Conclusion of the Bucharest Peace. Story

| Part II

Completion of the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-1812.

March 7(19), 1811, the next (after General I.I. Mikhelson, General Baron K.I. Meyendorff, Field Marshal Prince A.A. Prozorovsky, General Prince P.I. Bagration, General. Count N.M. Kamensky) M.I. was appointed commander-in-chief of the Danube Army during this war. Kutuzov.

“On the occasion of the illness of the infantry general Count Kamensky 2nd, dismissing him until he is cured,” said the imperial rescript, “we appoint you commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army. We are very pleased to confer this title on you to open a new path to distinction and glory.” He accepted the monarch's choice with dignity. “The Sovereign’s power of attorney in such an important case,” he wrote to the Minister of War on March 1 (13), “contains everything that can only flatter a person, even the least ambitious. In less advanced years I would have been more useful. Incidents gave me knowledge of that land and the enemy. I wish that my bodily strength, in the performance of my duties, sufficiently corresponds to my most important feeling.” The nature of military operations with this appointment underwent major changes.

The new commander-in-chief faced a difficult task; he needed to achieve what his predecessors had failed to do, although with the arrival of Kutuzov, a significant part of the army - 5 divisions - had already begun to be withdrawn to Russia. There were 4 divisions left on the Danube, numbering about 46 thousand people. On the other hand, the Turkish army strengthened to 60 thousand people, it was led by the new Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha, who sought an offensive. Knowledge of "land and enemy" was absolutely necessary to achieve peace. The general knew the vizier since his embassy to Constantinople in 1783 and, first of all, considered it necessary to notify his old acquaintance of his appointment and congratulate Ahmed on his successes in the bureaucratic career. Kutuzov thought about future negotiations, but his old acquaintance did not. A large number of French instructors, especially in the artillery, gave Ahmed Pasha confidence in his forces. The Turks planned to use their numerical superiority and cross the Danube in two large detachments. Kutuzov initially entered into negotiations with the Grand Vizier, inviting him to begin discussing peace terms on the terms of Russia's refusal of indemnity and the reduction of territorial demands. However, Ahmed Pasha refused these lucrative offers, counting on success and the imminent start of the Russian-French war.

The new commander-in-chief of the Moldavian Army in his further actions proceeded from two calculations: 1) it is impossible to defend the entire line of the Danube from Belgrade to the mouth of the river with the forces of 4 divisions; 2) in order to keep the Turks behind the Danube, they must be disturbed on the right bank of the river. Therefore, he decided to go on the offensive from the Rushchuk fortress, knowing that it would attract enemy forces. Kutuzov never underestimated the enemy and was not going to take actions fraught with losses and successes that could not be developed into a real victory. “I will not miss the opportunity,” I wrote to the Minister of War from Bucharest on May 20 (June 1), “so as not to take advantage of any ill-considered step of the enemy. Going to the vizier in Shumla, attacking him in this fortification, strong in nature and with a certain degree of art, was both impossible and would not bring any benefit; and the acquisition of such a fortification, according to the plan of a defensive war, is not at all necessary. But perhaps, with my modest behavior, I will encourage the vizier himself to come out, or send, if possible, a noble corps to Razgrad, or further to Rushchuk. And if such an event happens to me, then, having taken the entire corps of Essen 3rd, except for a small number that should remain in Rushchuk, I will lead them against the enemy. At the location of unfortified Razgrad, which is advantageous for our troops, of course, with God’s help, I will defeat it and can pursue it, up to 25 versts, without any risk.”

Active defense did not mean abandoning allied support. Back in April 1811, the commander-in-chief transported 200,000 rifle cartridges to Kara-Georgia and transported a detachment of Major General Count I.K. to Serbia. Orurka. The general managed to circumvent the Austrian ban on food supplies to the Serbian rebels and conclude a secret agreement with Austrian grain merchants, who undertook to secretly ensure food supplies. June 19 (July 1), 1811 Kutuzov crossed the Danube with 20 thousand people. at Rushchuk. To ensure uninterrupted supply of his army, he managed to use the differences between the Grand Vizier and Pasha Viddin. Mullah Pasha was afraid that, if the Sultan's army was successful, he would have to leave his virtually uncontrolled place and preferred to negotiate the sale of the Turkish Danube flotilla to the Russians for 50,000 chervonets. On June 22 (July 4), the Turks, as the Russian commander wanted, launched an offensive near Rushchuk and were defeated near this fortress. Having lost about 5 thousand people, Ahmed Pasha immediately retreated to a remote fortified camp, hoping to meet a Russian attack there. Kutuzov did not follow these plans and made a decision that surprised everyone: “If we follow the Turks, we will probably reach Shumla, but then what will we do! It would be necessary to return, as last year, and the vizier would declare himself the winner. It’s much better to encourage my friend Ahmet Bey and he will come to us again.”

The commander-in-chief decided to gather all his 4 divisions into a single fist. He withdrew the garrison from Ruschuk, blew up its fortifications and returned to the left bank of the Danube. Ahmed Pasha immediately occupied the city and declared his victory. On July 17 (29), a messenger from the Grand Vizier appeared at Kutuzov’s headquarters with a letter in which he outlined his preliminary demands for a peace treaty - the restoration of the territorial integrity of the pre-war possessions of the Porte. Kutuzov refused. Inspired by their successes, the Turks began to implement their old plans. On July 20 (August 1), the 20,000-strong corps of Izmail Bey began to cross the Danube at Kalafat, where it was firmly locked by a 6,000-strong Russian detachment sent there in advance under the command of Lieutenant General A.P. von Sass. News from the Danube greatly pleased Paris. There they hoped for a continuation of the Russian-Turkish war and looked with displeasure at the transfer of part of the Moldavian army to the north.

On August 15, 1811, at a reception on his name day, Napoleon immediately noted this in a conversation with the Russian ambassador. Naturally, the French emperor clothed his displeasure in the form of concern for Russian interests: “... by withdrawing five divisions from the Danube army, you deprived yourself of the means to deliver a strong blow to the Turks and thereby force them to conclude a peace beneficial to you. I don’t understand what your hopes for peace negotiations in Bucharest are based on. Fearing the imaginary danger published by some newspapers, you have weakened the Danube army to such an extent that it cannot even maintain a defensive position. It is extremely difficult to defend such an extended line as from Viddin to the Black Sea.” Judging by subsequent events, Kutuzov perfectly understood the difficulty of the last problem, and therefore came up with an original solution for it. On August 28 (September 9), the vizier began to cross to the left bank of the Danube near the village of Slobodzeya, a few kilometers above Rushchuk. The location was chosen in such a way that the Turkish artillery, positioned on the high right bank, could support the Turkish army across the river. Under this cover the Turks immediately fortified their camp with trenches. On September 2 (14), about 36 thousand people crossed there. All that Kutuzov cared about was that as many Turks as possible move to the left bank of the river.

Even earlier, the Russian commander-in-chief, having correctly calculated the enemy’s course of action, moved the 9th and 15th divisions, which played the role of a reserve, closer to the Danube, and on September 8 (20) sent them on reinforced marches to Slobodzeya. As a result, the Grand Vizier never dared to try to move away from his crossing. Contrary to his expectations, Kutuzov did not attack the Turkish camp, but firmly surrounded it with Russian fortifications. On the night of October 1 (13), a 7,000-strong detachment of Lieutenant General E.I. Markova secretly crossed the Danube 12 kilometers above Slobodzeya and on October 2 (14) suddenly attacked part of the Turkish army stationed on the right bank near the artillery. In a short battle, Markov scattered over 30 thousand Turks, losing only 9 people. killed and 40 wounded. The Turkish camp, all the artillery, ships and supplies of the Grand Vizier were captured. The Turkish army found itself surrounded under fire from its own guns. “All our troops on the left bank of the Danube,” Kutuzov later reported, “witnessed the horror that spread throughout the Turkish camp at the unexpected approach of General Markov.”

On October 7 (19), von Sass undertook exactly the same operation, transporting part of his blocking detachment to Viddin. With the support of Serbian militias, a 3,000-strong Russian detachment defeated the troops of the local pasha. Ishmael Bey immediately abandoned Kalafat and hastily retreated beyond the Balkans. Russian troops again began active operations beyond the Danube. On October 10 (22) and 11 (23) Turtukai and Silistria were taken. All this time, the Serbs did not stop their actions, who received great assistance with weapons, money and ammunition. The success was complete, but it was complicated by the fact that the Grand Vizier himself was surrounded, who, according to Turkish tradition, had no right to negotiate in such a situation. Fortunately, on October 3 (15), he escaped from the camp. The joyful Kutuzov congratulated the generals and officers of his headquarters on this: “The Vizier has left, his escape brings us closer to peace.” The general was not mistaken - on October 16 (28), 1811, peace negotiations began. The situation of the blocked army became tragic - having eaten all the horses, the garrison of the camp ate grass, suffering from a shortage of absolutely everything - from firewood to clean water inclusive. Mortality reached several hundred people daily. Turkish soldiers tried to approach Russian positions to buy or exchange food, but the commander strictly prohibited such an exchange. About 2 thousand people. ran over to the Russian side.

