As it was during the war. When the Great Patriotic War began

By June 1941, the Second World War, having drawn into its orbit about 30 states, came close to the borders of the Soviet Union. There was no force in the West that could stop the army of Nazi Germany, which by that time had already occupied 12 European states. The next military-political goal - the main one in its significance - was the defeat of the Soviet Union for Germany.

Deciding to unleash a war with the USSR and relying on "lightning speed", the German leadership intended to complete it by the winter of 1941. In accordance with the "Barbarossa" plan, a giant armada of selected, well-trained and armed troops was deployed near the borders of the USSR. The German General Staff placed its main bet on the crushing power of a surprise first strike, the swiftness of the rush of concentrated aviation, tank and infantry forces to the vital political and economic centers of the country.

Having completed the concentration of troops, Germany attacked our country early in the morning of June 22 without declaring war, bringing down a flurry of fire and metal. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against the Nazi invaders began.

For 1418 long days and nights, the peoples of the USSR marched towards victory. This path was incredibly difficult. Our Motherland fully knew both the bitterness of defeats and the joy of victories. The initial period was especially difficult.

German invasion of Soviet territory

While a new day, June 22, 1941, was breaking in the east, the shortest night of the year was still going on on the western border of the Soviet Union. And no one could even imagine that this day would be the beginning of the most bloody war that would last four long years. The headquarters of the German army groups, concentrated on the border with the USSR, received the prearranged signal "Dortmund", which meant - to start the invasion.

Soviet intelligence revealed the preparations the day before, about which the headquarters of the border military districts immediately reported to the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). So, the chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District, General P.S. Klenov at 10 pm on June 21 reported that the Germans had completed the construction of bridges across the Neman, and the civilian population was ordered to evacuate at least 20 km from the border, “there is talk that the troops were ordered to take their starting position for the offensive.” Chief of Staff of the Western Special Military District, Major General V.E. Klimovskikh reported that the wire fences of the Germans, which still stood along the border during the day, were removed by evening, and in the forest, located not far from the border, the noise of motors was heard.

In the evening, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov invited the German ambassador Schulenburg and told him that Germany, without any reason, was deteriorating relations with the USSR every day. Despite repeated protests from the Soviet side, German planes continue to intrude into its airspace. There are persistent rumors about the upcoming war between our countries. The Soviet government has every reason to believe this, because the German leadership did not react in any way to the TASS report of June 14. Schulenburg promised to immediately report the complaints he had heard to his government. However, this was just a simple diplomatic excuse on his part, because the German ambassador was well aware that the Wehrmacht troops were on full alert and were just waiting for a signal to move east.

With the onset of dusk on June 21, the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov received a phone call from the Chief of Staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, General M.A. Purkaev and reported on a German defector who said that at dawn next day the German army will start a war against the USSR. G.K. Zhukov immediately reported this to I.V. Stalin and People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. Stalin summoned Timoshenko and Zhukov to the Kremlin and, after an exchange of opinions, ordered to report on the draft directive prepared by the General Staff on bringing the troops of the western border districts to combat readiness. Only late in the evening, after receiving a cipher from one of the residents of Soviet intelligence, who reported that there would be a decision that night, this decision was war, adding another point to the draft directive read to him that the troops should in no case succumb to possible provocations, Stalin allowed to send it to the districts.

The main meaning of this document boiled down to the fact that he warned the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts about a possible attack by the aggressor during June 22-23 and demanded "to be in full combat readiness to meet a sudden attack by the Germans or their allies." On the night of June 22, the districts were ordered to covertly occupy fortified areas on the border, by dawn to disperse all aviation over field airfields and camouflage it, keep the troops dispersed, put the air defense on alert without additional lifting of assigned personnel, and prepare cities and objects for blackout . Directive No. 1 categorically forbade the holding of any other events without special permission.
The transmission of this document was completed only at half past one in the morning, and the entire long journey from the General Staff to the districts, and then to the armies, corps and divisions as a whole, took more than four hours of precious time.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 1 of June 22, 1941 TsAMO.F. 208.Op. 2513.D.71.L.69.

At dawn on June 22, at 3:15 am (Moscow time), thousands of guns and mortars of the German army opened fire on the border outposts and the location of the Soviet troops. German planes rushed to bombard important targets in the entire border strip - from the Barents Sea to the Black. Many cities were subjected to air raids. In order to achieve surprise, the bombers flew over the Soviet border in all sectors at the same time. The first strikes hit precisely the bases of the latest types of Soviet aircraft, command posts, ports, warehouses, and railway junctions. Massed enemy air strikes thwarted the organized exit of the first echelon of border districts to the state border. Aviation, concentrated on permanent airfields, suffered irreparable losses: on the first day of the war, 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, and most of them did not even have time to take to the air. However, despite this, in the first day the Soviet Air Force made about 6 thousand sorties and destroyed over 200 German aircraft in air battles.

The first reports of the invasion of German troops into Soviet territory came from the border guards. In Moscow, at the General Staff, information about the flight of enemy aircraft across the western border of the USSR was received at 03:07. At about 4 o'clock in the morning, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov called I.V. Stalin and reported the incident. At the same time, already in plain text, the General Staff informed the headquarters of the military districts, armies and formations about the German attack.

Upon learning of the attack, I.V. Stalin called for a meeting of senior military, party and government officials. At 5:45 a.m., S.K. arrived at his office. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria and L.Z. Mehlis. By 7:15 a.m., Directive No. 2 was drawn up, which, on behalf of the People's Commissar of Defense, demanded:

"1. Troops to attack the enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border. Do not cross the border until further notice.

2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces. Destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of his ground forces with powerful strikes by bomber and ground attack aircraft. Air strikes should be carried out to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 km. Bomb Koenigsberg and Memel. Do not make raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions.

The prohibition to cross the border, besides the limitation of the depth of air strikes, indicates that Stalin still did not believe that a “big war” had begun. Only by noon, members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Beria - prepared the text of the statement of the Soviet government, which Molotov spoke on the radio at 12:15.



Speech on the radio by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
and People's
commissioner for foreign affairs
Molotova V.M. dated June 22, 1941 TsAMO. F. 135, Op. 12798. D. 1. L.1.

At a meeting in the Kremlin, the most important decisions were made, which laid the foundation for turning the whole country into a single military camp. They were issued as decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: on the mobilization of those liable for military service in all military districts, with the exception of the Central Asian and Trans-Baikal, as well as the Far East, where the Far Eastern Front had existed since 1938; on the introduction of martial law in most of the European territory of the USSR - from the Arkhangelsk region to the Krasnodar Territory.


Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on martial law
and on the approval of the Regulations on Military Tribunals
dated June 22, 1941 TsAMO. F. 135, Op. 12798. D. 1. L.2.


Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on mobilization by military districts.
Reports of the High Command of the Red Army for June 22-23, 1941
TsAMO. F. 135, Op. 12798. D. 1. L. 3.

On the morning of the same day, the first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky, having gathered people's commissars responsible for the main industries, gave the orders provided for by the mobilization plans. Then no one even thought that the outbreak of war would soon break everything planned, that it would be necessary to urgently evacuate industrial enterprises to the east and create there, essentially anew, the military industry.

Most of the population learned about the beginning of the war from Molotov's speech on the radio. This unexpected news deeply shocked the people, aroused alarm for the fate of the Motherland. At once, the normal course of life was disrupted, not only plans for the future were upset, there was a real danger to the lives of relatives and friends. At the direction of the Soviet and party organs, rallies and meetings were held at enterprises, institutions, and collective farms. The speakers condemned the German attack on the USSR and expressed their readiness to defend the Fatherland. Many immediately applied for voluntary enlistment in the army and asked to be immediately sent to the front.

Germany's attack on the USSR was not only a new stage in the life of the Soviet people, to one degree or another it affected the peoples of other countries, especially those who were soon to become its main allies or opponents.

The government and people of Great Britain immediately breathed a sigh of relief: a war in the east, at least for a while, would push back the German invasion of the British Isles. So, Germany has one more, besides quite a serious opponent; this would inevitably weaken it, and therefore, the British reasoned, the USSR should immediately be considered as its ally in the struggle against the aggressor. This is exactly what Prime Minister Churchill expressed, who on the evening of June 22 spoke on the radio about another German attack. “Any person or state that fights against Nazism,” he said, “will receive our help ... This is our policy, this is our statement. It follows from this that we will give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can ... Hitler wants to destroy the Russian state because, if successful, he hopes to withdraw the main forces of his army and aviation from the east and throw them on our island.

The US leadership made an official statement on June 23. Acting Secretary of State S. Welles read it on behalf of the government. The statement emphasized that any rallying of forces against Hitlerism, regardless of their origin, would hasten the downfall of the German leaders, and that the Hitlerite army was now the main danger to the American continent. The next day, President Roosevelt told a press conference that the United States was pleased to welcome another opponent of Nazism and intended to provide assistance to the Soviet Union.

The population of Germany learned about the beginning of a new war from the Fuhrer's appeal to the people, which was read on the radio by the Minister of Propaganda I. Goebbels on June 22 at 5:30. He was followed by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop with a special memorandum listing accusations against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that Germany, as in her previous aggressive actions, placed all the blame for unleashing the war on the USSR. In his address to the people, Hitler did not forget to mention the "conspiracy of Jews and democrats, Bolsheviks and reactionaries" against the Reich, the concentration of 160 Soviet divisions on the borders, which allegedly threatened not only Germany, but also Finland and Romania for many weeks. All this, they say, forced the Fuhrer to undertake an "act of self-defense" in order to secure the country, "to save European civilization and culture."

The extreme complexity of the rapidly changing situation, the high mobility and maneuverability of military operations, the stunning power of the first strikes of the Wehrmacht showed that the Soviet military-political leadership did not have an effective system of command and control. As planned earlier, the leadership of the troops was carried out by the people's commissar for defense, Marshal Timoshenko. However, without Stalin, he could not solve almost a single issue.

On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created, consisting of: People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov, Marshal Budyonny and People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral Kuznetsov.

At the Stavka, an institute of permanent advisers to the Stavka was organized, consisting of Marshal Kulik, Marshal Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Chief of the Air Force Zhigarev, Vatutin, Chief of Air Defense (Air Defense) Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Beria, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mekhlis.

Such a composition allowed the Headquarters to quickly solve all the tasks of leading the armed struggle. However, it turned out two commanders-in-chief: Timoshenko - legal, who, without Stalin's sanction, did not have the right to give orders to the army in the field, and Stalin - actual. This not only complicated command and control, but also led to belated decisions in the rapidly changing situation at the front.

Events on the Western Front

From the first day of the war, the most alarming situation developed in Belarus, where the Wehrmacht dealt the main blow with the most powerful formation - the troops of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Bock. But the Western Front that opposed it (commander General D.G. Pavlov, member of the Military Council Corps Commissar A.F. Fominykh, chief of staff General V.E. Klimovskikh) had considerable forces (Table 1).

Table 1
The balance of forces in the Western Front at the beginning of the war

Forces and means

Western front *

Army Group "Center" (without 3 mgr) **

Ratio

Personnel, thousand people

Tanks, units

Combat aircraft, units

* Only serviceable equipment is taken into account.
** Until June 25, the 3rd Panzer Group (TG) operated in the zone of the North-Western Front.

On the whole, the Western Front was slightly inferior to the enemy in terms of guns and combat aircraft, but significantly outnumbered him in terms of tanks. Unfortunately, it was planned to have only 13 rifle divisions in the first echelon of the covering armies, while the enemy concentrated 28 divisions in the first echelon, including 4 tank divisions.
Events on the Western Front unfolded in the most tragic way. Even in the course of artillery preparation, the Germans captured bridges across the Western Bug, including in the Brest region. Assault groups were the first to cross the border with the task of capturing border outposts literally within half an hour. However, the enemy miscalculated: there was not a single frontier post that would not offer him stubborn resistance. The border guards fought to the death. The Germans had to bring the main forces of the divisions into battle.

Fierce fighting broke out in the skies over the border regions. The pilots of the front waged a fierce struggle, trying to wrest the initiative from the enemy and prevent him from seizing air supremacy. However, this task turned out to be impossible. Indeed, on the very first day of the war, the Western Front lost 738 combat vehicles, which accounted for almost 40% of the aircraft fleet. In addition, on the side of the enemy pilots there was a clear advantage in both skill and quality of equipment.

The belated exit to meet the advancing enemy forced the Soviet troops to engage in battle on the move, in parts. On the directions of the aggressor's strikes, they failed to reach the prepared lines, which means that they did not succeed in a continuous front of defense. Having met resistance, the enemy quickly bypassed the Soviet units, attacked them from the flanks and rear, sought to advance their tank divisions as far as possible in depth. The situation was aggravated by sabotage groups thrown out on parachutes, as well as submachine gunners on motorcycles rushing to the rear, who disabled communication lines, captured bridges, airfields, and other military facilities. Small groups of motorcyclists fired indiscriminately from machine guns in order to give the defenders the appearance of being surrounded. With ignorance of the general situation and loss of control, their actions violated the stability of the defense of the Soviet troops, causing panic.

