the 9th Army was concentrated and deployed in the Suwalki ledge and in the area from Augustow to Ostrolenka with a total length of 270 km. She had the task of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops northwest of Grodno, rapidly advancing to Minsk and, in cooperation with the southern strike force, destroying the Soviet troops between Bialystok and Minsk. In the future, this strike force was supposed to go to the Vitebsk, Polotsk region and to the north in order to prevent the concentration of Soviet troops in the upper reaches of the river. Zap. Dvina and create conditions for the subsequent actions of Army Group Center.

Strike force as part of the 2nd Panzer Group and the main forces of the 4th Army was concentrated and deployed from Ostrolenka to the southeast and further along the Western Bug to Vlodava in a section with a total length of 280 km. The grouping had the task of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops in the Brest region, quickly advancing with tank formations to Minsk and, in cooperation with the northern strike group, destroying the Soviet troops west of Minsk. Subsequently, advancing on Smolensk, the 2nd Panzer Group and the 4th Army were to capture the Smolensk region and to the south, prevent the concentration of Soviet troops in the area of ​​​​the upper reaches of the Dnieper and thereby create conditions for the subsequent offensive of Army Group Center.

Overall operational location depth Nazi troops ranged from 15 km on the auxiliary (Bialystok) direction to 120 km on the directions of attacks of Army Group Center. The latter was created with the expectation of delivering two simultaneous strikes: on the Suvalk-Minsk and on the Brest-Baranovichi directions.

The entire 3rd tank group (2 army and 2 motorized corps, consisting of 5 infantry, 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions) and two army corps of the 9th army were deployed against the troops of the 11th army of the Baltic Special military district (until June 25, the 3rd Panzer Group was advancing in the zone of the North-Western Front and therefore was not included in the tables for calculating forces and means at the beginning of the operation, but is considered introduced during the hostilities).

The rest of the forces of the Army Group "Center" were aimed at an offensive in the zone of the Western Special Military District.

The 3rd and 2nd tank groups were on the flanks of Army Group Center, where its strike groups were created. Four of the five motorized corps were in the first echelon of strike groups.

This deployment of the troops of Army Group Center corresponded to the operational plans of the Nazi command. IN Directive No. 21 ("Plan Barbarossa") The German High Command noted that this army group "should advance with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw region and north of it and split the enemy forces in Belarus."

When performing the immediate task, the German Army Group Center troops had tasks: the number of main attacks - 3, secondary -1, auxiliary - 1, the depth of the immediate task of the group was from 130 to 350 km, the further - 670 km, the width of the offensive front at the beginning of the operation was 550 km, the front of the offensive of the main groupings was up to 115 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive is 51, of which 31 are infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized, 1 cavalry, 3 security, one motorized brigade and a motorized SS regiment.

The number of divisions of the main grouping was 44.5, of which 15.5 were armored and motorized. The group included 820 thousand people, the total number of tanks and assault guns - 1765, guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars) - 14390, aircraft - 1677 (bombers - 980, fighters - 530, reconnaissance aircraft - 167). Medium operational density was 7.5 divisions per 1 km of the front.

Specifically, for tank groups and field armies, the immediate and further tasks were distributed as follows:

3rd Panzer Group in cooperation with the troops of the 9th Army, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops northeast of Suwalki and, developing the offensive through Vilnius, reach the Minsk region. The directions of the main attacks - 1, secondary - 1, the depth of the immediate task is 270 km, the further 210 km, the width of the offensive front at the beginning of the operation is 35 km, the offensive front of the main grouping is 35 km. The total number of advancing divisions is 11, of which: infantry - 4, tank - 4, motorized - 3. Total tanks and assault guns - 955, guns and mortars (without 50 mm mortars) - 3627, supported more than 600 aircraft 2- th air fleet. The average operational density was 5.5 divisions per 1 km of the front, more than 200 tanks attacked in the direction of the main attack.

The 9th Army part of its forces to advance after the 3rd Panzer Group, to consolidate its success, and the rest of the forces to advance in the directions of Lida and Grodno with the task of dismembering and destroying the encircled Soviet troops. The immediate task was from 130 to 190 km, the further task was 270 km, the front of the offensive by the beginning of the operation was from 32 to 60 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive was 9.5, of which 8 were infantry, 1 guard and 1 motorized brigade. Supported (without 50 mm mortars) - 4865 guns.

2nd tank group to break through, together with infantry formations, the border fortifications northwest and south of Brest and, developing the offensive in the general direction to Kobrin, Baranovichi, Minsk, connect in the Minsk region with the 3rd Panzer Group and complete the encirclement of the bulk of the troops in Belarus. The directions of the main attacks - 2, auxiliary - 1, the depth of the immediate task is up to 350 km, the further - up to 320 km, the width of the offensive front at the beginning of the operation was up to 105 km, the offensive front of the main groupings was up to 75 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive - 16 5 of them: infantry - 7, tank - 5, motorized - 3, cavalry - 1 and a motorized brigade - 1. The total number of divisions of the main grouping is 15.5, of which tank - 8.5. Total tanks and assault guns - 810, guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars) - 4737, supported up to 1000 aircraft of the 2nd Air Fleet. The average operational density was 5 divisions per 1 km of the front, more than 170 tanks attacked in the direction of the main attack.

The 4th Army, with part of the forces of the army corps, to advance behind the motorized corps of the 2nd Panzer Group, consolidating their success, and with the main forces to advance in the northeast direction on Bialystok and Volkovysk in order to dismember the Soviet troops in the Bialystok ledge and in cooperation with the troops of the 9th th army to eliminate them. The depth of the immediate task was up to 240 km, the further one - up to 290 km, the width of the offensive front by the beginning of the operation was up to 145 km, the front of the main groupings offensive ranged from 3 to 12 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive was 13, of which: infantry - 12 , security - 1. The total number of divisions of the main grouping - 14.

Directly in the ZapOVO band(without the 3rd tank group), there were 39 divisions, a motorized brigade and a motorized SS regiment "Grossdeutschland", (considering that the brigade and the motorized regiment are taken as half a division, it turns out 40 settlement divisions), a brigade of 6-barreled mortars. In total, in the ZapOVO zone there were 2 field (4th and 9th) armies, 1 tank (2nd) group, 13 corps (rifle - 10, motorized - 3), 40 settlement divisions, including: infantry divisions - 27, armored - 5, motorized - 3, cavalry - 1, guards - 3, motorized brigades - 1, motorized SS regiment "Grossdeutschland". This grouping was deployed on the territory of Poland in a section of 470 km from the city of Goldap to the city of Vlodava and included: up to 635 thousand people, guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars) - 10763, over 810 tanks and assault guns . From the air, the ground forces of Army Group Center were supported by squadrons of the 2nd Air Fleet as part of the 2nd and 8th Air Corps. In total, as of June 22, the 2nd Air Fleet had 1367 aircraft, of which 994 were combat-ready. 224 aircraft were subordinated to the ground forces of Army Group Center, of which 200 aircraft were combat-ready. In total, in the Army Group "Center" in the ground forces and in the 2nd Air Fleet there were 1611 aircraft together, incl. 1194 combat ready. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire Eastern Front. 40.2% of all divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea were concentrated here (including 42.8% of motorized and 52.9% of tank divisions) 1 .