Meanwhile, the complete destruction of this army was by no means part of Kutuzov’s plans - he needed it as a guarantee of negotiations. Therefore, he began to feed her and prepare to keep this pledge under guard. “If you use force against the Turkish army, which I have, so to speak, under guard,” he wrote on November 11 (23), 1811, to Barclay de Tolly, “then I will inevitably break off the negotiations, and, having taken this army, although I will, that the Porta will have less than fifteen thousand troops, but I will embitter the Sultan and, due to his well-known disposition, I will, perhaps, give up hope for peace for a long time, and if, moreover, the conditions now proposed seem similar to the court, what a heavy responsibility I am exposed to and, perhaps, a curse from the whole nation. On the other hand, perhaps the time of year will not allow me to keep the Turkish army in the position I have it now; when the ice spreads along the Danube, then I will have to remove the flotilla from its position, and maybe return Lieutenant General Markov to this side. The only way that I am beginning to put into action, if I could succeed, is the following: since I give very little food to the Turkish army and they have nothing more than a summer dress with them, they endure hunger and cold and daily approach ours. outposts, begging for bread; some offer their expensive weapons for a few loaves of bread; they don’t have anything to start a fire with, so they burnt all the tent poles and all the damaged gun carriages.” As a result, a proposal was made to the Turks - to move inland from the Danube, closer to the Russian army stores, where a camp would be prepared for them and supplies would be provided according to the standards of the Russian army. The condition was the surrender of weapons.

November 23 (December 5), 1811, the remnants of the Turkish army capitulated. 12 thousand people They were actually captured (formally they were not yet considered prisoners of war), and 56 guns became trophies. Russian victories plunged Vienna into fussy despondency. Metternich did not hide the fact that any peace treaty between Russia and Turkey, concluded on conditions other than maintaining the pre-war borders, would be disadvantageous to Austria. The reason was simple. “I am as much afraid of the wounded pride of the minister as of the threatening damage to the benefits of Austria. – The Russian envoy reported from Vienna. “She cannot look with indifference at our acquisitions in the east, the only country to which her claims for acquisitions are directed that could reward her for the losses suffered in the wars against France.” Napoleon was most irritated. News from the banks of the lower Danube infuriated him: “Understand these dogs, these scoundrels, the Turks, who managed to allow themselves to be defeated in this way! Who could have foreseen this and expected this! - this is how the Emperor of France reacted to this news.

Indeed, Paris's plans were disrupted. French diplomacy strained every effort to disrupt the peace treaty. Napoleon offered the Sultan an alliance and promised to facilitate the return of all the territories lost by Turkey over the past 60 years. Alexander I, in the name of the Fatherland, called on Kutuzov to use every effort to make peace, and he carried out the order. His task was simplified by the actions of the French ambassador, who went so far as to threaten in his desire to keep the Sultan in the war, and by the efforts of the English ambassador, who sought to end the war. Turkey's situation was extremely difficult; it needed peace. The Sultan did not have an army, a riot broke out in the navy, and the capital suffered from a shortage of bread. However, the position of the commander-in-chief was not simple. The emperor expected from him not just the end of the war. “Having carefully considered everything that happened and weighed all the circumstances related to the political situation in Europe,” he wrote to Kutuzov on December 12 (24), 1811, “I find: 1) that a peace indecent to the dignity of Russia will be more harmful for it than useful ; 2) by diminishing respect for the power of Russia, it will prove a clear lack of firmness in our cabinet, and; 3) will bring a sad understanding of our representatives and the motives by which they acted.”

Thus, the commander-in-chief had to hurry to conclude peace, but not make concessions in the face of the obvious war impending on Russia. The latter could not but affect the intransigence of the Turks. The Sultan's Council, assembled in November 1811, advocated peace only if the demands of the Russian side were moderate. Kutuzov, in order to achieve his goals, was forced to demonstrate considerable diplomatic skill. Peace negotiations were protracted and difficult. To speed them up, Kutuzov demonstrated his readiness to move from words to actions. On January 1(13), 1812, he warned about the possibility of ending the truce, after which the surrendered army was transferred to the category of prisoners of war and legally, which had to be done on January 3(15). At the end of January 1812, the commander ordered four small Russian detachments to cross the Danube at Sistovo, Silistia, Galati and Izmail and demonstrate Russian weapons to the Turkish coast. On February 2(14) this was used. No one interfered with this demonstration, and a few days later the troops returned back, as unhindered as they had come. A simple raid contributed greatly to the acceleration of affairs in Bucharest.

At the last stage, the negotiations were under serious threat. On February 11 (23), 1812, the Emperor signed the Highest Rescript, which said: “... wanting to decisively end the war with Porto, I do not find a better way to achieve this goal than to carry out a strong blow under the walls of Constantinople with sea and land forces.” Three divisions were assigned to the landing, of which only one was in Crimea, the second as part of the Moldavian Army, and the third in Podolia. Troops have already begun moving to Sevastopol and Odessa. Lieutenant General Duke E.O. was appointed at the head of the expedition. de Richelieu. The troop movements were noticeable and caused great concern to the Turkish delegation. Following this, Kutuzov skillfully used not only military success, but also rumors about proposals for the division of the Ottoman Empire, made by Napoleon on the eve of Erfurt, which greatly worried the Turks, who did not particularly trust their Parisian patron.

March 5(17), 1812 N.P. Rumyantsev sent a secret message to the Commander-in-Chief, which played a significant role in subsequent negotiations: “These days, the aide-de-camp Colonel Chernyshev arrived here from Paris, sent by courier from Emperor Napoleon with a letter to His Imperial Majesty, in which he, in convincing sayings, expresses his readiness to agree with The Sovereign Emperor about means that can serve to his satisfaction and to preserve the closest ties between Russia and France. Ambassador Prince Kurakin confirms the same thing, drawing the attention of the Highest Court to a doubtless way, according to correct information that has reached him, to end all disputes with France. This method is the division of the Ottoman Empire or, more precisely, the provinces belonging to it in Europe. His Majesty found the similarity of this news with that which came to us from Stockholm to be so important that he ordered me to immediately send a courier to Your Lordship with this news.” The Emperor ordered this information to be brought to the Turkish side, accompanied by assurances of his conviction about the need for the existence of the Ottoman Empire and peace between it and Russia. This information was skillfully used by Kutuzov, becoming, obviously, worthy of trust from the point of view of the Turks. This once again accelerated the progress of negotiations.

On April 18 (30), 1812, Kutuzov, in instructions to the Russian representatives at the negotiations, outlined the main requirements for the future peace treaty, which had been communicated to him shortly before by the chancellor. They consisted of 4 points:

"1. Peaceful and quiet existence of the Serbs and giving them the opportunity to establish a system of civil and internal government in their country and to exercise government themselves; Moreover, the sovereign rights of the Sultan should in no way be infringed or diminished.

2. Confirmation of the privileges granted to Wallachia and the remaining part of Moldavia, with the additions regarding which it was agreed at the conference in Zhurzhevo.

3. The cession of conquests made in Asia during the war, or, if this proves impossible, the maintenance of the status quo for a period of five years, after which period, or even before its expiration, the commissioners appointed by both sides must proceed to establish the border by friendly agreement, or, finally, complete silence in the treaty about this border.

4. Establishment of the border in Europe along Seret, according to the agreement reached in Zhurzhevo.”

By early May 1812, negotiations were close to completion. Both sides considered it best to make concessions. “I surrender to the generosity of Your Imperial Majesty. – Reported from Bucharest on May 4 (16) to Emperor Kutuzov. – That I couldn’t do anything better is due to the state of affairs in Europe; that I did not miss any efforts and methods, God is my witness.” Kutuzov felt the approach of the denouement; on May 6 (18), Admiral Chichagov arrived in Bucharest with a favorable rescript from Alexander I, signed on April 5 (17), 1812: “By concluding peace with the Ottoman Porte, interrupting the actions of the army, I find it appropriate that you come to St. Petersburg, where you are expected to be rewarded for all the famous services that you have rendered to Me and the Fatherland. Hand over the army entrusted to you to Admiral Chichagov.” Of course, the emperor could not be sure that peace would be concluded by the time Kutuzov’s successor arrived, and just in case, he had with him another rescript ordering him to transfer the army to Chichagov and leave for St. Petersburg to participate in the State Council. The Emperor did not favor Kutuzov and clearly did not want the successful end of a long and not always successful war to be associated with his name. Kutuzov understood everything and remained in Bucharest for another 10 days - until the agreement was signed.