Many rifle divisions of the first echelon of the armies were dismembered from the very first hours, some were surrounded. Communication with them was interrupted. By 7 o'clock in the morning the headquarters of the Western Front had no wired connection even with the armies.

When the front headquarters received the directive of the People's Commissar No. 2, the rifle divisions were already drawn into the fighting. Although the mechanized corps began advancing to the border, but due to their great distance from the areas of the enemy’s breakthrough, communications disruption, the dominance of German aviation in the air, “fall on the enemy with all their might” and destroy his strike groups, as required by the order of the People's Commissar, Soviet troops, naturally they couldn't.

A serious threat arose on the northern face of the Bialystok ledge, where the 3rd Army of General V.I. Kuznetsova. Constantly bombarding the army headquarters located in Grodno, the enemy put out of action all communication centers by the middle of the day. Neither the headquarters of the front, nor the neighbors could not be contacted for a whole day. Meanwhile, the infantry divisions of the 9th German Army had already managed to push Kuznetsov's right-flank formations to the southeast.

On the southern face of the ledge, where the 4th Army, led by General A.A. Korobkov, the enemy had a three-four-fold superiority. Management was broken here as well. Not having time to take the planned lines of defense, the rifle formations of the army under the blows of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian began to retreat.

Their retreat put the formations of the 10th Army, which was in the center of the Bialystok ledge, in a difficult position. From the very beginning of the invasion, the front headquarters had no connection with it. Pavlov had no choice but to send by plane to Bialystok, to the headquarters of the 10th Army, his deputy General I.V. Boldin with the task of establishing the position of the troops and organizing a counterattack in the Grodno direction, which was envisaged by the wartime plan. The command of the Western Front for the entire first day of the war did not receive a single report from the armies.

Yes, and Moscow throughout the day did not receive objective information about the situation on the fronts, although in the afternoon it sent its representatives there. To clarify the situation and help General Pavlov, Stalin sent the largest group to the Western Front. It included the deputies of the people's commissar of defense marshals B.M. Shaposhnikov and G.I. Kulik, as well as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General V.D. Sokolovsky and the head of the operational department, General G.K. Malandin. However, it was not possible to reveal the actual situation both on this front and on others, to understand the situation. This is evidenced by the operational report of the General Staff for 22 hours. “German regular troops,” it stated, “during June 22 fought with the border units of the USSR, having little success in certain areas. In the afternoon, with the approach of the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army, the attacks of the German troops on the predominant stretch of our border were repulsed with losses for the enemy.

Based on the reports of the fronts, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concluded that the battles were mainly fought near the border, and the largest enemy groupings are the Suwalki and Lublin, and the further course of the battles will depend on their actions. Due to the misleading reports of the headquarters of the Western Front, the Soviet High Command clearly underestimated the powerful German grouping that struck from the Brest region, however, it was not oriented in the general air situation either.

Believing that there were enough forces for a retaliatory strike, and guided by the pre-war plan in case of a war with Germany, the People's Commissar of Defense signed Directive No. 3 at 21:15. The troops of the Western Front were ordered to cooperate with the North-Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction with powerful counterattacks to the flank and rear, destroy his Suwalki grouping and, by the end of June 24, capture the Suwalki area. The next day, together with the troops of other fronts, it was necessary to go on the offensive and defeat the strike force of Army Group Center. Such a plan not only did not correspond to the true situation, but also prevented the troops of the Western Front from creating a defense. Pavlov and his staff, having received Directive No. 3 late at night, began preparations for its implementation, although it was simply unthinkable to do this in the hours remaining before dawn, and even in the absence of communication with the armies.

On the morning of June 23, the commander decided to launch a counterattack in the direction of Grodno, Suwalki with the forces of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps, as well as the 36th cavalry division, uniting them into a group under the command of his deputy General Boldin. Formations of the 3rd Army were also to take part in the planned counterattack. It should be noted that this decision was absolutely unrealistic: the formations of the 3rd Army operating in the direction of the counterattack continued to retreat, the 11th mechanized corps fought intense battles on a wide front, the 6th mechanized corps was too far from the counterattack area - 60-70 km, yet further from Grodno was the 36th cavalry division.

At the disposal of General Boldin was only part of the forces of the 6th mechanized corps of General M.G. Khatskilevich, and then only by noon on June 23. Considered by right the most complete in the Red Army, this corps had 1022 tanks, including 352 KB and T-34. However, during the advance, being under the incessant attacks of enemy aircraft, he suffered significant losses.

Fierce battles unfolded near Grodno. After the capture of Grodno by the enemy, the 11th mechanized corps of General D.K. Mostovenko. Before the war, he had only 243 tanks. In addition, in the first two days of fighting, the corps suffered significant losses. However, on June 24, the formations of the Boldin group, with the support of front-line aviation and the 3rd long-range bomber corps of Colonel N.S. Skripko managed to achieve some success.

Field Marshal Bock sent the main forces of the 2nd Air Fleet against the Soviet troops, which launched a counterattack. German planes hovered continuously over the battlefield, depriving parts of the 3rd Army and Boldin's group of the possibility of any maneuver. Heavy fighting near Grodno continued the next day, but the forces of the tankers quickly dried up. The enemy pulled up anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as an infantry division. Nevertheless, Boldin's group managed to chain significant enemy forces to the Grodno region for two days and inflict significant damage on him. The counterattack eased, albeit not for long, the position of the 3rd Army. But it was not possible to wrest the initiative from the enemy, and the mechanized corps suffered huge losses.

Panzer Group Hoth deeply embraced Kuznetsov's 3rd Army from the north, while General Strauss' 9th Army formations attacked it from the front. Already on June 23, the 3rd Army had to withdraw beyond the Neman in order to avoid encirclement.

The 4th Army of General A.A. found itself in extremely difficult conditions. Korobkov. Guderian's tank group and the main forces of the 4th Army, advancing from Brest in the northeast direction, cut the troops of this army into two unequal parts. Fulfilling the directive of the front, Korobkov was also preparing a counterattack. However, he managed to collect only parts of the tank divisions of the 14th mechanized corps of General S.I. Oborina, and the remnants of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions. And they were opposed by almost two tank and two infantry divisions of the enemy. The forces were too unequal. The 14th mechanized corps suffered heavy losses. Rifle divisions were also bled. The oncoming battle ended in favor of the enemy.

The gap with the troops of the North-Western Front on the right wing, where the tank group Gotha rushed, and the difficult situation on the left wing, where the 4th Army was withdrawing, created a threat of deep coverage of the entire Bialystok grouping both from the north and from the south.

General Pavlov decided to reinforce the 4th Army with the 47th Rifle Corps. At the same time, the 17th mechanized corps (a total of 63 tanks, in divisions of 20-25 guns and 4 anti-aircraft guns) was transferred from the front reserve to the river. Sharu to create a defense there. However, they failed to create a solid defense along the river. The enemy tank divisions crossed it and on June 25 approached Baranovichi.

The position of the troops of the Western Front became more and more critical. Of particular concern was the northern wing, where an uncovered gap of 130 km was formed. Field Marshal Bock removed the Goth tank group, which rushed into this gap, from subordination to the commander of the 9th Army. Having received freedom of action, Goth sent one of his corps to Vilnius, and the other two to Minsk and bypassing the city from the north, in order to connect with the 2nd Panzer Group. The main forces of the 9th Army were turned to the south, and the 4th - to the north, in the direction of the confluence of the Shchara and Neman rivers, to cut the encircled grouping. The threat of complete catastrophe loomed over the troops of the Western Front.

General Pavlov saw a way out of the situation in delaying the advance of the 3rd Panzer Group Gotha with reserve formations united by the command of the 13th Army, three divisions, the 21st Rifle Corps, the 50th Rifle Division and the retreating troops were transferred to the army ; and at the same time, the forces of the Boldin group continue to deliver a counterattack on Gotu's flank.

The 13th army of General P.M. did not have time yet. Filatov to concentrate his forces, and most importantly, to put in order the troops moving away from the border, including the 5th Panzer Division of the North-Western Front, as enemy tanks broke into the location of the army headquarters. The Germans seized most of the vehicles, including those with encryption documents. The command of the army came to its own only on June 26th.

The position of the troops of the Western Front continued to deteriorate. Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, who was at the headquarters of the front in Mogilev, turned to the General Headquarters with a request to immediately withdraw the troops. Moscow allowed the withdrawal. However, it is already too late.

For the withdrawal of the 3rd and 10th armies, deeply bypassed by the tank groups of Hoth and Guderian from the north and south, there was a corridor no more than 60 km wide. Moving off-road (all roads were occupied by German troops), under continuous attacks by enemy aircraft, with almost total absence vehicles, in dire need of ammunition and fuel, the formations could not break away from the pressing enemy.

On June 25, the Stavka formed a group of armies of the reserve of the High Command, headed by Marshal S.M. Budyonny as part of the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies. Their formations, which began advancing as early as May 13, arrived from the North Caucasian, Orel, Kharkov, Volga, Ural and Moscow military districts and concentrated in the rear of the Western Front. Marshal Budyonny was given the task of starting to prepare a defensive line along the Nevel, Mogilev line and further along the Desna and Dnieper rivers to Kremenchug; at the same time "to be ready, on special instructions from the High Command, to launch a counteroffensive." However, on June 27, the Headquarters abandoned the idea of ​​​​a counteroffensive and ordered Budyonny to urgently occupy and firmly defend the line along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, from Kraslava to Loev, preventing the enemy from breaking through to Moscow. At the same time, the troops of the 16th Army, which had arrived in Ukraine before the war, and from July 1, the 19th Army, were also rapidly transferred to the Smolensk region. All this meant that the Soviet command finally abandoned offensive plans and decided to switch to strategic defense, transferring the main efforts to the western direction.

On June 26, Hoth's tank divisions approached the Minsk fortified area. The next day, the advanced units of Guderian entered the approaches to the capital of Belarus. The formations of the 13th Army were defending here. Fierce fighting began. At the same time, the city was bombarded by German aircraft; fires broke out, water supply, sewerage, power lines, telephone communications failed, but most importantly, thousands died civilians. Nevertheless, the defenders of Minsk continued to resist.

The defense of Minsk is one of the brightest pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The forces were too unequal. The Soviet troops were in dire need of ammunition, and to bring them up, there was not enough transport or fuel, besides, part of the warehouses had to be blown up, the rest were captured by the enemy. The enemy stubbornly rushed to Minsk from the north and south. At 4 pm on June 28, units of the 20th Panzer Division of the Gota group, breaking the resistance of the 2nd Rifle Corps of General A.N. Ermakov, broke into Minsk from the north, and the next day the 18th Panzer Division from the Guderian group rushed towards them from the south. By evening, the German divisions connected and closed the encirclement. Only the main forces of the 13th Army managed to withdraw to the east. A day earlier, the infantry divisions of the 9th and 4th German armies connected east of Bialystok, cutting off the escape routes of the 3rd and 10th Soviet armies. The encircled grouping of troops on the Western Front was divided into several parts.

Almost three dozen divisions fell into the cauldron. Deprived of centralized control and supply, they, however, fought until July 8. On the inner front of the encirclement, Bock had to keep first 21 and then 25 divisions, which accounted for almost half of all the troops of Army Group Center. On the outer front, only eight of its divisions continued their offensive towards the Berezina, and even the 53rd Army Corps was operating against the 75th Soviet Rifle Division.

Exhausted by continuous battles, difficult transitions through forests and swamps, without food and rest, the encircled were losing their last strength. The reports of Army Group Center reported that as of July 2, 116 thousand people were taken prisoner in the area of ​​Bialystok and Volkovysk alone, 1505 guns, 1964 tanks and armored vehicles, 327 aircraft were destroyed or captured as trophies. The prisoners of war were kept in appalling conditions. They were located in rooms not equipped for living, often directly under open sky. Hundreds of people died every day from exhaustion and epidemics. The weak were ruthlessly destroyed.

Until September, the soldiers of the Western Front left the encirclement. At the end of the month to the river. Sozh left the remnants of the 13th mechanized corps, led by their commander, General P.N. Akhlyustin. 1667 people, of which 103 were wounded, were brought out by the deputy commander of the front, General Boldin. Many who did not manage to get out of the encirclement began to fight the enemy in the ranks of partisans and underground fighters.

From the first days of the occupation, in areas where the enemy appeared, resistance from the masses began to arise. However, it developed slowly, especially in the western regions of the country, including Western Belarus, whose population was merged into the USSR only a year before the start of the war. At first, mainly sabotage and reconnaissance groups sent from behind the front line, many military personnel who were surrounded, and partly local residents began to operate here.