Army Group "Center" was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the troops of the Western District, located in the Belostok ledge, with a blow from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, after which they would go to the Smolensk region and create "prerequisites for the interaction of large tank and motorized forces with Army Group North" with the aim of destroying enemy troops in the Baltic and in the Leningrad region" 2 . Therefore, the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. The main blow was delivered south of Brest.

According to the plan, after capturing Minsk, Army Group Center was to quickly advance to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers from the Drissa to the mouth of the Sozh, force these water barriers from the move and continue the further offensive on Smolensk. At the same time, the 3rd Panzer Group and the 9th Army were tasked with advancing in a northeasterly direction and capturing the Polotsk-Vitebsk region, and the 2nd Panzer Group and 4th Army were tasked with developing an offensive against Smolensk. After the capture of Smolensk, the 3rd Panzer Group was intended for a joint offensive with Army Group North in the Leningrad direction.

Divisions of the 8th, 20th and part of the forces of the 42nd Corps of the 9th German Army deployed against our 3rd Army.

Most of the divisions of the 42nd Corps of the 9th Army, the 7th, 9th Corps and one division of the 13th Corps of the 4th German Army were deployed against the 10th Army of the Western Special Military District.

Units of the 43rd Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Tank Group (47th, 24th, 46th Mechanized Corps and the 12th Army Corps) were deployed against our 4th Army. In this sector, the Germans were able to achieve significant superiority.

To strengthen the power of the initial strike against the troops of the ZapOVO, the command of the Army Group "Center" concentrated the bulk of the troops and military equipment in the first operational echelon, which included 28 divisions, incl. infantry - 22, tank - 4 cavalry - 1, security - 1. In areas of defense breakthrough high operational densities troops (the average operational density was about 10 km per division, and up to 5-6 km in the direction of the main attack). This allowed the enemy to deliver a powerful initial blow and achieve a significant numerical superiority in forces and means over the Soviet troops. This was reflected in the fact that the superiority of the enemy in manpower in the main direction was - 6.5 times, in the number of tanks - 1.8 times, in the number of guns and mortars - 3.3 times.

The analysis shows that in terms of personnel, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops by an average of 2.5 times, in terms of tanks, aircraft, guns and mortars, the superiority was on the Soviet side. However in the direction of the main attack in the zone of the 4th army, the superiority of the Germans was overwhelming.

In the second tier Army Group "Center" was located 11 divisions, incl. infantry - 5, motorized - 3, tank - 1, security - 1, motorized brigade and SS motorized regiment "Grossdeutschland".

There was one security division in reserve. In the period from June 20 to July 3, it was planned to transfer 6 more infantry divisions from the OKH reserve, but they are not included in the calculation, because. will arrive after June 22, were on the way at the time of the count and will be counted as having arrived during the operation.

Western Special Military District (ZapOVO)(Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov) covered the direction from the southern border of the Lithuanian SSR to the northern border of Ukraine (Vlodava), having the task of preventing the enemy from invading the territory of the district, by stubborn defense of fortified areas along the line of the state border to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops districts. To cover the state border with a length of 470 km, the district had 3 covering armies in the first echelon - the 3rd, 10th, and 4th. The 13th Army was formed in the rear of the district. The Pinsk military flotilla (commander Rear Admiral D.D. Rogachev) was operationally subordinated to the commander of the district. The headquarters of the district was located in Minsk.

The defense was based on the stubborn holding of fortified areas and field fortifications along the state border. The direction of concentration of the main efforts in defense was determined in the following directions: Suwalki, Lida; Suwalki, Bialystok; from the front: Ostroleka, Malkina-Gurna to Bialystok; Sedlece, Volkovysk; Brest, Baranovichi. According to the plan, the defense was to be active. In the event of an enemy wedging in, all defending troops and reserves had to be ready, at the direction of the High Command, to deliver swift counter-attacks in order to defeat enemy groupings, transfer combat operations to its territory and capture advantageous lines. Based on this task, a grouping of forces and means was created and prepared, and the territory of the district was equipped. Options for the actions of the troops of the district were developed in detail, taking into account the alleged directions of the enemy's offensive. A strong offensive grouping of troops was created in the Bialystok ledge, which included the main forces of the first echelon of the ZapOVO (19 divisions out of 26, including all tank divisions), ready to deliver a crushing retaliatory strike in the event of an enemy attack in accordance with the plan for covering the state border. Most of them were part of the 10th Army, concentrated in the central part of the ZapOVO in the Bialystok ledge.

In terms of cover, 5 options for troop actions were carefully developed in the event of an enemy breakthrough through army defense areas. At the same time, first of all, the efforts of the mechanized corps were coordinated with the infantry, artillery, anti-tank brigades and aviation in directions and lines (regions).

Directly at the disposal of the district command as reserves were 18 divisions (including 12 rifle, 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions), 3 airborne brigades, 4 fortified areas (UR), 1 artillery and anti-tank brigade, 2 brigades Air defense and a number of separate parts.

In total, the ZAPOVO as part of the ground forces had 44 divisions (including 12 tank, 6 motorized, 3 airborne, 3 artillery brigades, 8 URs, 8 aviation divisions, 2 air defense brigades and other units). ZapOVO can be described as one of the strongest military districts in the Red Army. In its composition, it was second only to the Kyiv Special Military District. In the ZapOVO, together with the Pinsk military flotilla, there were: over 673 thousand personnel, over 14 thousand guns and mortars, about 2900 tanks (of which 2189 were serviceable, including 383 new), 1909 aircraft (of which 1549 were serviceable). This amounted to a quarter of the troops concentrated in the western districts. The Pinsk military flotilla included 31 boats, 7 monitors, 4 gunboats, an air squadron (10 aircraft), an anti-aircraft artillery battalion and a company of marines. In addition, there were 11 border detachments on the territory of Belarus, which numbered 19519 people. 3 of the Belarusian border district and a regiment of operational troops of the NKVD. At the same time, the protection of the old state border was carried out, where there was a border barrier zone - 5 border detachments were serving in it.