Under the terms of the Peace of Bucharest, Russia received Bessarabia, the border in Europe was transferred from the Dniester River to the Prut until it connected with the Danube, freedom of Russian trade navigation along this river was ensured, the Danube principalities occupied by Russian troops were returned to Turkey, but at the same time their internal autonomy, granted to based on the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi (1774) and Yassy (1791) peace treaties. Article 8 obliged Constantinople to grant Serbia autonomy in matters of internal administration and the right to Serbian officials to collect taxes in favor of the Sultan. At the same time, in the same article Russia was forced to make concessions:

“In accordance with what is established by the fourth article of the preliminary points, although there is no doubt that the Sublime Porte, according to its rules, will use leniency and generosity against the Serbian people, as from ancient times subjects of this power and paying tribute to it, however, looking at the participation that the Serbs took in the actions of this war, it is considered decent to establish special conditions for their safety. As a result, the Sublime Porte grants forgiveness and a general amnesty to the Serbs, and thus they cannot be bothered for their past deeds. The fortresses that they could build on the occasion of the war in the lands they inhabited, and which were not there before, will be, since they are useless for the future, destroyed and the Sublime Porte will continue to take possession of all the fortresses, palancas and other fortified places , existing since ancient times, with artillery, military supplies and other items and military shells, and she will establish garrisons there at her discretion. But, so that these garrisons do not do any oppression to the Serbs in contravention of the rights belonging to their subjects, the Sublime Porte, driven by a feeling of mercy, will take the measures necessary for their safety towards the Serbian people. She will grant the Serbs, at their request, the same benefits that the subjects of her Archipelago islands and other places enjoy, and will make them feel the effects of her generosity, leaving them to manage their internal affairs, determining the measure of their taxes, receiving them from their own hands, and she will finally establish all these objects in common with the Serbian people.”

At the same time, a secret agreement was concluded, according to which Russia pledged to demolish the fortresses of Izmail and Kiliya, which were passing to it, and in the future not to restore fortifications there. The reason for the concessions was the proximity of the war with France. The treaty also confirmed Russia's right to patronize Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In Transcaucasia, Türkiye recognized the expansion of Russian possessions, but the Anapa fortress was returned to it. For its part, Constantinople pledged to use its “good offices” to conclude peace between Russia and Persia. Thanks to this timely concluded treaty, Russia freed the Danube Army to fight the Napoleonic invasion. “There is no doubt,” wrote Count N.P. on May 16 (28), 1812. Rumyantsev Kutuzov - that the peace now concluded with the Porte will turn the displeasure and hatred of France towards it, and therefore it is also indisputable that the more Emperor Napoleon threatens the Porte, the sooner the Sultan will decide on all our proposals, then honoring an alliance with us for necessary for your own safety.”

In St. Petersburg they were dissatisfied with the terms of the agreement, considering the concessions too significant. Kutuzov fell into disgrace again. Alexander I was especially outraged that the general violated his direct instructions to achieve an offensive alliance with Turkey. It must be admitted that the emperor's discontent was not justified. The Sultan, who quickly found someone responsible for the concessions, was also dissatisfied. On his orders, the dragoman of the Porte, Dmitry Muruzi, was accused of treason. After this, Muruzi, already the ruler of Moldova, was summoned to Shumla, where he was arrested and brought to a speedy trial, after which he was beheaded. The head of the executed man was sent to the capital and was displayed in shame for three days in the square near the Cathedral of St. Sophia. Thus, everyone had to pay for the concessions except the Grand Vizier, who led the Turkish delegation.

It should be noted that Kutuzov managed to achieve maximum results in a limited time. The timeliness of the conclusion of peace is well illustrated by the following fact: the treaty was ratified by Alexander I in Vilna on June 11 (23), 1812, that is, the day before the start of the Napoleonic invasion, and the manifesto on the conclusion of peace followed only after the exchange of ratifications, on August 5 (17) of that the same year when the French had already deeply invaded Russia.

As for Turkey, it especially actively objected to the approval of a new border with Russia in Transcaucasia and the granting of autonomy to the Serbs, even subject to the transfer of fortresses in Serbia to the Turks. Initially, the Sultan ratified only the main text of the treaty, and only on July 2, ratifications were exchanged between the two empires. On August 16 (28), representatives of Serbia signed an address addressed to Emperor Alexander I: “Serbia and the Serbian people, remembering the countless benefits of Russia to them, hereby promise and undertake to the same faith and tribe of Russia, and in the future and in all centuries, to remain faithful and committed , and never change her in anything, as until now this has been proven in word and deed and faith (of heart and spirit) always and on every occasion.”

The Treaty of Bucharest confirmed international guarantees of the autonomy of Wallachia and Moldavia, and created this precedent in relation to Serbia. The annexation of Bessarabia to Russia created conditions for the free and progressive development of this territory, the borders of which have always been delineated by the Dniester and Prut rivers. Peace with Turkey and free trade along the Danube, of course, had a beneficial effect on the prospects for economic development of the entire south of Russia, from Odessa to Azov, although the importance of Russian trade interests in the eastern Mediterranean during this period should not be overestimated.

England remained the main exporter of Russian bread, hemp, lard, etc., as well as their main carrier, and the main trade route was the Baltic. If in the prosperous pre-war years (1802-1806) the average trade turnover of the Baltic Sea ports was 59.2 million rubles. ser., Bely - 3.3 million rubles, then Chernoy and Azov - 6.6 million rubles. The restoration of foreign trade was not associated with the Peace of Bucharest. On July 6 (18), 1812, a peace treaty with Great Britain was signed in Örebro (Sweden), St. Petersburg resumed contacts with London. On September 12 (24), 1812, after the exchange of ratifications, the emperor issued a manifesto on the resumption of trade relations between the two countries, followed by a decree on September 15 (27) lifting the embargo on British ships and the sequestration on the property of British subjects.

This had a very positive impact on Russian trade, but the consequences of the decree did not appear immediately. It came out almost at the end of navigation, which explains the relatively modest figures for Russian exports and imports in 1812 (38, 8 and 23.2 million rubles). In addition, 1812 and 1813 could hardly be called successful for trade. Exports from Russia in 1813 amounted to 33.4 million rubles, and imports – 29.5 million rubles. A turning point began in 1814, when goods worth 50.4 million rubles were exported and 35.6 million rubles were imported. And only in 1815 did the indicators of Russian exports and imports approach the pre-blockade indicators: 54.6 and 30.3 million rubles.

The Bucharest and subsequent Gulistan treaties legally formalized Russia's penetration into Transcaucasia, caused primarily by considerations of protecting coreligionists. This was already enough to make inevitable the growth of almost manic and therefore dangerous suspicion among English and especially Anglo-Indian politicians, and a war with the mountaineers of the North Caucasus, deprived of the usual prey for their raids, and a further deterioration in relations with Iran.

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Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1887. T.3. 1810, 1811 and 1812 Gr. Kamensky 2, book. Golenishchev-Kutuzov and Chichagov. P.406.

Zlotnikov M.F. Continental blockade and Russia. M.-L.1966. P.293.

No. 25197. P.405.

PSZ. First meeting. SPb.1830. T.32. 1812-1815. Right there. No. 25233. P.421.

Right there. No. 25224. P.421.

Zlotnikov M.F. Uk.op. P.291.

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COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS
Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA),
Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA)

"Treaty of Bucharest (1812)"

About the project Documents

E.P. Kudryavtseva

Peace of Bucharest 1812 - Russian breakthrough into the Balkans

The Peace of Bucharest, concluded by Russia and the Ottoman Empire on May 16 (28), 1812, as a result of the completed Russian-Turkish war, was one of the most important political and strategic documents that formed the basis of Russia’s geopolitical doctrine in the Balkans. This peace treaty, along with the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi peace of 1774, which for the first time allowed the Russian authorities to “make representations” in favor of the Christian subjects of the Porte, became the starting point on which all further Russian-Turkish documents were based, containing normative acts of the political existence of the Danube Principalities and Serbia within the Ottoman Empire.

The Bucharest Peace Treaty was a major diplomatic victory for Russia. He significantly strengthened its position on the southern borders - Russia turned into a Danube power, retained the regions in the Caucasus and the Black Sea coast with the city of Sukhumi that voluntarily joined it. Only conquered lands and fortresses were returned to Turkey, but Mingrelia, Imereti, Guria and Abkhazia, which voluntarily became part of Russia, remained with Russia. The terms of the treaty for the first time recognized the right of the Serbian people to have a number of bodies of self-government while being part of the Ottoman Empire, which provided Serbia with certain opportunities for future political development. The treaty recognized the autonomous self-government of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as the annexation of Bessarabia to Russia. The change in the southwestern border was important, since it now ran along the left bank of the Danube to its mouth and the Black Sea, which was of strategic importance for the defense of the Russian Empire.