On June 29, on the 8th day of the war, a directive was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions, which, along with other measures to turn the country into a single military camp to provide a nationwide rebuff to the enemy, contained instructions on the deployment of the underground and the partisan movement, the organizational forms, goals and objectives of the struggle were determined.

Importance to the organization partisan struggle behind enemy lines was the appeal of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army dated July 15, 1941 “To the military personnel fighting behind enemy lines”, issued in the form of a leaflet and scattered from aircraft over the occupied territory. In it, the activity of Soviet soldiers behind the front line was assessed as a continuation of their combat mission. Soldiers were asked to switch to methods guerrilla war. This leaflet-appeal helped many encircled people find their place in the common struggle against the invaders.

The fighting was already far from the border, and the garrison of the Brest Fortress was still fighting. After the withdrawal of the main forces, part of the units of the 42nd and 6th rifle divisions, the 33rd engineer regiment and the border outpost remained here. The advancing units of the 45th and 31st Infantry Divisions were supported by siege artillery. Barely recovering from the first stunning blow, the garrison took up the defense of the citadel with the intention of fighting to the end. The heroic defense of Brest began. Guderian recalled after the war: "The garrison of the important Brest fortress, which held out for several days, blocked the railway and highways leading through the Western Bug to Mukhavets, defended itself especially fiercely." True, the general for some reason forgot that the garrison held out not for several days, but for about a month - until July 20.

By the end of June 1941, the enemy had advanced to a depth of 400 km. The troops of the Western Front suffered heavy losses in men, equipment and weapons. The air force of the front lost 1483 aircraft. The formations remaining outside the encirclement fought in a strip over 400 km wide. The front was in dire need of replenishment, but he could not even get what he was supposed to be fully staffed according to the pre-war plan in case of mobilization. It was disrupted as a result of the rapid advance of the enemy, an extremely limited number of vehicles, disruption of the railway transport and general organizational confusion.

By the end of June, the Soviet military-political leadership realized that in order to repel aggression, it was necessary to mobilize all the forces of the country. To this end, on June 30, an emergency body was created - the State Defense Committee (GKO), headed by Stalin. All power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the GKO. His decisions and orders, which had the force of wartime laws, were subject to unquestioning implementation by all citizens, party, Soviet, Komsomol and military bodies. Each member of the GKO is responsible for certain area(ammunition, aircraft, tanks, food, transport, etc.).

In the country, the mobilization of those liable for military service continued in 1905-1918. birth in the army and navy. During the first eight days of the war, 5.3 million people were drafted into the armed forces. From National economy 234 thousand cars and 31.5 thousand tractors were sent to the front.

The headquarters continued to take emergency measures to restore the strategic front in Belarus. Army General D.G. Pavlov was removed from command of the Western Front and put on trial by a military tribunal. Marshal S.K. was appointed the new commander. Timoshenko. On July 1, the Stavka transferred the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies to the Western Front. In essence, a new front of defense was being formed. In the rear of the front, in the Smolensk region, the 16th Army was concentrated. The transformed Western Front now consisted of 48 divisions and 4 mechanized corps, but by July 1, the defense at the turn of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper was occupied by only 10 divisions.

The resistance of the Soviet troops, surrounded near Minsk, forced the command of Army Group Center to disperse their formations to a depth of 400 km, and the field armies fell far behind the tank groups. In order to more clearly coordinate the efforts of the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups to capture the Smolensk region and during the further attack on Moscow, Field Marshal Bock on July 3 combined both groups into the 4th Panzer Army, headed by the command of the 4th Field Army Kluge. The infantry formations of the former 4th Army were united by the 2nd Army (it was in the reserve of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces Command - OKH), under the command of General Weichs, to eliminate the Soviet units surrounded west of Minsk.

In the meantime, fierce battles were going on in the interfluve of the Berezina, the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. By July 10, enemy troops crossed the Western Dvina, reached Vitebsk and the Dnieper south and north of Mogilev.

One of the first strategic defensive operations of the Red Army, later called the Belorussian one, ended. For 18 days, the troops of the Western Front suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 44 divisions that were originally part of the front, 24 were completely lost, the remaining 20 lost from 30 to 90% of their composition. Total losses - 417,790 people, including irretrievable - 341,073 people, 4,799 tanks, 9,427 guns and mortars and 1,777 combat aircraft. Leaving almost all of Belarus, the troops retreated to a depth of 600 km.

Defense of the North-Western Front and the Baltic Fleet

The Baltics also became the arena of dramatic events with the beginning of the war. The North-Western Front, which was defending here under the command of General F.I. Kuznetsova was much weaker than the fronts operating in Belarus and Ukraine, since he had only three armies and two mechanized corps. Meanwhile, the aggressor concentrated large forces in this direction (Table 2). Not only Army Group North under the command of Field Marshal W. Leeb took part in the first strike against the Northwestern Front, but also the 3rd Panzer Group from the neighboring Army Group Center, i.e. Kuznetsov's troops were opposed by two of four German tank groups.

table 2
The balance of forces in the strip of the North-Western Front at the beginning of the war

Forces and means

Northwestern

army group

Ratio

"North" and 3 tgr

Personnel, thousand people

Guns and mortars (without 50 mm), units

Tanks,** units

Combat aircraft**, units

* Without the forces of the Baltic Fleet
**Only serviceable

Already on the first day of the war, the defense of the North-Western Front was split. Tank wedges punched deep holes in it.

Due to the systematic disruption of communications, the commanders of the front and the armies were unable to organize command and control of the troops. The troops suffered heavy losses, but they could not stop the advance of the tank groups. In the zone of the 11th Army, the 3rd Panzer Group rushed to the bridges across the Neman. And although specially dedicated demolition teams were on duty here, along with the retreating units of the army, enemy tanks also slipped over the bridges. “For the 3rd tank group,” wrote its commander, General Goth, “it was a big surprise that all three bridges across the Neman, the capture of which was part of the group’s task, were captured intact.”

Having crossed the Neman, Hoth's tanks rushed to Vilnius, but ran into desperate resistance. By the end of the day, the formations of the 11th Army were dismembered into parts. Between the North-Western and Western fronts, a large gap was formed, which turned out to be nothing to close.

During the first day, German formations wedged to a depth of 60 km. While a deep penetration of the enemy required vigorous response measures, both the front command and the army command showed obvious passivity.

Order of the Military Council of the Baltic Special Military District No. 05 dated June 22, 1941
TsAMO. F. 221. Op. 1362. D. 5, volume 1. L. 2.

On the evening of June 22, General Kuznetsov received Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissar, in which the front was ordered: "Holding firmly the coast of the Baltic Sea, deliver a powerful counterattack from the Kaunas area to the flank and rear of the enemy's Suwalki grouping, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front, and by the end of 24.6, capture the area Suwalki.

However, even before receiving the directive, at 10 o'clock in the morning, General Kuznetsov ordered the armies and mechanized corps to launch a counterattack on the enemy's Tilsit grouping. Therefore, the troops carried out his order, and the commander decided not to change tasks, essentially not fulfilling the requirements of Directive No. 3.

Six divisions were to attack the Gepner Panzer Group and restore the position along the border. Against 123 thousand soldiers and officers, 1800 guns and mortars, more than 600 enemy tanks, Kuznetsov planned to put up about 56 thousand people, 980 guns and mortars, 950 tanks (mostly light).

However, a simultaneous strike did not work out: after a long march, the formations entered the battle on the move, most often in scattered groups. Artillery, with an acute shortage of ammunition, did not provide reliable support to the tanks. The task remained unfulfilled. The divisions, having lost a significant part of their tanks, withdrew from the battle on the night of June 24th.

At dawn on June 24, the fighting flared up with renewed vigor. More than 1,000 tanks, about 2,700 guns and mortars, and more than 175,000 soldiers and officers took part in them on both sides. Parts of the right flank of the 41st motorized corps of Reinhardt were forced to go on the defensive.

An attempt to resume the counterattack the next day was reduced to hasty, poorly coordinated actions, moreover, on a wide front, with a low organization of control. Instead of delivering concentrated strikes, the corps commanders were ordered to operate "in small columns in order to disperse enemy aircraft." Tank formations suffered huge losses: only 35 tanks remained in both divisions of the 12th mechanized corps.

If as a result of the counterattack it was possible for some time to delay the advance of the 41st motorized corps of Reinhardt in the Siauliai direction, then the 56th corps of Manstein, bypassing the counterattacking formations from the south, was able to make a swift throw to Daugavpils.

The position of the 11th Army was tragic: it was squeezed in pincers between the 3rd and 4th tank groups. The main forces of the 8th Army were more fortunate: they stayed away from the armored fist of the enemy and retreated to the north in a relatively organized manner. The interaction between the armies was weak. Almost completely stopped the supply of ammunition and fuel. The situation required decisive measures to eliminate the enemy's breakthrough. However, having no reserves and having lost control, the front command could not prevent the retreat and restore the situation.

Field Marshal Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, ordered the 3rd Panzer Group Goth to be turned southeast, towards Minsk, as envisaged by the Barbarossa plan, so from June 25 it was already operating against the Western Front. Using the gap between the 8th and 11th armies, the 56th motorized corps of the 4th tank group rushed to the Western Dvina, cutting the rear communications of the 11th army.

The Military Council of the North-Western Front considered it expedient to withdraw the formations of the 8th and 11th armies to the line along the rivers Venta, Shushva, Viliya. However, on the night of June 25, he made a new decision: to launch a counterattack by the 16th Rifle Corps of General M.M. Ivanov to return Kaunas, although the logic of events required the withdrawal of units beyond the river. Viliya. Initially, the corps of General Ivanov had a partial success, but he could not complete the task, and the divisions retreated to their original position.

In general, the front troops did not fulfill the main task - to detain the aggressor in the border zone. Attempts to eliminate the deep breakthroughs of German tanks in the most important directions also failed. The troops of the North-Western Front could not hold on to intermediate lines and rolled back further and further to the northeast.

Military operations in the northwestern direction unfolded not only on land, but also at sea, where the Baltic Fleet was subjected to enemy air strikes from the very first days of the war. By order of the commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral V.F. Tributs on the night of June 23, the installation of minefields at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland began, and the next day, the same barriers began to be created in the Irben Strait. The increased mining of fairways and approaches to bases, as well as the dominance of enemy aircraft and the threat to bases from land, fettered the forces of the Baltic Fleet. Dominance at sea for a long time passed to the enemy.

During the general withdrawal of the troops of the North-Western Front, the enemy met stubborn resistance at the walls of Liepaja. The German command planned to capture this city no later than the second day of the war. Against the small garrison, which consisted of parts of the 67th Infantry Division of General N.A. Dedayev and the naval base of Captain 1st Rank M.S. Klevensky, the 291st Infantry Division operated with the support of tanks, artillery and marines. Only on June 24, the Germans blocked the city from land and sea. The inhabitants of Liepaja, led by the defense headquarters, fought together with the troops. Only on the orders of the command of the North-Western Front on the night of June 27 and 28, the defenders left Liepaja and began to make their way to the east.

On June 25, the North-Western Front received the task of withdrawing troops and organizing defense along the Western Dvina, where the 21st mechanized corps of General D.D. was advanced from the Stavka reserve. Lelyushenko. During the withdrawal, the troops found themselves in a difficult situation: after an unsuccessful counterattack, the management of the 3rd mechanized corps, led by General A.V. Kurkin and the 2nd Panzer Division, left without fuel, were surrounded. According to the enemy, more than 200 tanks, more than 150 guns, as well as several hundred trucks and cars were captured and destroyed here. Of the 3rd mechanized corps, only one 84th motorized division remained, and the 12th mechanized corps lost 600 out of 750 tanks.

The 11th Army found itself in a difficult position. I'm leaving for the river. Viliya was hindered by enemy aircraft, which destroyed the crossings. A threat of encirclement was created, and the transfer of troops to the other side moved very slowly. Having received no help, General Morozov decided to withdraw to the northeast, but only on June 27 did it become clear that the enemy, who had captured Daugavpils the day before, cut this path as well. There was only free eastbound, through forests and swamps to Polotsk, where, in the strip of the neighboring Western Front, on June 30, the remnants of the army came out.

Field Marshal Leeb's troops were rapidly advancing deep into the territory of the Baltic states. Organized resistance was provided by the army of General P.P. Sobennikov. The line of defense of the 11th Army remained uncovered, which Manstein immediately took advantage of, sending his 56th motorized corps along the shortest path to the Western Dvina.

To stabilize the situation, the troops of the North-Western Front needed to gain a foothold on the line of the Western Dvina. Unfortunately, the 21st mechanized corps, which was to defend itself here, had not yet reached the river. Failed to timely take up the defense and formations of the 27th Army. And the main goal of Army Group "North" at that moment was precisely a breakthrough to the Western Dvina with the direction of the main attack on Daugavpils and to the north.