IN the first echelon of the covering armies 13 divisions (12 infantry and 1 cavalry division) were located at a distance of up to 50 km from the state border, the operational density reached 30-35 km per division. They were located in areas at a distance of 15-40 km from the border. The remaining 13 divisions (8 tank, 4 motorized, 1 cavalry) were in the second echelons of the covering armies.

Mechanized corps, constituting second echelon of covering armies, located 50-100 km from the border.

In the reserve of the ZapOVO (100 - 400 km from the border) there were 18 more divisions, of which 12 rifle and 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions and 4 SD on the old state border. Of this number, 12 divisions did not complete mobilization, and the two newly formed mechanized corps were almost without tanks, with a small amount of small arms and completely not knocked together.

The depth of defense was: armies 50 - 75 km, districts 100 - 150 km. Average operational density was - 47 km division of the 1st echelon. Operational Density troops was 30 - 37 km per division.

The troops of the 1st and 2nd echelon of the covering armies occupied the points of permanent deployment. The formations of the front were not fully staffed, although in absolute terms the superiority in tanks and aircraft was on the Soviet side. Many Soviet tanks were outdated and out of order, produced back in the 30s, they had not only thin armor and weak weapons, but also a small supply of motor resources. In the first hours of the war, the enemy destroyed a significant amount of equipment with artillery and aircraft, which did not even enter the battle. Near the border, a few subdivisions and units were engaged in the construction of fortifications.

Alerted on the morning of June 22, the troops of the district found themselves under attack from enemy ground and air forces. The advanced formations of the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies, not having time to occupy the defensive lines provided for by the plan, were forced to engage in oncoming battles and battles on the move, when advancing to cover areas, separately, in parts, without proper operational formation, under continuous strikes by enemy aircraft, to conduct defensive battles in unprepared positions. As a result, command and control of the troops was largely paralyzed.

The enemy strike groupings, as envisaged by the plan of the Nazi command, launched an offensive on the flanks of the Bialystok salient from the areas west of Grodno and south of Brest. The right flank of the 3rd Army of General V.I. Kuznetsov turned out to be open. In a strip 40 km wide against the 3rd infantry divisions of the 8th army corps of the Germans, one 56th rifle division of Major General S.P. Sakhnov was forced to join the battle.

A difficult situation also developed on the left wing of the Western Front. On the Brest-Baranovichi direction, on a 100-kilometer section, where the poorly manned and who did not have time to advance from Brest Fortress The 6th, 42nd, right-flank 49th and left-flank 75th rifle divisions of the 4th army of General A.A. Korobkov, 16 German divisions advanced, including 5 tank divisions.

Unable to withstand the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the troops of the 4th Army (42nd and 6th Rifle Divisions) were forced to retreat. By the end of June 22, the Pinsk military flotilla as an advanced detachment reached the Kobrin area, but could not establish communications with either the headquarters of the 4th Army or the formations of the 28th Rifle Corps. On the first day of the war, the enemy managed to advance 60 km in the Brest-Baranovichi direction and occupy Kobrin.

From the first days of the war until the 20th of July, for almost a month, being in complete encirclement, the defenders repelled the fierce attacks of the enemy Brest Fortress, where the enemy had a 10-fold superiority in forces.

On the very first day of the war, June 22, 26 Soviet airfields were subjected to massive air raids, where the most combat-ready aviation regiments were based. Having inflicted heavy damage on our aircraft, the enemy seized air supremacy. During the first day of fighting, the Air Force of the Western Front lost 738 aircraft, of which 528 aircraft were on the ground, which amounted to about 40% of the aircraft fleet of the Western Front or 63.7% of all aviation losses on the Soviet-German front for June 22. Upon learning of this, the commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of 2 Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, Major General Ivan Ivanovich Kopets shot himself.

During June 22, the enemy landed several tactical airborne assault forces in the rear of the Western Front, which inflicted great damage on the rear services and disrupted communications and communications.

By the end of the first day, the enemy strike groupings advanced 35 km, and in some directions up to 70 km. There was a threat of deep coverage of both wings of the Western Front by enemy tank formations. The troops of the 10th Army operating in the center of the front were under the threat of encirclement.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the command of the front lost control of the troops. Communication with armies and divisions was systematically broken. The fighting, relying on fortified areas, was focal in nature. Trying to turn the tide of events, the Soviet command on the evening of June 22 set the front troops the task of launching a counterattack with the combined arms armies and mechanized corps, supported by front-line and long-range bomber aviation, by the end of June 24, to surround and defeat the wedged enemy in the Suwalki area. Moreover, the main attention was focused on the destruction of the infantry formations that had broken through in the Grodno region, followed by an offensive on the flank of the Suvalka group of Germans.

Counterattack of the right wing of the Western Front carried out in accordance with Directive of the Rate No. 03 did not bring the expected result. The dispersal of detached formations involved in defensive battles, the limited time for preparing for offensive operations and organizing interaction, the lack of reliable means of communication for control - all this did not allow the troops to be gathered into a single fist in a short time.

On June 23 and 24, bloody battles took place in the Grodno region, in which both sides suffered heavy losses. After the capture of Grodno by the Germans on June 24, the front commander clarified the task for Boldin's group (6th, 11th MK, 36th cd) and the 3rd Army. They were ordered to capture the city and advance 70 km. However, this task did not take into account the real situation. Although Boldin's group managed to chain significant enemy forces to the Grodno region for two days and inflict significant damage on him, they failed to capture the city. The counterattack somewhat eased the position of the 3rd Army. The enemy advance was delayed. In some areas, German troops were driven back. However, it was not possible to build on the success. The command of the Army Group "Center" transferred two additional army corps from the reserve and turned some parts of the 3rd Panzer Group G. Goth. Enemy aviation, having seized the initiative in the air, continuously bombed the battle formations of the Soviet troops. The mechanized corps were forced to blow up or burn dozens of wrecked tanks on the battlefield, without being able to evacuate them, so that they would not fall into the hands of the enemy. To avoid encirclement, the 3rd Army retreated behind the Neman.

Did not bring noticeable success and hastily organized counterattack of the 14th mechanized corps of the 4th army on the left wing of the Western Front. The position of the 4th Army, especially in the center, was becoming critical. The gap with the troops of the North-Western Front on the right wing, where the tank group of G. Goth rushed, and the difficult situation on the left wing, where the 4th Army retreated, created a threat of deep coverage of the entire Bialystok grouping both from the north and from the south. The commander of the Western Front, General D.G. Pavlov, decided to reinforce the 4th Army with the 47th Rifle Corps, while the 17th Mechanized Corps from the front reserve was transferred to the river. Sharu to create a defense there. However, it was not possible to create a solid defense along the river. The enemy tank divisions crossed the river. Sharu and June 25 approached Baranovichi.