First of all, the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest should be considered as a positive political step on the eve of the war with Napoleon. Indeed, on the eve of the war with France, Russia sought to end the protracted military conflict with the Ottoman Empire: Alexander I ratified the Treaty of Bucharest literally the day before the invasion of the “Great Army” into Russia. As a result of the concluded peace, Russia managed to ensure Turkey's neutrality before the decisive battle with Napoleon. However, the significance of the Bucharest Peace is not limited to the creation of a favorable strategic climate on the eve of the war with France.

The peace concluded in Bucharest required great diplomatic skill from the Russian representatives and was the undoubted merit of M.I. Kutuzov, who negotiated with the Ottoman representatives. In the fall of 1811, Kutuzov received instructions from St. Petersburg with peace terms acceptable to Russia. But since the Turks were not ready to begin negotiations at this time, Kutuzov had to resume hostilities, defeat the Turks at Rushchuk, and only then return to discussing peace terms. In his secret rescript dated March 22 (April 3), 1812, Alexander I wrote to Kutuzov: “You will render the greatest service to Russia by hastily concluding peace. I most convincingly appeal to you with love for your Fatherland to direct all your attention to achieving this goal. Glory to you will be eternal...” On the Russian side, the agreement was signed by the Russian envoy in Constantinople A.Ya. Italinsky, General of the Moldavian Army I.V. Sabaneev and the first dragoman of the Russian mission in Constantinople I.P. Fonton. The Turkish delegation was headed by Galib Efendi and included the commander-in-chief of the Turkish army, Ahmet Pasha.

When signing the agreement, says researcher V.N. Vinogradov, Kutuzov took on enormous responsibility - after all, despite the fact that the emperor directly pointed out the need to sign the agreement, its terms did not at all correspond to the claims of Russia. Back in the summer of 1810, Kutuzov received instructions from St. Petersburg to seek concessions from Turkey to Moldova and Bessarabia, as well as monetary compensation. Only after Kutuzov managed to convince the Turkish side that the mission of Napoleon's adjutant Count of Narbonne to Alexander's headquarters would result in Russian-French agreements directed against Turkey itself, did the Ottoman government rush to conclude an agreement with Russia. Ahmet Pasha quite frankly expressed his thoughts in a conversation with Fonton when he said that the reconciliation of Russia and Turkey was the main task of the moment, since they must “take care of the common defense.” The French side considered it incredible that the conclusion of such an agreement was possible - after all, even the day before, in February 1812, Napoleon tried to convince the Sultan of the need to sign a Franco-Turkish alliance, which would allow Turkey to lay claim to the vast Russian territories of the Black Sea region and Transcaucasia. The French emperor considered it incredible that the scales had tipped to the Russian side - in June 1812 he directly asked Adjutant General A.D. Balashova: “Is it true that you made peace with the Turks? ...if you claim, as they tell me, the border along the river. The rod, nothing will come of it, rest assured.” The signing of the peace was kept in great secrecy and gave rise to numerous rumors about the contents of the articles of this document. Later, when Napoleon wrote his memoirs on Fr. St. Helena, he admitted that after the news of the Bucharest Peace he should have abandoned the campaign against Russia - after all, instead of two potential allies - Turkey and Sweden, who could pull the flanks of the Russian army to the north and south - he was faced with a single enemy , which strengthened its political position through the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Swedish agreements. Thus, according to Napoleon’s associate Count F.-P. Segur, possible friends of France became its enemies, and the 50,000-strong Moldavian army could, forgetting about the Turkish threat, take part in the battles on the western front.

A separate issue of the signed agreements was the fate of the Caucasian lands. Even before the peace was signed, Kutuzov admitted to Rumyantsev that he intended to sign “a dark and confusing article on the Caucasus, which... would give us the opportunity... to insist on preserving for us what is now in charge of our troops.” Indeed, Kutuzov intended not to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. However, the British intervened in this issue, who, according to Admiral Chichagov, “only thought about what harm could be for English India if Russia established itself in the Caucasus.” As a result of the peace, Russian troops were evacuated from Anapa, Poti and Akhalkalaki, but remained in Sukhumi and Redut-Kala, controlling almost the entire coast of Abkhazia, Megrelia and Guria. Russia acquired a 200 km long section of the Black Sea coast. Despite the fact that the demands of the Porte in this matter were fully satisfied, the dispute over the ownership of the Caucasian territories remained for a long time one of the main points of discussion in Russian-Turkish relations. If Ghalib Effendi demanded a return to the “status quo ante bellum” position, the Russian side insisted that only territories occupied by “force of arms”, but not voluntarily annexed, that had entered into Russian citizenship before the start of the war were subject to return. As Kutuzov predicted, the article regarding the situation of the Caucasian lands for many years remained the most “dark and confusing” in a long series of Russian-Turkish contradictions. Apparently, it was precisely the conditions of the Caucasian settlement that became the reason that the Sultan, upon receiving news of the conclusion of the Peace of Bucharest, ordered the execution of the Turkish dragoman who signed the treaty, without deciding, however, to completely abandon its execution. However, it should be noted that in Romanian historiography there are assumptions that the conclusion of peace is a consequence of the betrayal of the Ottoman deputies. The executed Dimitrie Moruzi allegedly had a ring worth 12 thousand lei and documents for ownership of an estate in that part of Moldova that was ceded to Russia. There is no documentary evidence to support this thesis, and the very assumption of this kind probably arose precisely because the conclusion of peace was of particular importance for Russia. No wonder E.V. Tarle very highly appreciated the significance of this document: “Kutuzov is a diplomat,” says E.V. Tarle - dealt Napoleon a heavy blow in 1812 even earlier than Kutuzov the military leader.”

However, one cannot discount the self-sufficiency of the terms of the treaty for all subsequent Russian policy in the Balkans and the development of the concept of geopolitical priorities in the entire Middle East region, including the Straits. One of the most important, and perhaps the main, consequences of the Treaty of Bucharest was the opportunity received by Russia to control the implementation of all articles of the treaty, build on this further Russian-Turkish relations and use them to strengthen its influence in the vastness of the Balkan Peninsula by ensuring the political development of the Orthodox peoples subject to the Porte - Moldovans, Vlachs, Serbs, Greeks.

The political situation in Europe on the eve of the conclusion of the treaty remained extremely difficult. In 1807, the Tilsit Agreement was concluded between Alexander I and Napoleon, as a result of which Russia became an ally of France. According to the Russian-French agreements, the two European powers divided the spheres of their political interests. As a result, France got Western Europe, and Russia got Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, which became the object of close attention of the Russian government. According to preliminary agreements, Russia strengthened its influence in the Danube principalities and Serbia, and France in Albania, Dalmatia and Kotor. The final text of the Russian-French alliance, signed on June 25, 1807, no longer contained these conditions, but implied the mediation of Paris in relation to all controversial Russian-Turkish issues. Of course, this situation could not meet the interests of the Russian side, since the success of its policy in the Ottoman Empire directly depended on the absence of third intermediary parties that violated a possible Russian-Turkish agreement.

Despite the rapprochement between Russia and England under the threat of Napoleonic aggression, Russian-English contradictions could not be considered completely eliminated. At this time, Russia could not pretend to be a worthy adversary of Great Britain in the Mediterranean basin - the previous positions that it occupied in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic were lost, and the Russian-Turkish treaties of 1799 and 1805, which gave significant advantages to the Russian fleet in the Straits, ceased to operate. Moreover, according to the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1809, the Bosporus and Dardanelles, at the insistence of Great Britain, were closed to warships of all powers, which was a significant blow, first of all, to the Russian fleet. However, at the conclusion of the Bucharest Peace, England was on the side of Russia - after all, the terms of the peace were beneficial to the Russian ally of Great Britain and strengthened its military power on the western borders of the Russian Empire. At the same time, the concepts of Russia and England regarding cooperation with the Ottoman Empire differed significantly. If Great Britain stood in the position of maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, then plans to establish new semi-independent Christian states on the vast territory of the Ottoman Empire, relying on the help of Orthodox Russia, became widespread in Russian ruling circles. These plans for the creation of separate or a common Slavic-Serbian state, uniting several Slavic peoples within its borders, were purely hypothetical constructions that did not have definite political support from the government, but they expressed the general trends of Russia’s future policy in the Balkans quite clearly.