On the morning of June 26, the German 8th Panzer Division approached Daugavpils and captured the bridge across the Western Dvina. The division rushed to the city, creating a very important bridgehead for the development of the offensive on Leningrad.

South-east of Riga, on the night of June 29, the advance detachment of the 41st motorized corps of General Reinhardt crossed the Western Dvina near Jekabpils on the move. And the next day, the advanced units of the 1st and 26th army corps of the 18th German army broke into Riga and captured the bridges across the river. However, a decisive counterattack of the 10th Rifle Corps of General I.I. Fadeev, the enemy was driven out, which ensured the systematic withdrawal of the 8th Army through the city. On July 1, the Germans recaptured Riga.

As early as June 29, the Headquarters ordered the commander of the North-Western Front, simultaneously with the organization of defense along the Western Dvina, to prepare and occupy the line along the river. Great, while relying on the fortified areas there in Pskov and Ostrov. From the reserve of the Stavka and the Northern Front, the 41st Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps, as well as the 234th Rifle Division, advanced there.

Instead of generals F.I. Kuznetsova and P.M. Klenov on July 4, generals P.P. Sobennikov and N.F. Vatutin.

On the morning of July 2, the enemy struck at the junction of the 8th and 27th armies and broke through in the direction of Ostrov and Pskov. The threat of an enemy breakthrough to Leningrad forced the command of the Northern Front to create the Luga task force in order to cover the southwestern approaches to the city on the Neva.

By the end of July 3, the enemy captured Gulbene in the rear of the 8th Army, depriving it of the opportunity to retreat to the river. Great. The army, commanded by General F.S. Ivanov, was forced to retreat north to Estonia. A gap formed between the 8th and 27th armies, where the formations of the 4th tank group of the enemy rushed. On the morning of the next day, the 1st Panzer Division reached the southern outskirts of the Island and immediately crossed the river. Great. Attempts to discard it were unsuccessful. On July 6, the Germans completely captured the Island and rushed north to Pskov. Three days later, the Germans broke into the city. There was a real threat of a German breakthrough to Leningrad.

In general, the first defensive operation of the North-Western Front ended in failure. For three weeks of hostilities, his troops retreated to a depth of 450 km, leaving almost the entire Baltic. The front lost over 90 thousand people, more than 1 thousand tanks, 4 thousand guns and mortars and more than 1 thousand aircraft. His command failed to create a defense capable of repelling the attack of the aggressor. The troops were not able to gain a foothold even on such barriers that were advantageous for defense, such as pp. Neman, Western Dvina, Velikaya.

A difficult situation developed at sea. With the loss of bases in Liepaja and Riga, the ships moved to Tallinn, where they were subjected to constant fierce bombing by German aircraft. And in early July, the fleet had to come to grips with organizing the defense of Leningrad from the sea.

Border battles in the area of ​​the Southwestern and Southern fronts. Actions of the Black Sea Fleet

The Southwestern Front, commanded by General M.P. Kirponos, was the most powerful grouping of Soviet troops concentrated near the borders of the USSR. The German Army Group "South" under the command of Field Marshal K. Rundstedt was tasked with destroying Soviet troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, preventing them from retreating beyond the Dnieper.

The Southwestern Front had enough strength to give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor (Table 3). However, the very first day of the war showed that these possibilities could not be realized. From the first minute of the connection, headquarters, airfields were subjected to powerful air strikes, and the air force was unable to provide proper opposition.

General M.P. Kirponos decided to inflict two blows on the flanks of the main enemy grouping - from the north and south, each with the forces of three mechanized corps, in which there were a total of 3.7 thousand tanks. General Zhukov, who arrived at the front headquarters on the evening of June 22, approved his decision. The organization of a front-line counterattack took three days, and before that only part of the forces of the 15th and 22nd mechanized corps managed to advance and attack the enemy, and in the 15th mechanized corps there was only one forward detachment of the 10th Panzer Division. To the east of Vladimir-Volynsky a counter battle broke out. The enemy was detained, but soon he again rushed forward, forcing the counterattacks to retreat beyond the river. Styr, in the region of Lutsk.

The decisive role in defeating the enemy could be played by the 4th and 8th mechanized corps. They included over 1.7 thousand tanks. The 4th mechanized corps was considered especially strong: it only had 414 vehicles at its disposal for the new KB and T-34 tanks. However, the mechanized corps was fragmented into parts. His divisions operated in different directions. By the morning of June 26, the 8th mechanized corps of General D.I. Ryabysheva went out to Brody. Of the 858 tanks, barely half remained, the other half, due to all kinds of breakdowns, lagged behind almost on a 500-kilometer route.

At the same time, mechanized corps were being concentrated to deliver a counterattack from the north. The strongest in the 22nd mechanized corps, the 41st tank division, was attached in parts to rifle divisions and did not take part in the frontal counterattack. The 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the east, had to overcome 200-250 km. Both of them totaled only 564 tanks, and even then of the old types.

Meanwhile, rifle formations fought stubborn battles, trying to delay the enemy. On June 24, in the zone of the 5th Army, the enemy managed to encircle two rifle divisions. A 70-kilometer gap was formed in the defense, using which the German tank divisions rushed to Lutsk and Berestechko. The surrounded Soviet troops defended stubbornly. For six days, units made their way to their own. Of the two infantry regiments of the division that were surrounded, only about 200 people remained. Exhausted in continuous battles, they retained their battle banners.

The soldiers of the 6th Army also staunchly defended themselves in the Rava-Russian direction. Field Marshal Rundstedt assumed that after the capture of Rava-Russkaya, the 14th motorized corps would be introduced into the battle. According to his calculations, this should have happened by the morning of June 23. But all Rundstedt's plans were thwarted by the 41st division. Despite the fierce fire of German artillery, massive bomber strikes, the regiments of the division, together with the battalions of the Rava-Russky fortified area and the 91st border detachment, held back the advance of the 4th Army Corps of the 17th Army for five days. The division left its positions only by order of the army commander. On the night of June 27, she withdrew to the line east of Rava-Russkaya.

On the left wing of the Southwestern Front, the 12th Army of General P.G. was defending. Monday. After the transfer of the 17th Rifle and 16th Mechanized Corps to the newly created Southern Front, the only rifle corps remained in it - the 13th. He covered the 300-kilometer section of the border with Hungary. For now, there was silence.

Intense battles unfolded not only on the ground, but also in the air. True, the fighter aircraft of the front could not reliably cover the airfields. In the first three days of the war alone, the enemy destroyed 234 aircraft on the ground. Bomber aircraft were also used inefficiently. In the presence of 587 bombers, front-line aviation during this time made only 463 sorties. The reason is unstable communications, the lack of proper interaction between combined arms and aviation headquarters, and the remoteness of airfields.

On the evening of June 25, the 6th Army of Field Marshal V. Reichenau crossed the river on the 70-kilometer stretch from Lutsk to Berestechko. Styr, and the 11th Panzer Division, almost 40 km away from the main forces, captured Dubno.

On June 26, the 8th mechanized corps entered the battle from the south, the 9th and 19th from the northeast. The corps of General Ryabyshev advanced from Brody to Berestechko by 10-12 km. However, other connections could not support his success. The main reason for the uncoordinated actions of the mechanized corps was the lack of a unified leadership of this powerful tank grouping from the front command.

More successful, despite the smaller forces, were the actions of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps. They were included in the 5th Army. There was also a task force headed by the first deputy front commander, General F.S. Ivanov, who coordinated the actions of the formations.

On the afternoon of June 26, the corps finally attacked the enemy. Overcoming enemy resistance, the corps commanded by General N.V. Feklenko, together with the infantry division, reached Dubno by the end of the day. Operating to the right of the 9th mechanized corps of General K.K. Rokossovsky turned around along the Rivne-Lutsk road and entered into battle with the 14th Panzer Division of the enemy. He stopped her, but he couldn't move a single step further.

Near Berestechko, Lutsk and Dubno, an oncoming tank battle- the largest since the beginning of World War II in terms of the number of forces participating in it. About 2 thousand tanks collided on both sides in a section up to 70 km wide. Hundreds of aircraft fought fiercely in the sky.

The counterattack of the Southwestern Front delayed for some time the advance of the Kleist group. In general, Kirponos himself believed that the border battle was lost. The deep penetration of German tanks in the Dubno area created the danger of a blow to the rear of the armies, which continued to fight in the Lvov salient. The military council of the front decided to withdraw the troops to a new defensive line, about which it reported to the Headquarters, and, without waiting for the consent of Moscow, gave the armies the appropriate orders. However, the Headquarters did not approve the decision of Kirponos and demanded that counterattacks be resumed. The commander had to cancel his own orders that had just been given, which had already begun to be carried out by the troops.

The 8th and 15th mechanized corps barely managed to get out of the battle, and then a new order: stop the withdrawal and strike in a northeast direction, in the rear of the divisions of the 1st tank group of the enemy. There was not enough time to organize the strike.

Despite all these difficulties, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. Troops in stubborn battles in the Dubno region, near Lutsk and Rivne, until June 30, fettered the 6th army and the enemy tank group. German troops were forced to maneuver in search of weak spots. The 11th Panzer Division, having covered itself with part of its forces from the attack of the 19th Mechanized Corps, turned to the southeast and captured Ostrog. But it was nevertheless stopped by a group of troops created on the initiative of the commander of the 16th Army, General M.F. Lukin. Basically, these were units of the army that did not have time to sink into trains to be sent to Smolensk, as well as the 213th motorized division of Colonel V.M. Osminsky from the 19th mechanized corps, whose infantry, having no transport, lagged behind the tanks.

The soldiers of the 8th mechanized corps tried with all their might to break out of the encirclement, first through Dubno, and then in a northerly direction. The lack of communication did not allow coordinating their own actions with neighboring connections. The mechanized corps suffered heavy losses: many soldiers died, including the commander of the 12th Panzer Division, General T.A. Mishanin.

The command of the Southwestern Front, fearing the encirclement of the armies defending in the Lvov ledge, decided on the night of June 27 to begin a systematic withdrawal. By the end of June 30, Soviet troops, leaving Lvov, occupied a new line of defense, which is 30-40 km east of the city. On the same day, the vanguard battalions of the mobile corps of Hungary went on the offensive, which on June 27 declared war on the USSR.

On June 30, Kirponos received the task: by July 9, using the fortified areas on the state border of 1939, "to organize a stubborn defense by field troops, with the allocation of anti-tank artillery weapons in the first place."

Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky and Letichevsky fortified regions, built in the 1930s 50-100 km east of the old state border, were put on alert with the outbreak of war and, reinforced by rifle units, could become a serious obstacle to the enemy. True, there were gaps in the system of fortified areas, reaching 30-40 km.

The troops of the front had to retreat 200 km deep into the territory in eight days. Particular difficulties fell on the lot of the 26th and 12th armies, which had the longest path ahead, and with the constant threat of an enemy strike to the rear, from the north, by formations of the 17th army and the 1st tank group.

In order to impede the advance of the Kleist group and gain time to withdraw its troops, the 5th Army launched a counterattack on its flank from the north with the forces of two corps, which had exhausted their forces to the limit in previous battles: in the divisions of the 27th Rifle Corps, there were about 1.5 thousand people, and the 22nd mechanized corps had only 153 tanks. There was not enough ammunition. The counterattack was hastily prepared, the attack was carried out on a hundred-kilometer front and at different times. However, the fact that the blow fell in the rear of the tank group gave a significant advantage. Mackensen's corps was detained for two days, which made it easier for the Kirponos troops to get out of the battle.

The troops retreated with heavy losses. A significant part of the equipment had to be destroyed, since even a minor malfunction could not be eliminated due to the lack of repair facilities. In the 22nd mechanized corps alone, 58 out-of-service tanks were blown up.

On July 6 and 7, enemy tank divisions reached the Novograd-Volynsky fortified area, the defense of which was to be strengthened by the retreating formations of the 6th Army. Instead, some parts of the 5th Army were able to come out here. Here, the group of Colonel Blank, which got out of the encirclement, went on the defensive, created from the remnants of two divisions - a total of 2.5 thousand people. For two days, the subdivisions of the fortified area and this group held back the onslaught of the enemy. On July 7, Kleist's tank divisions captured Berdichev, and a day later, Novograd-Volynsk. Following the tank group on July 10, the infantry divisions of the 6th Army of Reichenau bypassed the fortified area from the north and south. It was not possible to stop the enemy even on the old state border.

A breakthrough in the Berdichevsky direction was of particular concern, because it created a threat to the rear of the main forces of the Southwestern Front. By joint efforts, formations of the 6th Army, the 16th and 15th mechanized corps held back the onslaught of the enemy until July 15.

To the north, the enemy's 13th Panzer Division captured Zhitomir on July 9. Although the 5th Army tried to delay the rapid advance of enemy tanks, the approaching infantry divisions repelled all of its attacks. In two days, German tank formations advanced 110 km and on July 11 approached the Kyiv fortified area. Only here, on the defensive line created by the troops of the garrison and the population of the capital of Ukraine, the enemy was finally stopped.