By the end of June 23, the Pinsk military flotilla was dispersed along the waterways east and west of Pinsk, but could not establish contact with anyone.

The position of the troops of the Western Front became more and more critical. Of particular concern was the northern flank, where an uncovered gap of 130 km was formed. The troops of the front were unable to detain the enemy in the border zone and liquidate his deep breakthroughs. The enemy strike groupings outflanked the 3rd and 10th armies, creating a real threat of encirclement for them. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the troops were forced to retreat, conducting rearguard battles.

By the end of the fourth war, tank formations of the Army Group Center had advanced deep into Soviet territory up to 200-250 km. As a result, more than 60 front-line warehouses and bases with property and weapons, located in a zone from 30 to 100 km from the state border, were either blown up and burned, or abandoned. The front lost from 50 to 90% of the stocks of fuel, ammunition, clothing and armored vehicles, food supplies 4 created in peacetime. This led to the fact that already in the first days of the war there was not enough combat equipment and food both to support the troops at the front and for the newly formed units and formations.

Soviet troops, holding back the onslaught of the enemy, suffered heavy losses. Taking into account the complexity of the situation, on June 25, the Headquarters of the High Command decided to create a defensive line in the rear of the Western Front and to concentrate on this line the army group of the Reserve of the High Command (19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd) led by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. .Budyonny. By the end of June 28, the reserve armies received the task of occupying and firmly holding the defense on the line Kraslava - Disna - Polotsk UR - Vitebsk - Orsha - r. Dnieper to Loev, to prevent the enemy from breaking through. Frontal aviation was strengthened. The front received 2 aviation divisions from the internal districts, 452 aircraft with crews also arrived in aviation units and formations by July 9. In the interests of the troops of the front, the 3rd long-range bomber aviation corps was involved.

On June 25, the Headquarters of the High Command ordered General of the Army D.G. Pavlov to urgently withdraw troops from the Bialystok ledge to the line of fortified areas of the old border. But it was already too late. By the time the directive was received, the troops of the 3rd and 10th armies were already in a semicircle of encirclement. For the retreat to Minsk, there was a narrow corridor no more than 60 km wide between the cities of Skidel and Volkovysk, which was under the control of the enemy.

On June 26 - 27, the forward detachments of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups of German troops, striking in converging directions, broke through to the outskirts of Minsk.

Defensive battle near Minsk lasted 4 days.

On June 25, fighting broke out in the Minsk fortified area. Here the enemy lost more than 100 tanks in one day. On June 28, German strike groups broke through to Minsk and captured the city. The retreat paths of eleven Soviet divisions were cut off. To the west of Minsk, six divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies, three of the 13th army, 2 of front-line subordination and the remnants of other units and formations of the front ended up in the enemy ring.

On June 30, General D.G. Pavlov was removed from his post for the loss of control of the troops, and Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko was appointed in his place. On July 2, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the Western Front.

During these days, the Pinsk military flotilla withdrew to the Luninets, Mozyr sector.

On July 3, the tank divisions of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups of the enemy rapidly launched an offensive to the east and northeast towards the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina with the task of seizing bridges and crossings on these rivers on the move. Meanwhile, the main forces of the army corps of the 4th army of the enemy were involved in the fight against the Soviet troops, surrounded to the west of Minsk. Here, units cut off from command, deprived of centralized control, supply and communications, did not lay down their arms, fought stubborn battles behind enemy lines. Outside the encirclement, 16 bloodless divisions held back the formations of the 3rd and 2nd German tank groupsp. The defeat of the troops of the Western Front led to a breakthrough of the strategic front in the Minsk direction, where a huge gap more than 400 km wide was formed in the defense of the Soviet troops. Neither the command of the Western Front, nor the five Marshals of the Soviet Union (B.M. Shaposhnikov, G.I. Kulik, K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko and S.M. Budyonny), who arrived here by Stalin's decision, could correctly assess the situation and expediently dispose of the available forces. Following them, with a special punitive task, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, L.Z. Mekhlis, arrived.

By July 4, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred 4 more armies to the Western Front, and now 7 armies began to operate as part of the front. Preparation for defensive operations at the turn of the river. Zap. Dvina and Dnieper was fought in difficult conditions. Many formations and units of the 19th, 20th, and 21st armies (13 divisions) were only on the way to the front. By the time the German fascist troops came out to the river. Zap. In the Dvina and Dnieper, the reserves that arrived here did not have time to concentrate, create defensive positions, and deploy troops in the necessary battle formation. There were 24 divisions in the first echelons of the armies. They hastily dug trenches, created anti-tank barriers. The defense was being prepared in wide bands: from 35 to 70 km per division. In preparation for hostilities, the poor material and technical security of the troops had a negative effect. Units and formations were not fully equipped with personnel, weapons and military equipment. In the divisions of the first echelons of the armies, there were only 145 tanks. The front had a total of 3800 guns and mortars, 501 aircraft (of which only 389 were serviceable). 5

The German high command was also in a hurry, which wanted to take advantage of the favorable situation that had developed in the western strategic direction and speed up the attack on Moscow. In order to increase the penetrating power of the tank troops, which suffered heavy losses in the first days of the war, and speed up their offensive, on July 3 the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were merged into the 4th tank army, headed by Field Marshal G. von Kluge. The 4th Field Army was disbanded. Her infantry formations were transferred to the 2nd Army, Colonel General M. von Weichs, who arrived here from the reserve of the main headquarters of the ground forces (OKH).

Along with the reorganization, Army Group Center was reinforced with troops. If by the beginning of the war she had over 50 divisions (including the 3rd tank group), then in the first days of July - 63, of which 28 (12 infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized and 1 cavalry) advanced in the first echelon and 35 infantry divisions - in the second. In particular, 10 infantry divisions arrived here from the OKH reserve; 2 infantry divisions were transferred from Army Group North, and a cavalry brigade from Germany 6 . The superiority of the enemy in manpower and military equipment became overwhelming.

In early July, stubborn battles broke out in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions. On July 4, the Military Council of the Western Front set the task for the troops: to firmly defend the line of the Polotsk fortified area, the line of the river. Zap. Dvina - Senno - Orsha and further along the river. Dnieper, prevent the enemy from breaking through.

The greatest threat to the Western Front was the Berezino-Mogilev direction, where the formations of the 2nd Panzer Group were advancing.

From July 1 to July 3, three German tank divisions, with the support of aviation, crossed the river. Berezina in the 80 km section between the cities of Berezino and Bobruisk and began to develop an offensive against Mogilev. The Hitlerite command hoped that, having broken through the defenses on the Berezina, Guderian’s tank group would reach the Dnieper in one day, after which they would immediately capture the crossings near the cities of Rogachev, Mogilev and Orsha. However, on the way to the Dnieper, the fascist troops met fierce resistance. Fighting on the highway Bobruisk - Mogilev took on a stubborn character.