The Bucharest Peace basically posed the problem of the political existence of the Danube principalities and Serbia. Among the numerous Orthodox peoples who inhabited the Ottoman Empire, only Serbs, Moldovans and Wallachians could claim both independent political existence and political support from Russia, since only they had formed and developed internal governance bodies and represented regions of high political interest for the Russian authorities . It was the Danube principalities that were a strategically important region, border lands between Russia and Turkey, which have long had a number of political privileges. It was here that the Russian-Turkish wars began and were fought, and the local population turned their gaze towards Russia with hope. The adopted provisions on the autonomy of these components of the Ottoman Empire, along with the annexation of Bessarabia and the opening up of opportunities for commercial shipping along the Danube with access to the Black Sea - everything was connected with the strengthening of the commercial (and, if possible, military) presence of the Russian fleet in the Straits, and, consequently, , and in the Mediterranean. Thus, the conditions of the Bucharest Peace, which solved specific problems of Russian foreign policy, contained the basis for subsequent agreements built on the foundation laid in 1812. First of all, this concerned the fate of the Christian peoples of Turkey.

Supporting the political status of Serbia and the Danube principalities as autonomies within the Ottoman Empire was of utmost importance for the further development of the independence of the future Balkan states. The Treaty of Bucharest provided for ensuring the rights of Serbia “as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the Serbian nation,” which was used by the Serbian side in the coming years to create its own constitution - the Charter, in the development of which Russian diplomats took an active part.

In general, Russia's diplomatic support for the Serbian liberation movement and the desire to attract the attention of European powers to the problem of the oppressed Slavic peoples testified to the growing role of the eastern direction in Russian foreign policy and its intention to support the Orthodox subjects of the Porte in their struggle against Ottoman oppression. The attempt to attract attention to Turkish Christians during the Congress of Vienna, and then the open severance of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire in 1821 after the outbreak of the Greek Revolution - all these were successive steps by the Russian government in the same direction. The Eastern problem has once and for all taken its place among Russia's foreign policy priorities. All further peace initiatives of the Russian government, as well as attempts to resolve controversial Russian-Turkish issues by military means, were based on the agreements signed in Bucharest.

After the end of the Congress of Vienna and the creation of the Holy Alliance, the Russian government intensified the Balkan direction of its foreign policy, which was a consequence of the peace signed in Bucharest in 1812. It was the articles of the Treaty of Bucharest that appeared in all subsequent agreements between Russia and the Ottoman Empire as the foundation of their interaction and allowed the Russian leadership to act with reasonable demands for unconditional fulfillment of all terms of the accepted agreement. References to the Treaty of Bucharest sounded like a refrain during the Russian-Turkish discussions, which were conducted in Constantinople by the Russian envoy G.A. for six years. Stroganov on the political structure of Serbia and the Danube principalities. Mention of the treaty is present in later Russian-Turkish documents - the Ackerman Convention of 1826 and the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, the terms of which were extremely important for the future fate of the Balkan peoples: self-government of the Danube principalities expanded, Greece and Serbia received autonomy.

Kuznetsova G.A. The diplomatic debut of Alexander I. The Peace of Tilsit // Russian diplomacy in portraits. M., 1992. P. 117.

Quote By: Munkov N.P. Kutuzov is a diplomat. M., 1962. P. 88.

Kudryavtseva E.P. Russia and the formation of Serbian statehood. 1812-1856 M., 2009.

In Bucharest, on the Russian side, the chief commissioner was Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, on the Turkish side, Ahmed Pasha.

Peace negotiations began back in October 1811, after the defeat of the main forces of Turkey near Rushchuk (today Ruse, Bulgaria) and the encirclement of most of them at Slobodzeya. The Sultan's authorized representative, Galib Efendi, as well as English and French diplomats, tried to delay the negotiations in every possible way, but Kutuzov achieved their completion a month before the start of Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Thanks to this agreement, the security of the southwestern borders of Russia was ensured, and Turkey could no longer take part in Napoleon’s campaign against Russia. This was a major military and diplomatic victory that improved the strategic situation for Russia at the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812. The Danube Army could be redeployed to reinforce the troops covering Russia's western borders. Türkiye also left its alliance with France.

The Bucharest Peace Treaty consisted of 16 public and two secret articles.

For the first time, Russia received naval bases on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea. Also, the Treaty of Bucharest ensured the privileges of the Danube principalities and the internal self-government of Serbia, which marked the beginning of its complete independence. The main provisions of the treaty were confirmed on September 25 (October 7) by the Ackerman Convention.

After the conclusion of the Bucharest Peace, a manifesto was issued on the withdrawal of troops from Moldova beyond the Prut and securing the right to dispose of property for a period of one year, during which residents from both banks of the Prut could freely move at their own request to Turkish and Russian territory and sell their property. This year saw many sales and exchanges of estates.

The subsequent development of the two parts of the Principality of Moldova after 1812 in different political, socio-economic and cultural environments predetermined their different historical destinies.

On May 16 (28), 1812, Russia and the Ottoman Empire ended another war by signing a peace treaty in Bucharest. There was less than a month left before Napoleon's army invaded Russia.

The reason for the Russian-Turkish war of 1806–1812 was the removal of the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia, Constantine Ypsilanti and Alexander Muruzi, by Sultan Selim III.

This action, carried out in August 1806 under pressure from the French envoy General Sebastiani, was a gross violation of treaties between the two empires. According to them, the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia could be appointed and removed only with the consent of Russia.

Turkey ignored the protests of Russian diplomats, and in September closed the Bosporus and Dardanelles to the passage of any Russian ships.

Military instructors, advisers, and fortress construction specialists poured into Turkey from France. Sebastiani, pushing the Sultan towards war, promised direct military assistance.

Unable to bring the Turks to their senses diplomatically, St. Petersburg sent troops into Moldova and Wallachia.

In 1807, the squadron of Vice Admiral D. Senyaev defeated the Turkish fleet.

It was not possible to develop success. Russia, as part of the anti-French coalition, clashed with France. The main forces had to be thrown against Napoleon.

In the summer of 1807, the confrontation ended with the Peace of Tilsit, which was unfavorable for Russia. France and Russia pledged to jointly resist any power. Alexander I had to join Napoleon's continental blockade of England. Refusal to trade with it was unprofitable for both the treasury and entrepreneurs.

Alexander wrote to his mother: “The alliance with Napoleon is only a change in the methods of fighting against him.”

Napoleon took upon himself to mediate negotiations between Russia and Turkey to sign peace. However, Bonaparte was a crafty mediator. The negotiations ended in a truce.

In March 1809, hostilities resumed. For two years, Russian troops failed to achieve decisive success.

And in a situation of an impending threat from the West, the emperor remembered his “anti-crisis manager” - 65-year-old M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov. On March 7, 1811, he became commander-in-chief of the Danube Army - the sixth since the beginning of the war.

Decisive events unfolded in the fall. Under pressure from Paris, on the night of September 9, the Turks began to cross the Danube. The main part of their troops was transported 4 km above the Rushchuk fortress, near Slobodzeya. In three days, 40 thousand people crossed to the left bank.

“Let them cross, if only more of them would cross to our shore,” said Kutuzov, who was looking at this.

On the night of October 1, a detachment of seven thousand under Lieutenant General E. Markov crossed the Danube and attacked Turkish troops on the right bank of the river. Using the surprise factor, ours scattered 20 thousand Turks, losing 9 people killed and 40 wounded.

“The prudence and speed of General Markov surpass all praise,” Kutuzov reported to the Minister of War M. Barclay de Tolly. Turkish artillery, ships, food and ammunition ended up with the Russians.

Having defeated the enemy near Rushchuk, Kutuzov began to defeat him on the left bank of the Danube. Surrounded and under the guns of their own guns, the Turks were left without food, firewood, clothing, or clean water. They ate horses and ate roots and grass. The Turks made their way to Russian positions, hoping to exchange food.

Kutuzov wrote to M. Barclay de Tolly that “some offer their expensive weapons for a few rolls of bread, they don’t have anything to start a fire with, since they burned all the tent poles, all the damaged gun carriages.”

Hundreds of people died every day in the Turkish camp. Many gave up.

Special mention must be made about the attitude towards captives of other faiths. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1806–1812, our command pointed out to its subordinates the “kind treatment” of prisoners. They were provided with clothing and money.

Barclay de Tolly reminded Kutuzov of the need to supply the Turks with “serviceable and decent” clothing and shoes, to ensure that they do not need food and that “there was no offense or oppression for them” and that “all possible help and affectionate treatment” were provided. ...