The militia played an important role in repulsing the enemy's attack. Already on July 8, 19 detachments with a total number of about 30 thousand people were formed in Kyiv, and in general, over 90 thousand people joined the ranks of the militia in the Kyiv region. An 85,000-strong corps of volunteers was created in Kharkov, a corps of five divisions with a total of 50,000 volunteers was created in Dnepropetrovsk.

Not as dramatic as in Ukraine, the war began in Moldova, where the border with Romania along the Prut and the Danube was covered by the 9th Army. It was opposed by the 11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, which had the task of pinning down the Soviet troops and, under favorable conditions, going on the offensive. In the meantime, the Romanian formations sought to capture bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Prut. In the first two days, fierce battles broke out here. It was not without difficulty that the bridgeheads, except for one in the Skulyan region, were liquidated by Soviet troops.

Hostilities also flared up in the Black Sea. At 03:15 on June 22, enemy aircraft raided Sevastopol and Izmail, and artillery fired on settlements and ships on the Danube. Already on the night of June 23, fleet aviation took retaliatory measures by raiding military installations in Constanta and Sulina. And on June 26, a special created shock group Black Sea Fleet as part of the leaders "Kharkov" and "Moscow". They were supported by the cruiser "Voroshilov" and the destroyers "Savvy" and "Smyslivy". The ships fired 350 130mm shells. However, the 280-mm German battery covered the Moskva leader with return fire, which hit a mine while retreating and sank. At this time, enemy aircraft damaged the leader "Kharkov".

On June 25, the Southern Front was created from the troops operating on the border with Romania. In addition to the 9th, it included the 18th Army, formed from troops transferred from the Southwestern Front. The management of the new front was created on the basis of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, headed by its commander, General I.V. Tyulenev and the chief of staff, General G.D. Shishenin. The commander and his headquarters in the new location faced enormous difficulties, primarily due to the fact that they were completely unfamiliar with the theater of operations. In his first directive, Tyulenev set the front troops the task: “To defend the state border with Romania. In the event of an enemy crossing and overflying into our territory, destroy him with active actions by ground troops and aviation and be ready for decisive offensive operations.

Taking into account the success of the offensive in Ukraine and the fact that the Soviet troops in Moldova were holding their positions, Field Marshal Rundstedt decided to surround and destroy the main forces of the Southern and South- Western fronts.

The offensive of the German-Romanian troops against the Southern Front began on July 2. In the morning, strike groups attacked the formations of the 9th Army in two narrow sections. The main blow from the Iasi region was delivered by four infantry divisions at the junction of rifle divisions. Another blow by the forces of two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade hit one rifle regiment. Having achieved decisive superiority, the enemy already on the first day broke through the poorly prepared defenses on the river. Prut to a depth of 8-10 km.

Without waiting for the decision of the Headquarters, Tyulenev ordered the troops to begin a retreat. However, the High Command not only canceled it, on July 7 Tyulenev received an order to throw the enemy behind the Prut with a counterattack. Only the 18th Army adjoining the Southwestern Front was allowed to withdraw.

The undertaken counterattack managed to delay the offensive of the 11th German and 4th Romanian armies operating in the Chisinau direction.

The situation on the Southern Front was temporarily stabilized. The delay of the enemy allowed the 18th Army to withdraw and occupy the Mogilev-Podolsky fortified area, and the 9th Army managed to gain a foothold west of the Dniester. On July 6, its left-flank formations that remained in the lower reaches of the Prut and Danube were united into the Primorsky Group of Forces under the control of General N.E. Chibisov. Together with the Danube military flotilla, they repelled all attempts by the Romanian troops to cross the border of the USSR.

The defensive operation in Western Ukraine (later it was called the Lvov-Chernivtsi strategic defensive operation) ended in the defeat of the Soviet troops. The depth of their retreat ranged from 60-80 to 300-350 km. Northern Bukovina and Western Ukraine were left, the enemy went to Kyiv. Although the defenses in Ukraine and Moldova, in contrast to the Baltics and Belarus, still retained some stability, the fronts of the Southwestern strategic direction were unable to use their numerical superiority to repel the attacks of the aggressor and, as a result, were defeated. By July 6, the casualties of the Southwestern Front and the 18th Army of the Southern Front amounted to 241,594 people, including 172,323 irretrievable people. They lost 4381 tanks, 1218 combat aircraft, 5806 guns and mortars. The balance of power changed in favor of the enemy. Possessing the initiative and retaining offensive capabilities, Army Group South was preparing a strike from the area west of Kyiv to the south in the rear of the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

The tragic outcome of the initial period of the war and the transition to strategic defense

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War, which lasted from June 22 to mid-July, was associated with serious setbacks by the Soviet Armed Forces. The enemy has achieved major operational and strategic results. His troops advanced 300-600 km deep into Soviet territory. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the Red Army was forced to retreat almost everywhere. Latvia, Lithuania, almost all of Belarus, a significant part of Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova were under occupation. About 23 million Soviet people fell into fascist captivity. The country has lost many industrial enterprises and sown areas with ripening crops. A threat was created to Leningrad, Smolensk, Kyiv. Only in the Arctic, Karelia and Moldavia was the enemy advance insignificant.

During the first three weeks of the war, out of 170 Soviet divisions that took the first blow from the German military machine, 28 were completely defeated, and 70 lost more than half of their personnel and military equipment. Only three fronts - the North-Western, Western and South-Western - irretrievably lost about 600 thousand people, or almost a third of their strength. The Red Army lost about 4 thousand combat aircraft, over 11.7 thousand tanks, about 18.8 thousand guns and mortars. Even at sea, despite the limited nature of hostilities, the Soviet Navy lost its leader, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines, 5 minesweepers, 5 torpedo boats, and a number of other warships and transports. More than half of the reserves of the border military districts remained in the occupied territory. The losses suffered had a heavy impact on the combat readiness of the troops, who were in dire need of everything: ammunition, fuel, weapons, transport. It took the Soviet industry more than a year to replenish them. Back in early July, the German General Staff concluded that the campaign in Russia had already been won, although not yet completed. It seemed to Hitler that the Red Army was no longer able to create a continuous front of defense even in the most important areas. At a meeting on July 8, he only specified further tasks for the troops.

Despite losses, the Red Army troops, fighting from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, by mid-July had 212 divisions and 3 rifle brigades. And although only 90 of them were full-blooded formations, and the rest had only half, or even less than the regular staff, it was clearly premature to consider the Red Army defeated. The Northern, Southwestern and Southern Fronts retained their ability to resist, and the troops of the Western and Northwestern Fronts were hastily restoring their combat capability.

At the beginning of the campaign, the Wehrmacht also suffered losses that it did not know from the previous years of the Second World War. According to Halder, on July 13, over 92 thousand people were killed, wounded and missing in the ground forces alone, and the damage in tanks averaged 50%. Approximately the same data are already given in post-war studies by West German historians who believe that from the beginning of the war until July 10, 1941, the Wehrmacht lost 77,313 people on the eastern front. The Luftwaffe lost 950 aircraft. In the Baltic Sea, the German fleet lost 4 minelayers, 2 torpedo boats and 1 hunter. However, the losses of personnel did not exceed the number of field reserve battalions available in each division, due to which they were replenished, so the combat effectiveness of the formations was basically preserved. Since mid-July, the offensive capabilities of the aggressor remained large: 183 combat-ready divisions and 21 brigades.

One of the reasons for the tragic outcome of the initial period of the war is the gross miscalculation of the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union regarding the timing of aggression. As a result, the troops of the first operational echelon found themselves in an exceptionally difficult situation. The enemy smashed the Soviet troops in parts: first, the formations of the first echelon of the covering armies, located along the border and not put on alert, then with counter strikes, their second echelons, and then, developing the offensive, he preempted the Soviet troops in occupying advantageous lines in depth, on the move mastering them. As a result, the Soviet troops were dismembered and surrounded.

The attempts of the Soviet command to strike back with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the aggressor, undertaken by him on the second day of the war, no longer corresponded to the capabilities of the troops and, in fact, were one of the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles. The decision to switch over to strategic defense, adopted only on the eighth day of the war, turned out to be belated. In addition, this transition took place too hesitantly and at different times. He demanded the transfer of the main efforts from the southwestern direction to the western one, where the enemy delivered his main blow. As a result, a significant part of the Soviet troops did not fight as much as moved from one direction to another. This gave the enemy the opportunity to destroy formations in parts, as they approached the area of ​​concentration.

The war revealed significant shortcomings in command and control. The main reason is the poor professional training of the command personnel of the Red Army. Among the reasons for the shortcomings in command and control was excessive attachment to wired communications. After the very first strikes by enemy aircraft and the actions of his sabotage groups, permanent wire communication lines were disabled, and an extremely limited number of radio stations, the lack of the necessary skills in their use, did not allow establishing stable communications. The commanders were afraid of radio direction finding by the enemy, and therefore avoided using the radio, preferring wire and other means. And the bodies of strategic leadership did not have pre-prepared command posts. The Headquarters, the General Staff, the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and the branches of the armed forces had to lead the troops from offices in peacetime that were absolutely unsuitable for this.

The forced withdrawal of Soviet troops made mobilization in the western border districts extremely difficult and to a large extent disrupted. The headquarters and rear of divisions, armies, fronts were forced to conduct combat operations as part of peacetime.

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War ended with the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces. The military-political leadership of Germany did not hide its glee at the expected close victory. As early as July 4, Hitler, intoxicated by the first successes at the front, declared: “I always try to put myself in the position of the enemy. In fact, he already lost the war. It's good that we defeated the Russian tank and air forces at the very beginning. The Russians won't be able to restore them anymore." And here is what the chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, General F. Halder, wrote in his diary: "... it would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days."

However, they miscalculated badly. Already on July 30, during the battles for Smolensk, for the first time in two years of the Second World War, the Nazi troops were forced to go on the defensive. And the same German General F. Halder was forced to admit: “It became quite obvious that the method of conducting hostilities and the fighting spirit of the enemy, as well as the geographical conditions of this country, were completely different from those that the Germans met in the previous“ lightning wars, which led to successes that astonished the whole world. During the bloody battle of Smolensk, the heroic Soviet soldiers thwarted the plans of the German command for a "lightning war" in Russia, and the most powerful army grouping "Center" was forced to go on the defensive, postponing the non-stop attack on Moscow for more than two months.

But our country had to make up for the losses suffered, rebuild industry and Agriculture in a military way. This required time and a colossal exertion of the forces of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. By all means stop the enemy, do not let yourself be enslaved - for this we lived, fought, died Soviet people. The result of this massive feat of the Soviet people was the Victory won over the hated enemy in May 1945.

The material was prepared by the Research Institute ( military history) Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Photo from the archive of the Voeninform Agency of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Documents reflecting the activities of the leadership of the Red Army on the eve and in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, provided by the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

We have collected for you the most best stories about the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. First-person stories, not invented, living memories of front-line soldiers and witnesses of the war.

A story about the war from the book of the priest Alexander Dyachenko "Overcoming"

I was not always old and weak, I lived in a Belarusian village, I had a family, a very good husband. But the Germans came, my husband, like other men, went to the partisans, he was their commander. We women supported our men in any way we could. The Germans became aware of this. They arrived at the village early in the morning. They drove everyone out of their houses and, like cattle, drove to the station in a neighboring town. The wagons were already waiting for us there. People were stuffed into carts so that we could only stand. We drove with stops for two days, we were not given water or food. When we were finally unloaded from the wagons, some of us were no longer able to move. Then the guards began to drop them to the ground and finish them off with rifle butts. And then they showed us the direction to the gate and said: "Run." As soon as we ran half the distance, the dogs were released. The strongest ones ran to the gate. Then the dogs were driven away, all who remained were lined up in a column and led through the gate, on which it was written in German: "To each his own." Since then, boy, I can't look at the tall chimneys.

She bared her arm and showed me a tattoo of a row of numbers on the inside of the arm, closer to the elbow. I knew it was a tattoo, my dad had a tank inked on his chest because he was a tanker, but why inject numbers?

I remember that she also talked about how our tankers liberated them and how lucky she was to live to this day. About the camp itself and what happened in it, she did not tell me anything, probably, she felt sorry for my childish head.

I learned about Auschwitz only later. I learned and understood why my neighbor could not look at the pipes of our boiler room.

My father also ended up in the occupied territory during the war. They got it from the Germans, oh, how they got it. And when ours drove the Germans, those, realizing that the grown-up boys were tomorrow's soldiers, decided to shoot them. They gathered everyone and took them to the log, and then our plane saw a crowd of people and gave a queue nearby. The Germans are on the ground, and the boys are in all directions. My dad was lucky, he ran away, shot through his hand, but he ran away. Not everyone was lucky then.