The commander of the Western Front, in order to divert enemy forces from the Mogilev direction, ordered the 21st Army of General M.G. Efremov to launch a counterattack and defeat the enemy grouping in the area of ​​Bobruisk and Bykhov. Going on the offensive, units of the 21st Army crossed the Dnieper, liberated the cities of Zhlobin and Rogachev, and, successfully advancing towards Bobruisk, wedged into the enemy’s position up to 30 km.

The strike of the Soviet troops in the area of ​​Bobruisk, bypassing the enemy's Mogilev grouping from the west, alarmed the command of Army Group Center. To repel the offensive, it was forced to transfer significant forces - two army corps from the reserve of Army Group Center, and then two more infantry divisions. In total, during the counterattack, the 21st Army pinned down 8 German infantry divisions and inflicted serious damage on them. This noticeably weakened the troops of the right wing of Army Group Center. The situation in the Mogilev direction, however, continued to be very difficult.

In order to delay the German troops and buy time to organize the defense, on July 6, the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps launched a counterattack between Vitebsk and Orsha. On the first day of the offensive, the 5th mechanized corps entered the area of ​​​​the city of Senno, advancing 30-40 km. Parts of the 7th mechanized corps were also successful. The enemy suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive in this direction. Fierce fighting continued here for four days. A counterattack near Senno, combined with counterattacks by troops in other sectors, made it possible to delay the enemy's offensive and create a front of defense along the line of the river by the end of July 9. Zap. Dvina and Dnieper. By the evening of July 9, formations of the German 4th Panzer Army approached this line. Their attempts to seize bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Dnieper on the move were unsuccessful.

Possessing an overwhelming superiority in manpower and means, the Nazi troops of the Zuntr Army Group overcame the resistance of our advanced units in the Mogilev direction and on July 9 reached the main line of defense.

During the strategic defensive operation in Belarus (June 22 - July 9, 1941), Soviet soldiers showed the highest courage on the Western Front. The high title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 19 people. The pilots of the Western Front only on the first day of the war made 8 air and ground rams, and in the following days from June 23 to July 10 - 4 rams in the air and 6 against ground targets.

One of the first strategic defensive operations The Red Army, which later received the name of the Belarusian, ended. For 18 days troops of the Western Front suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 44 divisions that were originally part of the front, 24 were defeated (rifle - 10, tank - 8, mechanized - 4, cavalry - 2), the remaining 20 divisions lost from 30% to 90% of their forces and means. The front lost (captured by the enemy, blown up during the retreat by its troops, destroyed by enemy aircraft and for other reasons) 32 fuel depots out of 45 and all ammunition depots. The losses of the Soviet troops in total were: 417,729, and with the Pinsk military flotilla - 417,780 people. Of these: irrevocable - 341,073 people, sanitary - 76,717 people.

The front lost 9,427 guns and mortars, over 4,799 tanks and 1,797 aircraft. Despite this, the pilots of the Western Front on the first day of the war destroyed 143, and for the entire defensive operation 708 enemy aircraft, which amounted to about 40% of the initial composition of the enemy's 2nd air fleet. Leaving almost all of Belarus, the troops retreated to a depth of 450 to 600 km, there was a threat of a breakthrough on the move to Smolensk.

The losses of the Germans amounted to about 40 thousand soldiers and officers. Given that the Nazi troops in the initial period of the war lost over 100 thousand people, then the Western Front accounts for 40% of the losses inflicted on the enemy. On July 4, on the 13th day of the war, General F. Halder noted with concern that 50% of the regular number of combat vehicles remained in service in the 3rd Panzer Group. General G. Guderian reported that by July 12, the 2nd Panzer Group had lost 6 thousand people, incl. 400 officers - most of them commanders and chiefs.

Defensive operation in Belarus gave the first experience in the preparation and conduct of such operations of the Great Patriotic War under conditions of limited time, a rapidly changing situation, the use of large masses of tanks, aviation, and a large number of airborne assault forces. Resistance at intermediate lines, counterattacks by mechanized corps and combined arms formations inflicted significant damage on Army Group Center, slowing down the pace of its offensive, which made it possible for the Soviet command to deploy troops of the 2nd strategic echelon, which then delayed the advance of German troops in Smolensk battle 1941

Commander of the ZapOVO troops, General of the Army Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov Born on 23.10 (4.11). 1897 in the village. Smelly now Kostroma region. Member of the 1st World war. In the Red Army since 1919. During the Civil War he was the commander of a platoon, squadron, assistant commander of a cavalry regiment. Graduated from: Higher Cavalry School in 1922. Military Academy. Frunze in 1928, academic courses at the Military Technical Academy in 1931. Participated in battles on the CER, in the national revolutionary war in Spain 1936-1939, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. From June 1940 - commander of the Belarusian (from July 1940 - Western) Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - the commander of the troops of the Western Front. Army General (1941), Hero of the Soviet Union (1937). Awarded 5 orders, medals. In connection with the catastrophic failures of the troops of the front, on July 4, 1941, he was arrested, unreasonably accused of cowardice, the deliberate collapse of the command and control of the troops of the front and the surrender of weapons to the enemy without a fight; convicted and shot on July 22. He was rehabilitated by the Commission of the General Staff "due to the lack of corpus delicti" in 1957.

Chief of Staff of the ZapOVO, Major General Klimovskikh Vladimir Efimovich Born on May 27, 1885 in Kokand. In military service since 1913. Member of the 1st World War in the following positions: head of a mounted scout team, company commander, battalion commander. In the Red Army since 1918. He participated in the Civil War as an assistant chief of staff of the army, chief of staff of a division, chief of a department of army headquarters, chief of a division, and a group of troops. After the Civil War, he was the chief of staff of the rifle corps, the head of the department, and the assistant to the head of the headquarters of the military districts. December 1932 to June 1936 was a teacher at the Frunze Military Academy. From July 1936 - assistant army inspector, from February 1938. - Senior Lecturer at the Military Academy of the General Staff. From September 1939 was deputy chief of staff, from July 1940. - Chief of Staff of the Belarusian Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - Chief of Staff of the Western Front. Major General (1940). Awarded with the Order of the Red Banner, Honorary weapon. In connection with the catastrophic failures of the troops of the front in July 1941. was unreasonably accused of cowardice, deliberate collapse of the command and control of the front troops and surrender to the enemy without a fight, convicted and shot on July 22. He was rehabilitated by the Commission of the General Staff "due to the lack of corpus delicti" in 1957.

Deputy Commander of the ZapOVO Troops - Lieutenant General Boldin Ivan Vasilyevich
Member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO - Corps Commissar Fominykh A.Ya.
Chief of Artillery - Lieutenant General Klich N.A.
Head of the Signal Corps - Major General Grigoriev A.T.