In October 1811, Sultan Mahmud II was forced to enter into peace negotiations. This turn of events worried France. Its ambassador, Latour-Maubourg, began to persuade the Sultan to continue the war, hinting at Napoleon's imminent invasion of Russia. Turkey was promised the Danube principalities, Crimea and Transcaucasia.

The maneuvers of the French diplomats did not conceal a mystery for Kutuzov. The diplomatic experience accumulated in Catherine's times was useful to him. As Russia's ambassador to Turkey, Kutuzov understood the strategy of the Western powers aimed at fueling the Russian-Turkish conflict.

One way was to spread rumors that Turkey was preparing to attack Russia or Russia was preparing to attack Turkey. By sowing the seeds of mutual distrust between Russia and Turkey, London and Paris pushed them towards another war.

This time, “black PR” helped Russia. From somewhere a rumor appeared that Russia and France were preparing to enter into an alliance against Turkey. And since less than five years had passed since the signing of the Peace of Tilsit, such a prospect looked real.

The frightened Sultan, ignoring the generous promises of Paris, convened an emergency council. After weighing all the pros and cons, 50 out of 54 participants spoke in favor of peace with Russia.

Under the terms of the Bucharest Peace, the Russian-Turkish border passed along the Prut until its connection with the Danube. Bessarabia with the fortresses of Khotin, Bandera, Akkerman, Kiliya and Izmail, as well as a section of the Black Sea coast with the city of Sukhum, went to Russia.

Russia received naval bases in the Caucasus and the right to commercial shipping along the entire Danube.

For the peoples of Moldavia and Wallachia, Kutuzov achieved the preservation of the privileges established by the Iasi Peace Treaty of 1791.

The treaty confirmed Russia's right to patronize Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

Article 6 ordered St. Petersburg to return to Turkey all points in the Caucasus “conquered by arms....” This was the basis for the return of Anapa, Poti, and Akhalkalaki taken from battle - and at the same time the reason for holding Sukhum.

The Sultan pledged not to form an alliance with Napoleon, and also to use “his good offices” to conclude peace between Russia and Persia, which had been at war since 1804.

The peace was concluded on terms favorable to Russia, improved its strategic position and liberated the Danube Army on the eve of the “invasion of the twelve tongues” that followed a month later.

Russia owes its foreign policy success to Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, for whom 1812 became a stellar year not only in his military career, but also in the diplomatic field.

The Peace of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey was concluded on May 16 (May 28), 1812, following the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812. On the Russian side, the agreement was signed by Count Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, and on the Porte side by the Supreme Vizier Ahmed Pasha. The Treaty of Bucharest improved the strategic position of the Russian Empire by annexing the eastern part of Moldavia and obtaining naval bases on the Caucasus coast of the Black Sea. The strengthening of Russia's international position was also facilitated by the right of commercial navigation along the entire Danube.

And finally, the agreement ensured the security of the southwestern borders of Russia on the eve of the war with France and the strengthening of the troops covering the western borders of the empire at the expense of the liberated units of the Danube Army.

The reason for the war was the resignation in August 1803 of the rulers of Moldavia, Alexander Muzuri, and Wallachia, Constantine Ypsilanti. Whereas, according to the Russian-Turkish treaties, the appointment and removal of the rulers of the Danube principalities had to be coordinated with the Russian government. Back in 1783, at the insistence of the Russian envoy in Constantinople, Ya.N. Bulgakov, the Turkish government issued a hatti-sheriff, according to which taxes in Moldova and Wallachia were regulated, and the question of removing the rulers was raised only if they committed crimes. In 1802, the Russian envoy to Turkey V.S. Tamara, as a result of negotiations with the Porte, achieved the adoption of additional articles to the Hatti sheriffs, which determined the internal structure of Moldova and Wallachia.

According to the 16th article of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty, in November 1806, a 40,000-strong army under the command of General I.I. was introduced into the principalities. Mikhelson. If the fortresses of Khotin, Bendery, Akkerman and Kilia surrendered without a fight, then the attempt by General Meyendorff to capture Izmail ended in failure. True, General Miloradovich’s detachment managed to expel the Turks from Bucharest, which they had captured.

Under the influence of French diplomacy, on December 18, 1806, Türkiye declared war on Russia. Despite all the protests and actions (the breakthrough of the British squadron through the Dardanelles) of England, seeking to weaken French influence in the region, the Sultan entered into an alliance with Napoleon and declared war on the British. Active military operations in the Danube and the Caucasus began in the spring of 1807 and proceeded with varying success: the siege of Izmail until the end of July was limited to repelling Turkish attacks, Kamensky’s corps was forced to retreat from Brailov, and Miloradovich retreated to Bucharest. However, he did not allow the army of the vizier and the Rushchuk Pasha Mustafa, the squadron of D.N., to unite. Senyavina defeated the Turkish fleet in the Battle of Athos, and after the capture of Belgrade, Serbia came under Russian protectorate in July. In Transcaucasia, Gudovich's army, which at first acted unsuccessfully, defeated Yusuf Pasha on the Arpachay River, and the Black Sea squadron captured Anapa.

Military failures and the Treaty of Tilsit between Russia and France (June 1807) forced the Turks to accept the truce proposed by the Russian side, concluded on August 12, 1807 until March 3, 1809. Russian troops abandoned the Danube principalities, returned captured ships and the island of Tenedos. The Ottomans, in turn, pledged not to enter the principalities and cease hostilities in Serbia.

Having increased the size of the Danube Army to 80 thousand people after the conclusion of peace with Napoleon, Alexander I set the new commander-in-chief, Prince Prozorovsky, the task of changing the terms of the truce. In accordance with one of the secret conditions of the Tilsit Peace, Alexander I had to accept French mediation in a military conflict with Turkey. He promised to withdraw troops from the principalities provided that they were not occupied by the Turks. True, the Russian government used every excuse not to ratify this agreement and leave the troops in their previous positions. The question of the possibility of dividing the Ottoman Empire was even raised between Napoleon and the Russian emperor (albeit very cautiously). But in reality, Russia’s position in the eastern Mediterranean was weakened by the transfer of the Ionian Islands to the French. Moreover, Napoleon was not going to allow Russia to increase its influence in the Balkans. Franco-Russian relations after Tilsit demonstrated the incompatibility of the foreign policy goals of the two powers. At the end of 1807, Napoleon proposed a plan to retain the Danube principalities for Russia in exchange for Silesia, but at the same time put forward the idea of ​​a Franco-Austrian alliance to contain Russia in the Balkans. In 1808, at a meeting in Erfurt, Napoleon recognized Russia's right to the principalities in exchange for a promise to support France in the event of a conflict with Austria.

In turn, the Porte, having agreed to rapprochement with England and Austria, did not want to change the conditions and in March 1809 declared war on Russia. Relations with France, which had worsened by the beginning of 1811, dictated the need for an early conclusion of peace with the Turks, which was prevented not only by France, but also by Austria. In March 1811, the Russian army was led by General M.I. Kutuzov, who entered into peace negotiations with the vizier. But since both sides did not make concessions, the negotiations were soon interrupted. Only the defeat of the main forces of the Turks in the battles of Rushchuk and Slobodzeya, as well as the retreat of Izmail Bey to Sofia, persuaded the Turkish government to sign a peace treaty.

Negotiations in Zhurzhev since the autumn of 1811 took place in a difficult international situation associated with the brewing war between France and Russia. Taking this into account, Türkiye tried to delay the negotiations, but the persistence and diplomatic talent of M.I. Kutuzov led to their successful completion a month before the start of Napoleon I’s invasion of Russia. The success of the negotiations was also facilitated by Russia's refusal to impose strict territorial demands on Turkey.

The treaty consisted of 16 open and 2 secret articles, which provided for the destruction of the fortifications of Izmail and Kilia, which were transferred to Russia, and granted the right to Russian ships to use anchorages off the Turkish coast in the Poti area. However, if Russia fully ratified the treaty, Turkey, trying to complicate the issue of Russian ships entering Turkish waters, ratified only the main treaty (without secret articles).

The treaty undoubtedly improved the strategic position of the Russian Empire. He established a new Russian-Turkish border along the Prut River (instead of the Dniester) until it connected with the Danube, and then along the Chilia channel of the Danube to the Black Sea. That is, the eastern part of the Moldavian principality in the Prut-Dniester interfluve (later the Bessarabian region) with the fortresses of Khotyn, Bendery, Akkerman, Kiliya and Izmail went to Russia. This area made up 50% of the territory of Moldova and 25% of the population. In addition, Russia received the right of commercial navigation along the entire course of the Danube and the navigation of warships from the Kiliya mouth to the confluence of the Prut River with the Danube. The protection of Russia's trade interests in the East was also guaranteed.