My father entered Germany as a tanker. Their tank brigade distinguished itself near Berlin on the Seelow Heights. I saw pictures of these guys. Youth, and the whole chest in orders, several people -. Many, like my dad, were drafted into the army from the occupied lands, and many had something to avenge on the Germans. Therefore, perhaps, they fought so desperately bravely.

They marched across Europe, liberated the prisoners of concentration camps and beat the enemy, finishing off mercilessly. “We rushed into Germany itself, we dreamed of how we would smear it with the tracks of our tank tracks. We had a special part, even the uniform was black. We still laughed, no matter how they confused us with the SS men.

Immediately after the end of the war, my father's brigade was stationed in one of the small German towns. Or rather, in the ruins that were left of him. They themselves somehow settled in the basements of buildings, but there was no room for a dining room. And the commander of the brigade, a young colonel, ordered to knock down tables from shields and set up a temporary dining room right on the square of the town.

“And here is our first peaceful dinner. Field kitchens, cooks, everything is as usual, but the soldiers are not sitting on the ground or on the tank, but, as expected, at the tables. They had just begun to dine, and suddenly German children began to crawl out of all these ruins, cellars, cracks like cockroaches. Someone is standing, and someone is already unable to stand from hunger. They stand and look at us like dogs. And I don’t know how it happened, but I took the bread with my shot hand and put it in my pocket, I look quietly, and all our guys, without raising their eyes from each other, do the same.

And then they fed the German children, gave away everything that could somehow be hidden from dinner, the very children of yesterday, who quite recently, without flinching, were raped, burned, shot by the fathers of these German children on our land they captured.

The commander of the brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union, a Jew by nationality, whose parents, like all other Jews of a small Belarusian town, were buried alive by the punishers, had every right, both moral and military, to drive away the German "geeks" from their tankmen with volleys. They ate his soldiers, lowered their combat effectiveness, many of these children were also sick and could spread the infection among the personnel.

But the colonel, instead of firing, ordered an increase in the rate of consumption of products. And German children, on the orders of a Jew, were fed along with his soldiers.

Do you think what kind of phenomenon is this - Russian Soldier? Where does such mercy come from? Why didn't they take revenge? It seems that it is beyond any strength to find out that all your relatives were buried alive, perhaps by the fathers of these same children, to see concentration camps with many bodies of tortured people. And instead of "breaking away" on the children and wives of the enemy, they, on the contrary, saved them, fed them, treated them.

Several years have passed since the events described, and my dad, having graduated from a military school in the fifties, again passed military service in Germany, but already an officer. Once, on the street of one city, a young German called him. He ran up to my father, grabbed his hand and asked:

Don't you recognize me? Yes, of course, now it’s hard to recognize in me that hungry ragged boy. But I remember you, how you then fed us among the ruins. Believe us, we will never forget this.

This is how we made friends in the West, by force of arms and the all-conquering power of Christian love.

Alive. We will endure. We will win.

THE TRUTH ABOUT WAR

It should be noted that the speech of V. M. Molotov on the first day of the war did not make a convincing impression on everyone, and the final phrase aroused irony among some soldiers. When we, doctors, asked them how things were at the front, and we lived only for this, we often heard the answer: “We are draping. Victory is ours… that is, the Germans!”

I can't say that JV Stalin's speech had a positive effect on everyone, although the majority felt warm from him. But in the darkness of a long line for water in the basement of the house where the Yakovlevs lived, I once heard: “Here! Brothers, sisters became! I forgot how I was put in jail for being late. The rat squeaked when the tail was pressed! The people remained silent. I have heard similar statements many times.

Two other factors contributed to the rise of patriotism. Firstly, these are the atrocities of the Nazis on our territory. Newspaper reports that in Katyn near Smolensk the Germans shot tens of thousands of Poles captured by us, and not us during the retreat, as the Germans assured, were perceived without malice. Everything could be. “We couldn’t leave them to the Germans,” some argued. But the population could not forgive the murder of our people.

In February 1942, my senior operating nurse A.P. Pavlova received a letter from the liberated banks of Seliger, which told how, after the explosion of hand fans in the German headquarters hut, they hanged almost all the men, including Pavlova's brother. They hung him on a birch near his native hut, and he hung for almost two months in front of his wife and three children. The mood of this news at the whole hospital became formidable for the Germans: Pavlova was loved by both the staff and the wounded soldiers ... I made sure that the original letter was read in all the wards, and Pavlova's face, yellowed from tears, was in the dressing room before everyone's eyes ...

The second thing that made everyone happy was reconciliation with the church. Orthodox Church showed true patriotism in her preparations for the war, and he was appreciated. Government awards rained down on the patriarch and the clergy. With these funds, air squadrons and tank divisions with the names "Alexander Nevsky" and "Dmitry Donskoy" were created. They showed a film where a priest with the chairman of the district executive committee, a partisan, destroys atrocious fascists. The film ended with the old bell ringer climbing the bell tower and sounding the alarm, before that he crossed himself widely. It sounded directly: “Autumn yourself with the sign of the cross, Russian people!” The wounded spectators and the staff had tears in their eyes when the lights were turned on.

On the contrary, the huge sums of money contributed by the chairman of the collective farm, it seems, Ferapont Golovaty, evoked malicious smiles. “Look how he stole from hungry collective farmers,” said the wounded peasants.

The activities of the fifth column, that is, internal enemies, also caused enormous indignation among the population. I myself saw how many of them there were: German planes were signaled from the windows even with multi-colored rockets. In November 1941, in the hospital of the Neurosurgical Institute, they signaled from the window in Morse code. The doctor on duty, Malm, who was completely drunk and declassed, said that the alarm came from the window of the operating room where my wife was on duty. The head of the hospital, Bondarchuk, said at a five-minute morning meeting that he vouched for Kudrin, and two days later they took the signalmen, and Malm himself disappeared forever.

My violin teacher Yu. A. Alexandrov, a communist, although a secretly religious, consumptive person, worked as a fire chief of the Red Army House on the corner of Liteiny and Kirovskaya. He was chasing a rocket launcher, obviously an employee of the House of the Red Army, but he could not see him in the dark and did not catch up, but he threw the rocket launcher at Aleksandrov's feet.

Life at the institute gradually improved. The central heating began to work better, the electric light became almost constant, there was water in the plumbing. We went to the movies. Films such as "Two Soldiers", "Once upon a time there was a girl" and others were watched with an undisguised feeling.

At "Two Fighters" the nurse was able to get tickets to the cinema "October" for a session later than we expected. When we arrived at the next screening, we learned that a shell hit the courtyard of this cinema, where visitors from the previous screening were let out, and many were killed and wounded.

The summer of 1942 passed through the hearts of the townsfolk very sadly. The encirclement and defeat of our troops near Kharkov, which greatly increased the number of our prisoners in Germany, brought great despondency to everyone. The new offensive of the Germans to the Volga, to Stalingrad, was very hard for everyone to experience. The mortality of the population, especially increased in the spring months, despite some improvement in nutrition, as a result of dystrophy, as well as the death of people from air bombs and artillery shelling, was felt by everyone.

In mid-May, my wife and her ration cards were stolen from my wife, which is why we were again very hungry. And it was necessary to prepare for the winter.

We not only cultivated and planted kitchen gardens in Rybatsky and Murzinka, but received a fair amount of land in the garden near the Winter Palace, which was given to our hospital. It was excellent land. Other Leningraders cultivated other gardens, squares, the Field of Mars. We planted even a dozen or two potato eyes with an adjacent piece of husk, as well as cabbage, rutabaga, carrots, onion seedlings, and especially a lot of turnips. Planted wherever there was a piece of land.

The wife, fearing a lack of protein food, collected slugs from vegetables and pickled them in two large jars. However, they were not useful, and in the spring of 1943 they were thrown away.

The coming winter of 1942/43 was mild. Transport no longer stopped, all the wooden houses on the outskirts of Leningrad, including the houses in Murzinka, were demolished for fuel and stocked up for the winter. The rooms had electric lights. Soon, scientists were given special letter rations. As a candidate of sciences, I was given a letter ration of group B. It included 2 kg of sugar, 2 kg of cereals, 2 kg of meat, 2 kg of flour, 0.5 kg of butter and 10 packs of Belomorkanal cigarettes every month. It was luxurious and it saved us.

My fainting has stopped. I even easily kept watch with my wife all night, guarding the garden at the Winter Palace in turn, three times during the summer. However, despite the guards, every single head of cabbage was stolen.

Art was of great importance. We began to read more, to go to the cinema more often, to watch film programs in the hospital, to go to amateur concerts and to the artists who came to visit us. Once my wife and I were at a concert of D. Oistrakh and L. Oborin who arrived in Leningrad. When D. Oistrakh played and L. Oborin accompanied, it was cold in the hall. Suddenly a voice said softly, “Air raid, air raid! Those who wish can go down to the bomb shelter!” In the crowded hall, no one moved, Oistrakh smiled gratefully and understandingly at us all with his eyes alone and continued to play, not for a moment stumbling. Although the explosions pushed at my feet and I could hear their sounds and the yelping of anti-aircraft guns, the music absorbed everything. Since then, these two musicians have become my biggest favorites and fighting friends without knowing each other.

By the autumn of 1942, Leningrad was very empty, which also facilitated its supply. By the time the blockade began, up to 7 million cards were being issued in a city overflowing with refugees. In the spring of 1942, only 900 thousand of them were issued.

Many were evacuated, including part of the 2nd Medical Institute. All other universities left. But still, they believe that about two million people were able to leave Leningrad along the Road of Life. So about four million died (According to official data in besieged Leningrad about 600 thousand people died, according to others - about 1 million. - ed.) figure much higher than the official one. Not all the dead ended up in the cemetery. The huge ditch between the Saratov colony and the forest leading to Koltushi and Vsevolozhskaya took in hundreds of thousands of the dead and was leveled to the ground. Now there is a suburban vegetable garden, and there are no traces left. But the rustling tops and cheerful voices of the harvesters are no less happiness for the dead than the mournful music of the Piskarevsky cemetery.

A little about children. Their fate was terrible. Almost nothing was given on children's cards. I remember two cases particularly vividly.

In the most severe part of the winter of 1941/42, I wandered from Bekhterevka to Pestel Street to my hospital. Swollen legs almost did not go, his head was spinning, each cautious step pursued one goal: to move forward and not fall at the same time. On Staronevsky I wanted to go to the bakery to buy two of our cards and warm up at least a little. The frost cut to the bone. I stood in line and noticed that a boy of seven or eight years old was standing near the counter. He leaned over and seemed to shrink. Suddenly he snatched a piece of bread from the woman who had just received it, fell down, huddled up in a bag with his back up, like a hedgehog, and began to greedily tear the bread with his teeth. The woman who lost her bread screamed wildly: probably, a hungry family was waiting impatiently at home. The line got mixed up. Many rushed to beat and trample the boy, who continued to eat, a padded jacket and a hat protected him. "Man! If only you could help,” someone called out to me, apparently because I was the only man in the bakery. I was shaken, my head was spinning. “You beasts, beasts,” I croaked and, staggering, went out into the cold. I couldn't save the child. A slight push was enough, and I would certainly have been taken by angry people for an accomplice, and I would have fallen.

Yes, I am a layman. I did not rush to save this boy. “Do not turn into a werewolf, a beast,” our beloved Olga Berggolts wrote these days. Wonderful woman! She helped many to endure the blockade and preserved in us the necessary humanity.

On behalf of them, I will send a telegram abroad:

“Alive. We will endure. We'll win."

But the unwillingness to share the fate of a beaten child forever remained a notch on my conscience ...

The second incident happened later. We have just received, but already for the second time, a letter ration, and together with my wife we ​​carried it along Liteiny, heading home. Snowdrifts were quite high in the second blockade winter. Almost opposite the house of N. A. Nekrasov, from where he admired the front entrance, clinging to the grate immersed in snow, was a child of four or five years old. He moved his legs with difficulty, huge eyes on his withered old face peered in horror at the world. His legs were tangled. Tamara pulled out a large, double, lump of sugar and handed it to him. At first he did not understand and shrank all over, and then suddenly grabbed this sugar with a jerk, pressed it to his chest and froze in fear that everything that had happened was either a dream or not true ... We went on. Well, what more could barely wandering inhabitants do?

BREAKTHROUGH THE BLOCCADE

All Leningraders spoke daily about breaking the blockade, about the upcoming victory, peaceful life and the restoration of the country, the second front, that is, about the active inclusion of the allies in the war. On the allies, however, little hope. “The plan has already been drawn, but there are no Roosevelts,” the Leningraders joked. They also recalled the Indian wisdom: "I have three friends: the first is my friend, the second is the friend of my friend and the third is the enemy of my enemy." Everyone believed that the third degree of friendship only unites us with our allies. (So, by the way, it turned out that the second front appeared only when it became clear that we could liberate the whole of Europe alone.)