According to "Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZAPOVO Troops" N503859/cc/s [no later than May 20, 1941]:

Border with PribOVO - Oshmeny, Druskeniki, Margerabovo, Letzen, all points except Margerabov for ZapOVO inclusive.
Border with KOVO - Pinsk, Vlodava, Demblin, all except Demblin for ZapOVO inclusive.

Cover area N1 - 3 army
Compound:
Office of the 3rd Army;
control 4 case page;
56, 27, 85 And 24 division lines;
control 11 mechanized corps
29 And 33 tank divisions;
204 motorized division;
6 anti-tank artillery brigade;
11
border areas.
Army Headquarters - Grodno
Task- strong defense of the Grodno fortified region and field fortifications on the Kanchiamietis front, up to Shchuchin claim. cover the Lida, Grodno and Bialystok directions.

N2 cover area - 10 army
Compound:
management of the 10th army;
control 1 And 5 rifle corps
8, 13, 86 And 2 division pages;
control 6 cav. cases
6 And 36 kaval. divisions;
control 6 mechanical cases
4 And 7 tank divisions
29 motorized division;
9 mixed aviation division;
border areas.
Army Headquarters - Bialystok.
6 cavalry building to have in the Tykotsin, Sokoly, Menlyanin area.
border left- claim. Add., Svisloch, Surals, Chileevo and further along the river Bug
Task- strong defense of the Osowiec and Zambrovsky fortified regions and field fortifications within the borders, covering the direction to Bialystok and especially from Johannisburg, Ostroleka and Ostrow Mazowiecki.

Cover area N3 - 13th army
Compound:
control 2 p. case
113 And 49 division pages;
control 13 mech.hulls
25 And 31 tank divisions;
208 motorized division;
border areas.
Army Headquarters Belsk
border left- claim. Kossovo, Gainuvka, Drogochin, Gura-Kalvaria.
Task- with the defense of field fortifications, firmly cover the directions to Bielsk from the direction of Kossy and Sokolow.

Cover area N4 - 4 army
Compound:
command of the 4th army;
control 28 pages of the body
6, 42, 75 And 100 division lines;
control 14 mechanized corps
22 And 30 tank division
205 motorized division;
garrison of the Brest fortified region;
10 mixed aviation division;
border areas.
border left- border of the village of Kovo.
Task- strong defense of the Brest fortified region and field fortifications along the eastern bank of the Bug River, to cover the concentration and deployment of the army.

At the direct disposal of the district command to have:
21 17 rifle division and 50 division division
47 rifle corps, 55 rifle division, 121 And 155 divisions
44 rifle corps, 108 division division , 64 division and 161 divisions, 37 And 143 divisions
Anti-tank brigades - 7 -I in the area of ​​the station Blasostovitsa, Grudsk, Yaluvka; 8 -I - in the Lida area
Mechanized Corps:
17 microns, in the composition 27 And 36 tank divisions and 209 motorized division in the Volkovysk area
20 microns- in the composition 26 And 38 tank divisions and 210 motorized division in the Oshmyany area.
4 airborne corps in the area of ​​Pukhovichi, Osipovichi.
Aviation - 59 And 60 fighter aviation division; 12 And 13 bomber divisions.
3 aviation corps - part of 42 And 52 long-range bomber air divisions and 61 fighter division. The corps is used according to the instructions of the High Command.
_____________________________________________________

In 13 and 11 MK, according to Pavlov, one division was trained, and the rest, having received recruits, had only a training unit, and even then not everywhere. 14 MK had only one poorly trained motorized division and rifle regiments of tank divisions.

(Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Documents and Materials; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M. 1992; Müller-Gillerband B. Land Army of Germany, 1933-1945; TsAMO. F. 208. Op. 25899. D. 93. L .5 (number of the front with the Pinsk flotilla)

Forces and means	Western Front (only serviceable equipment is taken into account)	Army Group "Center" (without 3 Tgr)	Ratio
Personnel, thousand people	678	629,9	1,1: 1
Guns and mortars (without 50 mm), pcs.	10296	12500	1:1,2
tanks	2189 (2201 if added according to MK)	810	2,7: 1
combat aircraft	1539	1677	1: 1,1

In the first echelon, the Germans concentrated 28 divisions, of which 4 were armored.
In the first echelon of the covering armies, it was planned to have only 13 rifle divisions (WWII, M, 1998).

And here is the data published in the "Secrecy stamp lifted":
The number of troops at the beginning of the Belarusian defensive operation - 625,000 people + 2300 (Pinsk military flotilla)
(Discrepancy at 50,700 people.)
In the course of hostilities, 45 divisions were added to the Soviet troops. The duration of the operation is 18 days. The width of the front of hostilities is 450-800 km. The depth of withdrawal of Soviet troops is 450-600 km. Average daily losses - 23210 people.

Information about the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West
June 13, 1941
...
Western Front
I Ground Forces
44 divisions, including SD-24, TD-12, MD-6, CD-2
II Air Force
21 air regiment
3A: 8 divisions, of which: sd - 5, td - 2, md - 1
10A: sd - 5 ( where did the cavalry divisions, the 6th MK and the 29th motorized division go?)
13A: 11 divisions, of which: sd -6, td - 2, md - 1, cd - 2
4A: 12 divisions, of which: sd - 6, td - 4, md - 2
front reserve - 8 divisions, of which: sd - 2, td - 4, md - 2
____________________________________________________________________

From the certificate "on the training of assigned personnel in rifle divisions in 1941":

Order:
64 sd
108 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
143 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
161 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
_____________________________________________________________________

From the certificate it turns out that the 44th reserve corps was replenished. None of the divisions of the 1st echelon was replenished.

Approximately, the number of ZapOVO divisions was 9327 people each. (History of the 2nd World War, 12 volumes) with a staff of 14483 people.

_____________________________________________
Directive of the NPO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZapOVO [not later than June 22, 1941]

1. To increase the combat readiness of troops to the districts, withdraw all deep rifle divisions and command and control rifle corps with corps units to the camp in the areas provided for by the cover plan (NPO directive for N503859 / cc / s /).
2. Leave the border divisions in place, having their withdrawal to the border in the areas assigned to them, if necessary, will be carried out on my special order.
3. 44 line corps, as part of the management of the corps 108, 64, 161 and 143 divisions and corps units - withdraw to the Baranovichi area, at your discretion.
Withdraw the 37 division to the Lida area, including it in the 21 division of the corps.
4. The withdrawal of these troops must be completed by July 1, 1941.
5. Submit the withdrawal plan with an indication of the order and timing of the withdrawal for each connection with a courier ... [June 41]

People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko
Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov
_______________________________________________

* * *

So, the real location of our units on June 22, 1941. Data compiled from orders and memoirs of military leaders. The most detailed location of parts 4A is indicated in Sandalovo's book "The First Days of the War".