The western part of Moldova (along the right bank of the Prut River) and Wallachia were returned to Turkey. At the same time, the agreement restored the privileges of the Danube principalities granted to them by the Russian-Turkish treaties of 1774, 1791 and 1802. In addition, Turkey pledged to exempt the population of the principalities from taxes for two years. However, in December 1813, the Moldovans again turned to Russia with a request for protection. Serbia, which declared itself an independent kingdom under the protectorate of Russia, limited itself to gaining autonomy in matters of internal self-government and tax collection in favor of the Sultan, which laid the foundations for its future independence. The rebels were given amnesty.

In the Caucasus, all points conquered by Russian troops during the war (Anapa, Poti, Akhalkalaki) were returned to the Turks, but Russia retained those who voluntarily joined it in 1803-1804. possessions of Western Georgia (Mingrelia, Guria and Imereti) on the Black Sea coast to Arpachaya, the Adjara Mountains and the Black Sea. For the first time, Russia received naval bases on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea.

The treaty strengthened the military-political position of the country, ensuring on the eve of the war with France the security of the southwestern Russian borders and the release of the Danube (Moldavian) army to strengthen the troops covering the western borders of the empire. The treaty deprived France of such a valuable ally as the Ottoman Empire, which abandoned its alliance with Napoleon. In addition, the peace treaty with Turkey contributed to the conclusion of peace with Persia the following year.

After the conclusion of the Bucharest Peace, a manifesto was issued on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Turkish part of Moldova. At the same time, residents from both banks of the Prut were allowed to freely move to Turkish and Russian territory for a year and sell their property. After the ratification of the treaty, Admiral P.V. Chichagov proposed to the emperor to send troops to Dalmatia, the Adriatic and Switzerland with the aim of establishing a Slavic empire in the Balkans under Russian auspices. In the face of an imminent war with France, Alexander I used the threat of this plan to put diplomatic pressure on Austria, obtaining a promise from the Austrian government to keep its forces in reserve during Napoleon's attack on Russia.

Treatise on peace between Russia and the Ottoman Porte

By God's hastening grace, We, Alexander the First, Emperor and Autocrat, All-Russian, and so on, and so on, and so on. We declare through this, to whom it belongs, that on the 16th day of May of this month, 1812, between Our Imperial Majesty and His Majesty the Ottoman Emperor, the Most Excellent Sultans Great and Most Honorable, the Most Mighty King of Mecca and Medina and the Defender of the Holy Jerusalem, the King and Emperor of the Most Extensive provinces inhabited in European and Asian countries, and on the White and Black Seas, by the Most Serene, Most Powerful and Great Emperor, Sultan, son of Sultans and King, son of Kings, Sultan Magmud Khan, son of Sultan Abdul Hamid_Khan, by virtue of the powers given by both sides , namely: with Our Most Excellent and Most Excellent Count Mikhail Larionovich Gelenishchev-Kutuzov, Our General from the Infantry, Commander-in-Chief of Our Army, and the Order of Our Knight, also the Imperial-Austrian Order of Maria Theresa Grand Cross Knight and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem Commander, and with On the part of His Majesty the Ottoman Emperor, to the Most Illustrious and Most Excellent Supreme Vizier and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, Ahmed Pasha, a treaty of perpetual peace between both Empires, consisting of sixteen articles, which read as follows word by word, was decreed and concluded by authorized representatives elected on both sides.

In the name of the Lord Almighty.

His Imperial Majesty, the Most Eminent and Sovereign Great Sovereign, Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia, and His Majesty, the Most Eminent and Sovereign Great Sovereign, the Ottoman Emperor, having a sincere mutual desire that the ongoing war between the two Powers be stopped, and peace, friendship and good agreement in other ways were restored, they judged well: this righteous and saving matter should be entrusted to the efforts and leadership of the main authorized representatives, namely His Imperial Majesty, Autocrat of All-Russia, Most Excellent and Most Excellent Count Mikhail Golenishchev-Kutuzov, General of the Infantry, Commander-in-Chief of His Army, All Russians orders and the Grand Cross of the Imperial-Austrian Order of Maria Theresa Knight and Commander of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and from His Majesty, the Ottoman Emperor, the Most Excellent and Most Excellent G. Supreme Vizier and Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the illustrious Ottoman Porte Ahmed Pasha, so that for the resolution , the conclusion and signing of a peace treaty, worthy persons were elected, appointed and provided with full power of attorney from both parties. As a result, the Excellent and Honorable Messrs. were elected, appointed and authorized, namely: on the part of the Russian Imperial Court. Andrew of Italy, His Imperial Majesty Privy Councilor, Acting Chamberlain, orders of St. Vladimir of the second class, St. Anna of the first and St. George of the third class Cavalier; and Joseph Fonton, His Imperial Majesty Acting State Councilor, orders of St. Vladimir, third class, and St. Anne, second class Knight; on the part of the Illustrious Ottoman Porte, Excellent and Honorable Messrs. Esseid Said Magommed Khalib Efendi, Actual Kegaya Bey of the Ottoman Sublime Porte; Mufti Zadeh Ibrahim Selim Efendi, Kazi-Asker of Anadol, Actual Judge of the Ottoman Army, and Abdul Hamid Efendi, Actual Enicherileri of Kiatibi; who, having assembled in the city of Bucharest, upon the exchange of their powers, decreed the following articles:

Art. I. The enmity and disagreement that hitherto existed between both High Empires will henceforth cease with this Treaty, both on land and on water, and may there forever be peace, friendship and good agreement between His Imperial Majesty the Autocrat and the Padishah of All Russia and His Majesty the Emperor and Padishah of the Ottoman Empire, Their Heirs and Successors to the Thrones and their Mutual Empires.

Both Highly Contracting Parties will make constant efforts to avert everything that could cause enmity between mutual subjects; they will carry out exactly everything established by this peaceful Treaty, and will strictly observe that in the future, neither one nor the other, either openly or secretly, will act contrary to this Treaty.

Art. II. Both High Contracting Parties, thus restoring sincere friendship among themselves, deign to grant amnesty and general forgiveness to all those of their subjects who, during the now ended war, participated in hostilities, or in any way contrary to the interests of Their Sovereigns and States. As a result of this amnesty granted to them, none of them will henceforth be offended or oppressed for their past actions, but everyone who returns to his home will enjoy the property that he previously owned, under the protection and patronage of the laws, on an equal basis with others.

Art. III. All Treatises, conventions, acts and regulations, executed and concluded at different times between the Russian Imperial Court and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, are completely confirmed by both this Treaty and the previous ones, excluding only those articles that were subject to change from time to time; and both High Contracting Parties undertake to observe them sacredly and inviolably.

Art. IV. The first article of the preliminary clauses, already signed in advance, stipulated that the Prut River from its entrance into Moldova to its connection with the Danube and the left bank of the Danube from this connection to the mouth of the Chilia and to the sea, will form the border of both empires, for which this mouth will be common . Small islands, which were not inhabited before the war, and starting opposite Ishmael to the aforementioned mouth of the Kiliya are closer to the left bank, which belongs to Russia, will not be owned by either of the two Powers, and no fortifications or buildings will be made on them in the future, but These islands will remain empty, and mutual subjects can come there only for fishing and logging. The sides of the two large islands lying opposite Izmail and Chilia will also remain empty and uninhabited for an hour's distance, starting from the nearest point of the aforementioned left bank of the Danube; this space will be marked with signs, and the dwellings that existed before the war, as well as the old Kilia, will remain behind this boundary line.

As a result of the above-mentioned article, the Sublime Ottoman Porte cedes and gives to the Russian Imperial Court the lands lying on the left bank of the Prut, with fortresses, towns, villages and dwellings located there, while the middle of the Prut River will be the border between both high Empires.

Merchant ships of both Courts can, as before, enter the aforementioned Kiliya estuary, as well as along the entire course of the Danube River. As for the warships of the Russian Imperial Court, they can sail there from the Kiliya mouth to the junction of the Prut River with the Danube.

Art. V. His Majesty the Emperor and Padishah of All Russia gives and returns to the Illustrious Porte of the Ottoman the land of Moldova, lying on the right bank of the Prut River, as well as Greater and Lesser Wallachia, with fortresses, in the same condition as they are now, with cities, towns, villages, dwellings and with everything that is contained in these provinces, including the Danube islands, excluding what was said above in the fourth article of this Treatise.

The acts and regulations regarding the privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia, which existed and were observed before this war, are confirmed on the basis as stated in the fifth article of the preliminary paragraphs. The conditions depicted in the fourth article of the Treaty of Jassy will be exactly fulfilled, and which read as follows: not to demand any payment for old accounts, nor taxes for the entire wartime, on the contrary, the inhabitants of these two Provinces will be exempted from all taxes henceforth for two years, counting from the day exchange of ratifications; and give a period of time to the inhabitants of these Provinces who wish to move from there to other places. It goes without saying that this period will be extended for four months, and that the Sublime Porte will agree to adjust the taxes of Moldavia according to the proportionality of its current land.