Rarely did anyone talk about other outcomes. There were people who believed that Leningrad after the war should become a free city. But everyone immediately cut them off, recalling both “Window to Europe” and “ Bronze Horseman”, and the historical significance for Russia of access to Baltic Sea. But they talked about breaking the blockade every day and everywhere: at work, on duty on the roofs, when they “fought off planes with shovels”, extinguishing lighters, for meager food, getting into a cold bed and during unwise self-service in those days. Waiting, hoping. Long and hard. They talked either about Fedyuninsky and his mustache, then about Kulik, then about Meretskov.

In the draft commissions, almost everyone was taken to the front. I was sent there from the hospital. I remember that I gave liberation only to a two-armed man, surprised by the wonderful prostheses that hid his defect. “Don't be afraid, take it with a stomach ulcer, tuberculous. After all, all of them will have to be at the front for no more than a week. If they don’t kill them, they will wound them, and they will end up in the hospital,” the military commissar of the Dzerzhinsky district told us.

Indeed, the war went on with great bloodshed. When trying to break through to communication with the mainland, piles of bodies remained under Krasny Bor, especially along the embankments. "Nevsky Piglet" and Sinyavinsky swamps did not leave the tongue. Leningraders fought furiously. Everyone knew that behind his back his own family was dying of hunger. But all attempts to break the blockade did not lead to success, only our hospitals were filled with crippled and dying.

With horror, we learned about the death of an entire army and the betrayal of Vlasov. This had to be believed. After all, when they read to us about Pavlov and other executed generals of the Western Front, no one believed that they were traitors and "enemies of the people", as we were convinced of this. They remembered that the same was said about Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, even Blucher.

The summer campaign of 1942 began, as I wrote, extremely unsuccessfully and depressingly, but already in the fall they began to talk a lot about our stubbornness at Stalingrad. The fighting dragged on, winter approached, and in it we hoped for our Russian strength and Russian endurance. The good news about the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, the encirclement of Paulus with his 6th Army, and Manstein's failures in trying to break through this encirclement gave Leningraders new hope on New Year's Eve 1943.

I celebrated the New Year together with my wife, having returned by 11 o'clock to the closet where we lived at the hospital, from the detour around the evacuation hospitals. There was a glass of diluted alcohol, two slices of bacon, a piece of bread 200 grams and hot tea with a piece of sugar! A whole feast!

Events were not long in coming. Almost all of the wounded were discharged: some were commissioned, some were sent to convalescent battalions, some were taken to the mainland. But we did not long wander around the empty hospital after the bustle of unloading it. A stream of fresh wounded went straight from their positions, dirty, often bandaged with an individual bag over their overcoat, bleeding. We were both a medical battalion, a field hospital, and a front-line hospital. Some began to sort, others - to operating tables for permanent operation. There was no time to eat, and there was no time for food.

It was not the first time that such streams came to us, but this one was too painful and tiring. All the time, the hardest combination of physical work with mental, moral human experiences with the clarity of the dry work of a surgeon was required.

On the third day, the men could no longer stand it. They were given 100 grams of diluted alcohol and sent to sleep for three hours, although the emergency room was littered with the wounded in need of urgent operations. Otherwise, they began to operate badly, half-asleep. Well done women! Not only did they endure the hardships of the blockade many times better than men, they died much less often from dystrophy, but they also worked without complaining of fatigue and clearly fulfilling their duties.


In our operating room, they went on three tables: behind each - a doctor and a nurse, on all three tables - another sister, replacing the operating room. Personnel operating and dressing nurses all assisted in operations. The habit of working for many nights in a row in Bekhterevka, the hospital. On October 25, she helped me out on the ambulance. I passed this test, I can proudly say, like women.

On the night of January 18, a wounded woman was brought to us. On this day, her husband was killed, and she was seriously wounded in the brain, in the left temporal lobe. A shard with fragments of bones penetrated into the depths, completely paralyzing her both right limbs and depriving her of the ability to speak, but while maintaining an understanding of someone else's speech. Female fighters came to us, but not often. I took her on my table, laid her on my right, paralyzed side, anesthetized the skin and very successfully removed the metal fragment and bone fragments that had penetrated into the brain. “My dear,” I said, finishing the operation and getting ready for the next one, “everything will be fine. I took out the shard, and speech will return to you, and the paralysis will completely disappear. You will make a full recovery!"

Suddenly, my wounded free hand from above began to beckon me to her. I knew that she would not soon begin to speak, and I thought that she would whisper something to me, although it seemed incredible. And suddenly, wounded with her healthy naked, but strong hand of a fighter, she grabbed my neck, pressed my face to her lips and kissed me hard. I couldn't take it. I did not sleep for the fourth day, almost did not eat, and only occasionally, holding a cigarette with a forceps, smoked. Everything went haywire in my head, and, like a man possessed, I ran out into the corridor in order to at least for one minute come to my senses. After all, there is a terrible injustice in the fact that women - the successors of the family and softening the morals of the beginning in humanity, are also killed. And at that moment, our loudspeaker spoke, announcing the breaking of the blockade and the connection of the Leningrad Front with the Volkhovsky.

It was a deep night, but what started here! I was standing bloodied after the operation, completely stunned by what I had experienced and heard, and sisters, nurses, fighters ran towards me ... Some with a hand on an "airplane", that is, on a splint that abducted a bent arm, some on crutches, some still bleeding through a recently applied bandage . And so began the endless kissing. Everyone kissed me, despite my frightening appearance from spilled blood. And I stood, missed 15 minutes of the precious time for operating on other wounded in need, enduring these countless hugs and kisses.

The story of the Great Patriotic War of a front-line soldier

1 year ago, on this day, a war began that divided the history of not only our country, but the whole world into before And after. The participant of the Great Patriotic War Mark Pavlovich Ivanikhin, chairman of the Council of Veterans of War, Labor, Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies of the Eastern Administrative District, tells.

– – this is the day when our life was broken in half. It was a good, bright Sunday, and suddenly war was declared, the first bombings. Everyone understood that they would have to endure a lot, 280 divisions went to our country. I have a military family, my father was a lieutenant colonel. A car immediately came for him, he took his “alarming” suitcase (this is a suitcase in which the most necessary things were always ready), and together we went to the school, I as a cadet, and my father as a teacher.

Everything changed immediately, it became clear to everyone that this war would be for a long time. Disturbing news plunged into another life, they said that the Germans were constantly moving forward. That day was clear and sunny, and in the evening mobilization had already begun.

These are my memories, boys of 18 years old. My father was 43 years old, he worked as a senior teacher at the first Moscow Artillery School named after Krasin, where I also studied. It was the first school that released officers who fought on the Katyusha into the war. I fought in the Katyusha throughout the war.

- Young inexperienced guys went under the bullets. Was it certain death?

“We still did a lot. Even at school, we all needed to pass the standard for the TRP badge (ready for work and defense). They trained almost like in the army: they had to run, crawl, swim, and they also taught how to bandage wounds, apply splints for fractures, and so on. Although we were a little ready to defend our Motherland.

I fought at the front from October 6, 1941 to April 1945. I took part in the battles for Stalingrad, and from the Kursk Bulge through Ukraine and Poland reached Berlin.

War is a terrible ordeal. It is a constant death that is near you and threatens you. Shells are exploding at your feet, enemy tanks are coming at you, flocks of German aircraft are aiming at you from above, artillery is firing. It seems that the earth turns into a small place where you have nowhere to go.

I was a commander, I had 60 people under my command. All these people need to be held accountable. And, despite the planes and tanks that are looking for your death, you need to control yourself, and control the soldiers, sergeants and officers. This is difficult to do.

I can't forget the Majdanek concentration camp. We liberated this death camp, we saw emaciated people: skin and bones. And I especially remember the kids with cut hands, they took blood all the time. We saw bags of human scalps. We saw the chambers of torture and experiments. What to hide, it caused hatred for the enemy.

I still remember that we went into a recaptured village, saw a church, and the Germans set up a stable in it. I had soldiers from all the cities of the Soviet Union, even from Siberia, many of their fathers died in the war. And these guys said: “We will reach Germany, we will kill the Fritz families, and we will burn their houses.” And so we entered the first German city, the soldiers broke into the house of a German pilot, saw a Frau and four small children. Do you think someone touched them? None of the soldiers did anything bad to them. The Russian person is outgoing.

All the German cities that we passed remained intact, with the exception of Berlin, where there was strong resistance.

I have four orders. Order of Alexander Nevsky, which he received for Berlin; Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, two Orders of the Patriotic War of the 2nd degree. Also a medal for military merit, a medal for the victory over Germany, for the defense of Moscow, for the defense of Stalingrad, for the liberation of Warsaw and for the capture of Berlin. These are the main medals, and there are about fifty of them in total. All of us who survived the war years want one thing - peace. And so that the people who won the victory were valuable.


Photo by Yulia Makoveychuk

The Great Patriotic War, which lasted almost four years, affected every home, every family, claimed millions of lives. This applied to everyone, because Hitler did not just go to conquer the country, he went to destroy everything and everyone, sparing no one and nothing. The first information about the attack began to arrive at 3:15 at night from Sevastopol, and at four o'clock in the morning the entire western land of the Soviet state was attacked. And at the same time, the cities of Kyiv, Minsk, Brest, Mogilev and others were subjected to air bombardment.

For a long time it was believed that the top leadership of the Union, led by Stalin, did not believe in an attack Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941. However, recent studies of archival documents have led a number of historians to believe that the order to bring the western districts to combat readiness was issued by the Directive of the General Staff of the Red Army on June 18, 1941.

This Directive appears in the protocols of the interrogation of the former commander of the Western Front, Pavlov, although the Directive itself has not yet been found. According to historians, if it had been carried out a few days before the outbreak of hostilities, then by the winter of 1941 the Germans would have reached Smolensk.

In the first months of the border battles, the Red Army lost about 3 million people killed and taken prisoner. Against the backdrop of a general retreat, the Brest Fortress stands out, heroically defending for a month, Przemysl - a city where the Soviet not only withstood the blow of the German troops, but also managed to launch a counterattack and push back two kilometers deep into Poland.

The troops of the southern front (former Odessa military) repelled enemy attacks and deepened into the territory of Romania for several kilometers. The Soviet navy and naval aviation, brought to full combat readiness a few hours before the attack, did not lose a single ship or aircraft on that tragic day. And naval aviation in the fall of 1941 Berlin.

One of the most significant events of the beginning of the war was the capture by German troops of the suburbs of Leningrad on September 8, 1941 and the capture of the city in dense. The blockade, which lasted 872 days and was lifted by the Soviet troops only in January 1943, caused enormous damage to the city and its inhabitants. Unique architectural monuments were destroyed, palaces and temples, considered the pride of the Russian people, were burned. 1.5 million people, including young children, died from starvation, cold and constant bombing.

Selfless and heroic resistance, which was put up by a simple one at the very beginning of the war, thwarted the Germans' attempt to conduct a lightning war on the territory of the USSR - a blitzkrieg and, in a short six months, put great country on knees.

The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 - war of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Nazi Germany and its allies (Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Finland, Croatia); decisive part of World War II.

In Russian historical literature, the Great Patriotic War is usually divided into three periods:

I period (initial) from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942 (the Red Army leaves a large territory, fought heavy defensive battles, the first major defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow, the failure of the blitzkrieg attempt);

II period (the period of a radical turning point in the war) from November 19, 1942 to the end of 1943 (the Nazis were defeated at Stalingrad, on the Kursk Bulge, in the North Caucasus, on the Dnieper);

III period (final) from January 1944 to May 8, 1945 (liberation of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Crimea, Baltic States, restoration of the state border of the USSR, liberation of the peoples of Europe and the defeat of the Nazi coalition);

On June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. In the early morning, after artillery and aviation preparation, German troops crossed the border of the USSR.

On June 22 at 12 noon, Molotov made an official address to the citizens of the USSR on the radio, announcing the German attack on the USSR and announcing the start of patriotic war.

Battle for Moscow(September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942) - the fighting of Soviet and German troops in the Moscow direction. It is divided into 2 periods: defensive (September 30 - December 4, 1941) and offensive (December 5, 1941 - April 20, 1942). At the first stage, the Soviet troops of the Western Front stopped the offensive of the troops of Army Group Center. During the defensive battles, the enemy was significantly bled. On December 5-6, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, and on January 7-10, 1942, they launched a general offensive on the entire front. In January-April 1942, the troops of the Western, Kalinin, Bryansk and North-Western fronts defeated the enemy and pushed him back 100-250 km. The Moscow battle was of great importance: the myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled, the plan for a lightning war was thwarted, and the international position of the USSR was strengthened.