3 army

Army headquarters in Grodno.

Compound	Commander	Headquarters location	Location of parts
4th rifle corps
56 rifle division	major general Sakhnov S.P.		area of ​​the Augustow Canal 213th regiment in the Sapotskin area (took part in the construction of the Grodno UR)
27 rifle division
85 rifle division			west of Grodno
24 rifle division	Galitsky K.N.
11 mechanized corps (237 tanks, including 31 KV and T-34)	general Mostovenko D.K.	Volkovysk
29 tank division	Steklov		Grodno district
204 motorized division		Volkovysk	Volkovysk

6 anti-tank artillery brigade - Mikhalovo area;
garrison of the Grodno fortified region;
11 mixed aviation division;
86 border squad.
124 GAP RGC

* * *

10 army
Commander Major General Golubev Konstantin Dmitrievich,
chief of staff - Major General Petr Ivanovich Lyapin.
Army Headquarters - Bialystok.

Compound	Commander	Headquarters location	Location of parts
5 rifle corps	major general Garnov A.V.	Zambrow
86 rifle division		Tsekhanovets	Tsekhanovets district
13 rifle division		Snyadovo	Sniadowo-Zambrow district
6 cavalry corps	Nikitin I.S.	Lomza	Lomza region
6 cavalry division		Lomza	Lomza
36 cavalry division		Volkovysk	Volkovysk
6 mechanized corps (1021 tanks of which 14 KV and 338 T-34)	major general Khatskilevich Mikhail Georgievich	Bialystok
4 tank division		Bialystok	Bialystok region
7th Panzer Division	major general Borzilov	Bialystok region	Bialystok region
29 motorized division		Bialystok	Bialystok region

garrisons of the Osovets and Zambrovsky fortified regions;
9 mixed aviation division - Bialystok area;
border areas.

* * *

4 army
commander - Major General Korobkov A.A.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Sandalov Leonid Mikhailovich
Army Headquarters - Kobrin

Compound	Commander	Headquarters location	Location of parts
28 rifle corps	major general Popov Vasily Stepanovich	Brest
6 rifle division	Popsuy-Shapko M.A.	Brest	Brest
42 rifle division	major general Lazarenko I.S.	Brest	Brest, Zhabinka
75 rifle division	general Nedvigin S.I.	Malorita	Mednaya district, Chersk, Malorita
14 mechanized corps (520 tanks)	general Oborin S.I., chief of staff - colonel Tutarinov I.V.	Kobrin
22 tank division	general Puganov V.P.	Brest	Brest
30 tank division (174 T-26 tanks)	colonel Bogdanov S.I., chief of staff - colonel Bolotov N.N.	Pruzhany	Pruzhany
205 motorized division	colonel Kudyurov F.F.	Bereza-Kartuzskaya	Bereza-Kartuzskaya

The 49th division was transferred to 4A from 13A.

10 mixed aviation division (commander - colonel Belov M.G.)
(from new types of aircraft: Yak-1 - 20, Il-2 - 8, Pe-2 - 5)
33rd (Pruzhany) and 123rd (Kobrin) fighter regiments,
74th Assault Aviation Regiment - field airfield southeast of Vysokoe
39th bomber regiment (Pinsk);

30 mixed air division (241 aircraft):
138 fighters (I-16 - 44, I-153 - 74 and Yak-1 - 20 aircraft)
55 attack aircraft (I-15 - 47 and IL-2 - 8 aircraft)
48 bombers (SB - 43 and Pe-2 - 5 aircraft)

Kobrin air defense brigade area:
218th and 298th air defense divisions of the RGK,
28th separate anti-aircraft artillery battery,
11th VNOS Battalion
(the anti-aircraft units of the brigade area, as well as the anti-aircraft divisions of the formations of the 4th army, were in the Krupki district camp, 115 km northeast of Minsk, 450 km from the border (!?))

Brest UR:
16th, 17th, 18th machine gun and artillery battalions

Brest border detachment(commander - Kuznetsov A.P.)

120 gap RGK - Kossovo

As Sandalov writes, "the troops of the 4th Army did not have an operational formation, however, the actual location of its formations by June 22, 1941 can be represented as a construction in two echelons: the first echelon - four rifle and one tank divisions; the second echelon - one tank and one motorized division.

* * *

13th army
Commander Lieutenant General Filatov Petr Mikhailovich
chief of staff - brigade commander Petrushevsky A.V.

On June 22, the Army Headquarters was in Mogilev in connection with which,
113 sd and 13 microns were transferred to 10A,
49 sd was transferred to 4A

* * *

2 rifle corps (commander - Major General Ermakov A.N.) - In Minsk
100 Major General Russiyanov I.N.) - In Minsk
161 rifle division (commander - Colonel Mikhailov A.I.)

21 rifle corps(commander - Major General Borisov V.B.) in the area of ​​the station Druskeniki, Yasidomlya, Skidel, Dembrovo
17 rifle division (commander - Major General Batsanov T.K.)
50 rifle division (commander - Major General Evdokimov V.P.)
37 rifle division (commander - Colonel Chekharin A.E.) - Lida district

47 rifle corps(commander - General Povetkin S.I.) - in Bobruisk
near Pruzhany, Dams, Kartuzberez, Bluden
55 rifle division (commander - Colonel Ivanov D.I.) - Slutsk
121 rifle division (commander - Major General Zykov P.M.)
143 rifle division (commander - Major General Safonov D.P.)

44 rifle corps(commander - major general Yushkevich V.A.) - Baranovichi district
108 rifle division (commander - Major General Mavrichev A.I.) - district of Minsk
64 rifle division (commander - Colonel Iovlev S.I.) - district of Minsk

8 anti-tank artillery brigade (commander - Strelbitsky I.S.) - in the Lida area
7 anti-tank artillery brigade in the area of ​​Blasostovitsa station, Grudsk, Yaluvka

17 mechanized corps(36 tanks, commander - General Petrov) - Baranovichi district
27 tank division - in Novogrudok
36 tank division - Nesvizh area
209 motorized division - in Ivye

20 mechanized corps(93 tanks) - Borisov area
26 tank division - in Minsk
38 Panzer Division - Borisov
210 motorized division - Osipovichi

12
13 bomber air division
3rd aviation corps (commander - Colonel Skripko N.S.)

4th airborne corps (commander - General Zhadov A.S.) - Pukhovichi district

Pinsk flotilla(commander - Admiral Rogachev D.D.)