Art. VI. Except for the border of the Prut River, the borders on the side of Asia and other places are restored exactly as they were before the war, and as stated in the third article of the preliminary paragraphs. As a result, the Russian Imperial Court gives and returns to the Illustrious Ottoman Porte, in the same condition as the fortresses and castles that lie within this border and were conquered by its weapons, together with cities, towns, villages, dwellings and everything that this land contains.

Art. VII. The Mohammedan inhabitants of the lands ceded to the Russian Imperial Court, who might be located there due to the war, and the natural inhabitants of other places who remained in the same ceded lands during the war, may, if they wish, move to the area of ​​the Sublime Porte with their families and estates and there to remain forever under her rule; In which not only will they not be given the slightest obstacle, but they will also be allowed to sell their estate to whomever they wish among the local subjects and transfer the proceeds to the Ottoman possessions. The same permission is given to the natural inhabitants of the aforementioned ceded lands, who have their possessions there and are now located in the regions of the Sublime Porte.

At this end, both are given a period of eighteen months, starting from the day of the exchange of ratifications of this Treatise, to dispose of their above-mentioned affairs. In the same way, the Tatars of the Edyssapian Horde, who moved from Bessarabia to Russia during the continuation of this war, can, if they wish, return to the Ottoman regions, but with the fact that the Sublime Porte will then be obliged to pay the Russian Imperial Court for the costs that could have been used for transportation and the establishment of these Tatars.

On the contrary, Christians who have possessions in the lands ceded to the Russian Court, as well as those who, being natives of these lands themselves, are now in other Ottoman places, can, if they wish, move and settle in the aforementioned ceded lands, with their families and property; in which no obstacle will be placed in their way, and they are allowed to sell all kinds of estates that they own in the regions of the Sublime Porte to the inhabitants of the same Ottoman places, and transfer the proceeds to the regions of the Russian Empire, they will also be given eighteen months at the end period, counting from the day of exchange of ratifications of this Treaty of Peace.

Art. VIII. In accordance with what is established by the fourth article of the preliminary points, although there is no doubt that the Sublime Porte, according to its rules, will use leniency and generosity against the Serbian people, as from ancient times subjects of this power and paying tribute to it, however, looking at the participation that the Serbs took in the actions of this war, it is considered decent to establish special conditions for their safety. As a result, the Sublime Porte grants forgiveness and a general amnesty to the Serbs, and they can in no way be bothered for their past deeds. The fortresses that they could build on the occasion of the war in the lands they inhabited, and which were not there before, will be, since they are useless for the future, destroyed, and the Sublime Porte will continue to take possession of all the fortresses, padanki and other fortified places always existing, with artillery, military supplies and other articles and military ammunition, and she will establish garrisons there at her discretion. But so that these garrisons do not do any oppression to the Serbs, contrary to the rights of their subjects; then the Sublime Porte, driven by a feeling of mercy, will take the measures necessary for its safety towards the end of the Serbian people. She grants the Serbs, at their request, the same benefits that the subjects of her Archipelago islands and other places enjoy, and allows them to feel the effect of her generosity, leaving them to manage their internal affairs, determining the measure of their taxes, receiving them from their own hands, and she will finally establish all these objects in common with the Serbian people.

Art. IX. All prisoners of war, both male and female, of whatever nation or condition they may be, located in both Empires, must, soon after the exchange of ratifications of this peaceful Treaty, be returned and handed over without the slightest ransom or payment, excepting, however, Christians who accepted by their own will, the Mohammedan faith in the regions of the Sublime Porte, and the Mohammedans, also by their absolute desire, accepted the Christian faith in the regions of the Russian Empire.

The same will be done with those Russian subjects who, after signing this peaceful Treaty, would by some chance be captured, and who may be in the regions belonging to the Sublime Porte. The Russian Court, for its part, promises to deal equally with all the subjects of the Sublime Porte.

No payment shall be required for the sums spent by both High Contracting Parties for the maintenance of prisoners. Moreover, each of both sides will provide these prisoners with everything they will need on their way to the border, where they will be exchanged by the mutual Commissars.

Art. X. All cases and demands of mutual subjects postponed due to war will not be abandoned, but will again be considered and decided, by virtue of the laws, upon the conclusion of peace. Debts that mutual subjects may have on each other, as well as debts on the treasury, must be paid immediately and in full.

Art. XI. Upon the conclusion of a peace Treaty between both High Empires, and upon the exchange of ratifications of both Sovereigns, the ground forces and flotilla of the Russian Imperial Court will leave the pretexts of the Ottoman Empire. But as this exit must be taken into account with the distance of the places and their circumstances, both High Contracting Parties agreed to set a period of three months, counting from the day of the exchange of ratifications, for the final withdrawal, both on the part of Moldavia and Wallachia, and on the part of Asia. As a result, from the day of the exchange of ratifications until the expiration of the mentioned period, the ground forces of the Russian Imperial Court will completely withdraw from both the European and Asian sides, from all the lands returned to the Sublime Ottoman Porte by this Treaty; the flotilla and all warships will also leave the waters of the Sublime Ottoman Porte.

As long as the Russian troops remain in the lands and fortresses that are to be returned to the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in accordance with the present Peace Treaty, until the expiration of the time limit for the withdrawal of the troops, as long as the administration and order of things will remain in the state in which they now exist, under the authority of Russian Imperial Court, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte will in no way interfere with that until the expiration of the time appointed for the departure of all troops, who will supply themselves with all food supplies and other necessary items until the last day of their departure, in the same way as they behave there to this day supplied.

Art. XII. When the Minister or charge d'affaires of the Russian Imperial Court, staying in Constantinople, submits a note to demand, by virtue of Article VII of the Treaty of Jassy, ​​satisfaction for losses caused to the subjects and merchants of the Russian Imperial Court by the Corsairs of the Governments of Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli, or to make protests against subjects related to the provisions of the trade treaty, confirmed, and which would cause disputes and complaints; in this case, the Sublime Ottoman Porte will turn its attention to the implementation of what the Treatises prescribe, and that the mentioned subjects will be examined and resolved, without any omission of the instructions and publications issued at the end of the day. The Russian Imperial Court will observe the same thing in the reasoning of the subjects of the Sublime Porte in accordance with trade regulations.

Art. XIII. Upon the conclusion of this peaceful Treaty, the Russian Imperial Court agrees that the Illustrious Ottoman Porte, due to the similarity of the Divine Service with the Persians, will use its good services so that the war between the Russian Court and the Persian power will be over, and peace will be restored between them by mutual agreement.

Art. XIV. After the exchange of ratifications of this peaceful Treaty by the Commissioners-in-Chief of both Empires, orders will be sent mutually and without delay to all commanders of troops, both land and sea, to cease hostile actions; those who followed after the signing of this Treatise will be honored as if it had not happened, and will not cause any change in the regulations depicted in this Treatise. Likewise, everything that would have been won by one or the other of the High Contracting Parties during this interim will be returned immediately.

Art. XV. Upon signing of this peaceful Treaty by mutual plenipotentiaries, the Chief Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of All Russia and the Supreme Vizier of the Sublime Ottoman Porte will confirm it, and the acts will be exchanged with the same powers within ten days after the signing of this Treaty, and as soon as possible.

Art. XVI. This Treaty of Eternal Peace on the part of His Majesty the Emperor and the Padishah of All-Russia, and on the part of His Majesty the Emperor and the Ottoman Padishah, shall be approved and ratified by solemn ratifications signed by the personal hands of Their Majesties, which must be exchanged by mutual Plenipotentiaries in the same place where the This peaceful Treaty is concluded in four weeks, or, if possible, sooner, counting from the day of the conclusion of this Treaty.
This peace act, containing sixteen articles, and which will be accomplished by the exchange of mutual ratifications within the prescribed period, is signed by the force of our powers, approved by Our seals and exchanged for another similar one, signed by the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Ottoman Porte and approved by their seals.

Committed in Bucharest on May 16, 1812.

Ratification. For this sake, Our Imperial Majesty, after having satisfied ourselves with the above-mentioned treaty of eternal peace, confirmed and ratified it, as we hereby accept, confirm and ratify, in all its contents, promising with Our Imperial Word, for Us and Our Heirs, that everything in it What is stated in the treatise will be observable and executed by Us and will be inviolable. In assurance of which, We signed this ratification with our own hands and ordered it to be approved by Our State Seal. Given in Vilna, June 11, 1812, the second tenth year of Our State.