Defense of Sevastopol and the battle for the Crimea (September 12, 1941 - July 9, 1942) - the fighting of Soviet and German troops in the Crimea during the Great Patriotic War. The Nazi troops invaded the Crimea on October 20, 1941, and within 10 days they approached the outskirts of Sevastopol. The stubborn defense of Sevastopol began, field fortifications were already created during the fighting. After stubborn battles, having suffered serious losses, the Germans stopped frontal attacks on November 21 and proceeded to the siege of the city. On the morning of June 7, the enemy launched a decisive attack along the entire defense perimeter. The fight continued until 9 July. The 250-day defense of Sevastopol, despite its tragic end, showed the whole world the unbending dedication of the Russian soldier and sailor.


Battle of Stalingrad 1942 - 1943 Defensive (July 17 - November 18, 1942) and offensive (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943) operations carried out by Soviet troops in order to defend Stalingrad and defeat a large enemy strategic group operating in the Stalingrad direction. In defensive battles in the Stalingrad region and in the city itself, the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the Don Front managed to stop the offensive of the 6th Army of Colonel General F. Paulus and the 4th Panzer Army. At the cost of great efforts, the command of the Soviet troops managed not only to stop the advance of German troops in Stalingrad, but also to gather significant forces for the start of the counteroffensive. On November 19-20, the troops of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad and Don Fronts went on the offensive and surrounded 22 divisions in the Stalingrad area. Having repelled an enemy attempt to free the encircled grouping in December, the Soviet troops liquidated it. January 31 - February 2, 1943 the remnants of the enemy army surrendered. The victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War.

Operation Spark- an offensive operation of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War, carried out from January 12 to 30, 1943 in order to break the blockade of Leningrad. Siege of Leningrad - a military blockade by German troops during the Great Patriotic War of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). It lasted from September 8, 1941 to January 27, 1944 (the blockade ring was broken on January 18, 1943) - 872 days. On the night of January 12, Soviet bombers launched a massive attack on enemy positions in the breakthrough zone, as well as on airfields and railway junctions in the rear. On January 13-17, the fighting took on a protracted and fierce character. The enemy offered stubborn resistance, relying on numerous defense units. On January 18, the blockade of Leningrad was broken.

Battle of Kursk 1943 Defensive and offensive operations carried out by Soviet troops in the Kursk region to disrupt a major German offensive. The German command, after the defeat of its troops at Stalingrad, intended to conduct a major offensive operation in the Kursk region. The Soviet command assigned the task of repelling the enemy offensive to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. The enemy offensive began on July 5. On July 12, there was a turning point in the course of the battle. On this day, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On July 12, a new stage began in the Battle of Kursk, during which the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops developed. The main result of the battle was the transition of German troops to strategic defense. In the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War, a radical change started by the Battle of Stalingrad ended.

Belarusian operation(June 23 - August 29, 1944). The code name is Operation Bagration. One of the largest strategic offensive operations undertaken by the Soviet high command to defeat the Nazi Army Group Center and liberate Belarus. According to the nature of the hostilities and the achievement of the tasks set, the operation is divided into two stages. During the operation, Lithuania and Latvia were partially liberated. On July 20, the Red Army entered the territory of Poland and on August 17 approached the borders of East Prussia. By August 29, she entered the suburbs of Warsaw.

Berlin operation 1945 The final strategic offensive operation carried out by the Soviet troops on April 16 - May 8, 1945. The objectives of the operation were to defeat the group of German troops defending in the Berlin direction, capture Berlin and reach the Elbe to join the Allied forces. According to the nature of the tasks performed and the results, the Berlin operation is divided into 3 stages. 1st stage - breakthrough of the Oder-Neissen line of defense of the enemy (April 16 - 19); 2nd stage - encirclement and dismemberment of enemy troops (April 19 - 25); 3rd stage - the destruction of the encircled groups and the capture of Berlin (April 26 - May 8). The main goals of the operation were achieved in 16-17 days.

At 22:43 CET on May 8, the war in Europe ended with unconditional surrender. armed forces Germany. The fighting lasted 1418 days. Nevertheless, having accepted the surrender, the Soviet Union did not sign peace with Germany, that is, formally remained at war with Germany. The war with Germany was formally ended on January 25, 1955 by the issuance by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the decree "On the termination of the state of war between Soviet Union and Germany"

The opposition of the Russian people to the aggression of Germany and other countries seeking to establish a "new world order". This war became a battle between two opposing civilizations, in which the Western world set as its goal the complete destruction of Russia - the USSR as a state and nation, the seizure of a significant part of its territories and the formation of puppet regimes subject to Germany in the rest of its parts. The Judeo-Masonic regimes of the USA and England, who saw Hitler as an instrument for the implementation of their plans for world domination and the destruction of Russia, pushed Germany to war against Russia.

On June 22, 1941, the German armed forces, consisting of 103 divisions, including 10 tank divisions, invaded Russia. Their total number numbered five and a half million people, of which more than 900 thousand were military personnel of the Western allies of Germany - Italians, Spaniards, French, Dutch, Finns, Romanians, Hungarians, etc. This treacherous Western international was given 4300 tanks and assault guns , 4980 combat aircraft, 47200 guns and mortars.

The Russian armed forces of five western border military districts and three fleets opposing the aggressor were twice as inferior to the enemy in manpower, and in the first echelon of our armies there were only 56 rifle and cavalry divisions, which were difficult to compete with the German tank corps. The aggressor also had a great advantage in terms of artillery, tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.

By nationality, more than 90% of the Soviet army opposing Germany were Russians (Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians), which is why it can be called the Russian army without exaggeration, which does not in the least detract from the feasible contribution of other peoples of Russia to confronting the common enemy.

Treacherously, without declaring war, having concentrated overwhelming superiority on the direction of strikes, the aggressor broke through the defenses of the Russian troops, seized the strategic initiative and air supremacy. The enemy occupied a significant part of the country, moved inland up to 300 - 600 km.

On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was created (from August 6 - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command). All power was concentrated in the State Defense Committee (GKO), created on June 30. Since August 8, I.V. Stalin became the Supreme Commander. He gathered around him the outstanding Russian commanders G. K. Zhukov, S. K. Timoshenko, B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. M. Vasilevsky, K. K. Rokossovsky, N. F. Vatutin, A. I. Eremenko, K. A. Meretskov, I. S. Konev, I. D. Chernyakhovsky and many others. In his public speeches, Stalin relies on the feeling of patriotism of the Russian people, urging them to follow the example of their heroic ancestors. The main military events of the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 were the Battle of Smolensk, the defense of Leningrad and the beginning of its blockade, the military catastrophe of the Soviet troops in Ukraine, the defense of Odessa, the beginning of the defense of Sevastopol, the loss of Donbass, and the defensive period of the Moscow battle. The Russian army retreated 850-1200 km, but the enemy was stopped in the main directions near Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov and went on the defensive.

The winter campaign of 1941-42 began with a counteroffensive by Russian troops in the western strategic direction. In the course of it, a counteroffensive was carried out near Moscow, the Luban, Rzhev-Vyazemskaya, Barvenkovsko-Lozovskaya and Kerch-Feodosiya landing operations. Russian troops removed the threat to Moscow and North Caucasus, facilitated the situation of Leningrad, completely or partially liberated the territory of 10 regions, as well as over 60 cities. The blitzkrieg strategy collapsed. About 50 enemy divisions were destroyed. A major role in defeating the enemy was played by the patriotism of the Russian people, which was widely manifested from the first days of the war. thousands folk heroes, similar to A. Matrosov and 3. Kosmodemyanskaya, hundreds of thousands of partisans behind enemy lines in the first months greatly shook the morale of the aggressor.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the main military events unfolded in the southwestern direction: the defeat of the Crimean Front, the military catastrophe of the Soviet troops in the Kharkov operation, the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad, Donbass, Stalingrad defensive operations, the battle in the North Caucasus. In the northwestern direction, the Russian army carried out the Demyansk and Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operations. The enemy advanced 500 - 650 km, went to the Volga, captured part of the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. The territory was occupied, where before the war 42% of the population lived, a third of the gross output was produced, and more than 45% of the sown area was located. The economy was transferred to the war footing. A large number of enterprises were relocated to the eastern regions of the country (only in the second half of 1941 - 2,593, including 1,523 large ones), and 2.3 million heads of cattle were exported. In the first half of 1942, 10,000 aircraft, 11,000 tanks, approx. 54 thousand guns. In the 2nd half of the year, their output increased by more than 1.5 times.

In the winter campaign of 1942-43, the main military events were the Stalingrad and North Caucasian offensive operations, the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad. The Russian army advanced 600-700 km to the west, liberating a territory of over 480 thousand square meters. km, defeated 100 divisions (40% of the enemy forces on the Soviet-German front). In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Battle of Kursk was the decisive event. The partisans played an important role (Operation Rail War). During the battle for the Dnieper, 38 thousand people were liberated. settlements, including 160 cities; with the capture of strategic bridgeheads on the Dnieper, conditions were created for an offensive in Belarus. In the battle for the Dnieper, the partisans carried out Operation Concert to destroy enemy communications. The Smolensk and Bryansk offensive operations were carried out in other directions. The Russian army fought up to 500 - 1300 km, defeated 218 divisions.

During the winter campaign of 1943-44, the Russian army carried out an offensive in the Ukraine (10 simultaneous and consecutive front-line operations united by a common plan). She completed the defeat of Army Group South, went beyond the border with Romania and transferred the fighting to its territory. Almost simultaneously, the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation unfolded; Leningrad was finally released. As a result of the Crimean operation, Crimea was liberated. Russian troops advanced west by 250 - 450 km, liberated approx. 300 thousand sq. km of territory, reached the state border with Czechoslovakia.

In June 1944, when the United States and Britain realized that Russia could win the war without their participation, they opened a 2nd front in France. This worsened the military-political position of Germany. During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, Russian troops carried out the Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz, East Carpathian, Iasi-Kishinev, Baltic, Debrecen, East Carpathian, Belgrade, partially Budapest and Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive operations. The liberation of Belarus, Little Russia and the Baltic States (except for some regions of Latvia), partially Czechoslovakia was completed, Romania and Hungary were forced to surrender and entered the war against Germany, the Soviet Arctic and the northern regions of Norway were liberated from the invaders.

The 1945 campaign in Europe included the East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, completion of the Budapest, East Pomeranian, Lower Silesian, Upper Silesian, West Carpathian, Vienna and Berlin operations, which ended with the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. After the Berlin operation, Russian troops, together with the 2nd Army of the Polish Army, the 1st and 4th Romanian armies and the 1st Czechoslovak corps, carried out the Prague operation.

The victory in the war greatly raised the spirit of the Russian people, contributed to the growth of its national identity and self-confidence. As a result of the victory, Russia regained most of what was taken from her as a result of the revolution (except for Finland and Poland). The historical Russian lands in Galicia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, etc. returned to its composition. Most of the Russian people (including Little Russians and Belarusians) again became a single entity in one state, which created the prerequisites for their unification in a single Church. The fulfillment of this historic task was the main positive outcome of the war. The victory of Russian arms created favorable conditions for Slavic unity. At some stage Slavic countries united with Russia in something like a fraternal federation. The peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia realized for a certain period how important Slavic world stand together in the fight against the encroachments of the West on the Slavic lands.

At the initiative of Russia, Poland received Silesia and a significant part of East Prussia, from which the city of Koenigsberg with its surrounding territory passed into the possession of the Russian state, and Czechoslovakia regained the Sudetenland previously occupied by Germany.

The great mission to save humanity from the “new world order” was given to Russia at a huge price: the Russian people and the fraternal peoples of our Fatherland paid for this with the lives of 47 million people (including direct and indirect losses), of which approximately 37 million people were actually Russians (including Little Russians and Belarusians).

Most of all, it was not the military who directly participated in the hostilities that died, but civilians, the civilian population of our country. The irretrievable losses of the Russian army (killed, dead from wounds, missing, killed in captivity) amount to 8 million 668 thousand 400 people. The remaining 35 million are the lives of the civilian population. During the war years, about 25 million people were evacuated to the East. Approximately 80 million people, or about 40% of the population of our country, turned out to be in the territory occupied by Germany. All these people became "objects" of the implementation of the misanthropic program "Ost", were subjected to brutal repressions, died from the famine organized by the Germans. About 6 million people were driven into German slavery, many of them died from unbearable living conditions.

As a result of the war, the genetic fund of the most active and viable part of the population was significantly undermined, because in it, first of all, the strongest and most energetic members of society, capable of producing the most valuable offspring, perished. In addition, due to the fall in the birth rate, the country missed tens of millions of future citizens.

The enormous price of victory fell most heavily on the shoulders of the Russian people (including the Little Russians and Belarusians), because the main hostilities were carried out on their ethnic territories and it was to them that the enemy was especially cruel and merciless.

In addition to huge human losses, our country suffered colossal material damage. Not a single country in its entire history and in the Second World War had such losses and barbaric destruction from aggressors that fell on Great Russia. The total material losses of Russia in world prices amounted to more than a trillion dollars (US national income over several years).


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