* * *

Air Force of the Western Front

A total of 16 airfields to base 9, 10 and 11 gardens

Tirnovo (12 km from the border) - 131 aircraft (66 MiG-3 and 65 I-153)
Dolubovo (22 km from the border) - 83 aircraft (50 MiG-3 and 33 I-16)
Vysokie Mazowiec (16 km from the border) - 101 aircraft (70 MiG-3s and 31 I-16s)
At these airfields, all aircraft on the ground were destroyed.

In total, 732 aircraft were destroyed on the Western Front during the first day of the war.

Aviation formations (mixed and bomber)	Enemy aircraft shot down	Shot down in air battles	Shot down by anti-aircraft artillery	Destroyed on the ground	Didn't return from mission
9 garden	74	74	-	278	-
10 garden	23	23	-	157	-
11 garden	34	34	-	93	-
12 bad		-	2	-	-
13 bad		-	15	-	46
3rd Air Corps		2	1	-	7
Total:		133	18	528	53

Aviation of the Western Front
1		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
9th garden		Bialystok (management hell)	MiG-3, I-16	2/0	5/2	5	-	-	-	-
	41 iap	Bialystok, Seburcin	MiG-3, MiG-1	56/14	27/27	27	-	-	-	16
			I-16, I-15	22/4	36/18	36	25	25	-	-
	124 iap	Bialystok	MiG-3	70/8	16/16	16	-	-	-	29
		M.Mezovetsk	I-16	29/2	24/24	24	-	-	-	-
	126 iap	Belsk, Dolubovo	MiG-3	50/12	21/21	21	4	4	-	31
			I-16	23/10	42/13	42	-	-	-	-
	129 iap	Zabludovo, village Tarnovo	MiG-3	61/5		-	-	-	-	34
			I-153	57/8	40/40	40	11	11	-	-
	13 bap	Ros, Borisovshizna	SB, Ar-2	51/11	45/40	45	15	5	-	-
			Pe-2	8/0		-	-	-	-	-
Total in the air division			MiG-3, MiG-1, I-16, I-15, I-153, SB, Pe-2, Ar-2	429/74	256/201	256	55	45	0	110
10th garden		Kobrin (management hell)	Sat	1/0	3/1	-	-	-	-	-
	33 iap	Pruzhany	I-16	44/7	70/37	70	29	29	-	-
	74 cap	Pruzhany	I-153, I-15bis	62/2	70/60	70	21	21	-	-
			IL-2	8/0		-	-	-	-	-
	123 iap	Strigovo, Name day	I-153	61/8	71/53	71	6	6	-	-
			Yak-1	20/0		-	-	-	-	-
	39 bap	Pinsk, Zhabitsy	Sat	43/2	49/39	49	18	18	-	-
			Pe-2	9/0		-	-	-	-	-
Total in the air division			SB, Pe-2, Yak-1, I-16, I-15, I-153	248/19	263/190	260	74	74	0	0
11th garden		Lida (management hell)	SB, I-16, I-153	4/0	8/4	8	-	-	-	-
	122 iap	Lida	I-16, I-15bis	71/11	50/50	50	5	5	-	-
	127 iap	Skidel, Lesishche	I-153, I-15	72/7	53/53	53	39	21	-	-
	16 bap	Stomach, Cherlena	Sat	24/1	46/23	46	17	17	17	-
			Pe-2	37/0		-	-	-	-	39
Total in the air division			SB, Pe-2, I-16, I-15bis, I-153	208/19	157/130	157	61	43	17	39
12th bad		Vitebsk (management hell)	Sat	1/0	4/1	4	-	-	-	-
	43 bap	Vitebsk	Su-2	46/1	71/33	33	26	26	-	38
	128 bap	Ulla	Sat	41/1	68/31	31	-	-	-	37
	6 bap	Vitebsk	Sat	18/2	54/16	25	-	-	-	29
	209 bap	Balbasovo, Betskoye	Su-2	25/1	3/3	3	-	-	-
	215 bap	Smolensk, Herbalists	I-15bis	15/1	10/10	10	-	-	-
Total in the air division			SB, Su-2, I-15bis	146/6	210/94	106	26	26	0	104
13th bad		Bobruisk (management hell)	Sat	1/0	3/1	3	-	-	-	-
	24 bap	Bobruisk, Teikichi, Telushe	Sat	41/6	49/35	49	27	19	-	-
	97 bap	Bobruisk	Su-2	51/26	49/25	25	-	-	-	24
	121 bap	Bykhov	Sat	56/9	51/39	39	-	-	-	12
	125 bap	Bykhov	Sat	38/6	55/32	43	11	11	-	12
	130 bap	Bobrovichi, Gnoyevo	Sat	38/8	51/30	51	12	12	-	-
Total in the air division			SB, Su-2	225/55	258/162	210	50	42	0	48
43rd Iad		Balbasovo (management hell)	I-16	2/0	4/2	4	-	-	-	-
	160 iap	Balbasovo, Prongeevka	I-153, I-15	66/5	75/39	39	-	-	-	36
	161 iap	Balbasovo, Zubovo	I-16	62/3	59/17	17	-	-	-	42
	162 iap	Mogilev, Edlino	I-16	54/4	95/13	13	-	-	-	82
	163 iap	Mogilev, Lubnitsa	I-16	59/3	82/10	10	-	-	-	72
Total in the air division			I-16, I-153, I-15	243/15	315/81	83	0	0	0	232
313th rap		Slepnyanka	Sat	20/1	67/20	38	12	5	-	29
314th rap		Baranovichi	Sat	5/0	35/5	35	-	-	-	-
			Yak-2, Yak-4	28/0		-	-	-	-	12
161st reserve up		Lepel	I-16, I-153, I-15	42/8	65/34	65	7	7	-	-
162nd Reserve. up		Zyabrovka, Bronnoe, Kholmich	I-16, I-153, SB	64/8	76/56	76	-	-	-	-
Total for dep. up			SB, Yak-2, Yak-4, I-16, I-153, I-15	159/17	243/115	214	19	12	0	41
Total Air Force Military District				1658/205	1702/973	1286	285	242	17	574
Including new types			MiG-3, MiG-1, Yak-1, Pe-2, Il-2, Yak-2, Yak-4	347/39	64/64	64	4	4		16 1

1 - Aviation divisions and regiments that were part of them
2 - Name of dislocation points
3 - Aircraft types
4 - Number of combat aircraft (denominator - including defective aircraft)
5 - The total number of crews (the denominator - including the number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously taking to the air to perform a combat mission, depending on the presence of serviceable combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments)
6-10 - Crews prepared for combat operations:

6 - during the day in simple weather conditions
7 - at night in simple weather conditions
8 - during the day in difficult weather conditions
9 - at night in bad weather conditions
10 - retrained or commissioned upon arrival from schools